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Legal realism – which provided the foundation to cultivate a fruitful law and economics
movement – is fundamentally different from, if not the exact opposite of legal positivism.
Legal positivist thinking entails a lot of different features, but it does certainly not involve
consequentialist reasoning. Yet, even from a legal positivist’s perspective one of the main
functions of the law is to establish, maintain, and structure social order by regulating the
behavior of society’s members (cf.: Raz, 2009, Ch. 9). This function of the law permeates
much of scholarship in legal philosophy and legal theory. Among contemporary legal
scholars, Howarth (2013, p. 3) brings this idea to an extreme:
“The characterisation of lawyers that best fits what lawyers actually do is not hero,
or statesman, or trickster, or hired gun – all of which in some way relate back to
litigation – but engineer. Clients come to lawyers, as they come to engineers, with
problems that they cannot solve themselves. The service both engineers and lawyers
provide is the solving of those problems. But more than that, although both lawyers
and engineers might solve clients’ problems merely by offering advice and guidance,
the central instrument for solving problems that both use is a device of some kind
– usually a physical device in the case of engineers and a document in the case of
lawyers, although, as we shall see, it is less the physical embodiment of a device that
matters as how it alters the system within which it operates.”
With the social function of the law in mind we commonly ask two questions, each with
a positive and a normative part. First, we can ask for a functional mechanism that fulfills
a given legislative intent. If society is in state A and we want to achieve state B, what
policy will cause that transition (positive part) and if multiple policies solve this problem
which solution is preferable (normative part)? Second, given a set of mechanisms that
seemingly solve the same legal problem – think about, e.g., insights in comparative legal
scholarship – we can ask for their potential effects. If society is in state A and we have a
set of different alternative policies to our disposal what will the outcome of each policy
be (positive part) and which of these outcomes is preferable (normative part).
Somewhat naturally, the methodology we employ to accomodate statutory rules,
principles, and case law within the legal system (internal perspective of legal scholarship)
does not lend itself to answer questions about the social functionality of the legal construct
under analysis. Because our hermeneutic toolset does not offer an axiomatic – much less
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a behavioral – theory about how rule-subjected individuals act, understanding the law’s
social function calls for other methodological approaches. We need to embrace methods
of neighboring disciplines like sociology, anthropology, economics, and psychology if we
do not want to lose sight of the social function of the law. Therefore, the present research
borrows from economics and psychology (see subsequent Chapter III) to analyse the
impact of the law on individual behavior. This glance beyond the hermeneutic horizon
only strengthens legal scholarship as a discipline. Within his metaphor of the lawyer-
engineer Howarth (2013) emphasizes this complementary character with a rethorical
question:
“[C]an lawyers become more innovative and effective as designers of new devices by
using the methods of engineers?” (Howarth, 2013, p. 4)
To fix ideas, this introductory chapter will shortly introduce the research question
(Section A) and provide an overview of the parts comprising this project (Section B).
Finally, the introduction will conclude with underlining the original contribution of the
present research project (Section C).
A. What is the question?
In a nutshell, the research question is this: What are the effects of legal framing on
individual contractual performance or individual compliance with statutory rules? I
deduce this research question in Chapter II.
Chapter II also defines the notion of legal framing. In brief, I conceptualize framing as
the critical feature in individual decision-making that people consistently exhibit reference-
dependent preferences. In other words, people do not evaluate outcomes in a purely
absolute, objective manner. Rather, people form perceptions and evaluations relative
to one or multiple reference points. This feature implies that changes in the reference
point may cause different perceptions of the decision problem, although objectively the
decision problem remains the same. This conceptualization of framing is specific to
behavioral economics and one of the defining parts of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s
Prospect Theory – the relativity theory in economics – that lead to a Nobel Prize award.
Prospect Theory, in turn, has lead to a broader consideration of reference-dependent
decision-making that spurred economic research on ideas about, for instance, equality,
fairness, and altruism – individual motives that are very much at the heart of the study
of the law.
To illustrate consider two examples. The first example concerns a result from an field
study in the late 1990s (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler, 1997). In New
York, cab drivers pay a fixed fee for renting the car for 12 hours. How long they work,
however, is left to their discretion and they can keep all the revenues they earn during
this shift. The rational economic agent in neoclassical economics (homo oeconomicus) will
work as long as he can on profitable days. Because exerting work effort is costly, the same
economic agent will finish early on non-profitable days and safe the cost of work effort.
Surprisingly, Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler (1997) observe the opposite
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pattern. Cabbies work much longer on non-profitable days than on profitable days. The
authors explain this phenomenon with cabbies setting an individual earnings target for
each working day. A very salient earnings target is the rent they have to pay for the car.
Consequently, relative to the individual target drivers treat shortcomings as a loss and
thus continue working on non-productive days. By contrast they discontinue working,
when the target is achieved early on profitable days. This behavioral pattern, however, is
disadvantageous for the absolute monthly earnings for taxi drivers. On these grounds,
one may argue that contracts governing the renting of the car should be regulated.
As a second example, imagine that – equally famous as infamous – wine connoisseur
Mark Van Hoecke, in his golden age after passionately shaping the legal education at
Ghent University Law School, plans to open a wine bar. One of the challenges he faces
is designing the wine menu. Because Mark wants his patrons to only drink amazing
wines, the menu will solely be comprised of exquisite choices, of course. Given that this
condition is satisfied, Mark also has an interest that his patrons order the more expensive
wines. How would we arrange the wines in the menu:
a) according to country;
b) according to grape variety;
c) according to Mark’s taste;
d) most expensive first;
e) or least expensive first?
Because we know that most patrons are likely to be influenced by reference points, we
want to order the wine menu from most to least expensive. When people read from the top
of the page down, they encounter the most expensive wines first. These wines are likely
to set a reference point against which people compare all other wines. Each subsequent
wine would appear to be a of much better value as prices drop for a high-quality wine.
Patrons will soon stop choosing and order what they perceive as their favourite choice.
Conversely, if we design the wine menu by ordering from the least expensive wines to
the most expensive, the cheapest wines will set the reference point. Considering the
subsequent, more expensive wine would be perceived as relative loss as prices rise for
a low-quality wine. The entire menu would in fact seem to be more expensive. As a
consequence, people will stop browsing very close to the top and, on average, buy cheaper
wine.1
The predominant concept of framing in behavioral economics is inextricably linked
to reference-dependent decision making. Possible framing effects result from a change
of reference points. Consequently, I speak of “legal framing” whenever reference points
1 This example is inspired by a wine tasting with Mark Van Hoecke and by Jodi Kantor, “Entrees Reach




may be changed by alternative legal rules that are otherwise similar. After putting the
research question into perspective, let me reiterate: What are the effects of legal framing
on individual contractual performance or individual compliance with statutory rules? I
deduces the research question in detail and provide more context in Chapter II.
B. What lies ahead?
After Chapter II elaborates on the research question, Chapter III (based on Hoeppner and
Depoorter (2014) and Hoeppner (2014)) contains methodological notes. The methodology
employed to find answers to the research question follows Karl Popper (1962) in spirit:
I derive hypotheses about the behavior of rule-subjected individuals from theory and
empirically test these hypotheses. Therefore, the present research project comprises a mix
of methodological tools that go beyond classic hermeutic methods of legal scholarship.
First, in order to derive hypotheses about the behavior of rule-subjected individuals, I
use an economic approach. Second, to do so I employ mathematical modeling instead of a
purely verbal elaboration because (1) mathematical modeling facilitates maximal precision
of hypotheses and because (2) mathematical modeling is best suited to disclose otherwise
hidden assumptions that may be crucial to the generation of said hypotheses.2 Third,
the specific economic approach employed here constitutes a methodological advance as
compared to traditional economic theory of law with which doctrinal legal scholars are
familiar: I do not solely rely on homo oeconomicus to analyze the effects of a given rule,
but rather employ an updated economic paradigm. Chapter III will acquaint the reader
with this modern and more realistic economic paradigm (Hoeppner and Depoorter, 2014).
Fourth, I rely on experimentation to put the theoretic hypotheses to a rigorous test.
Experimentation as a method of empirical testing entered economic theory of law fairly
recently, but has been used in the law and psychology and criminology branches of legal
scholarship for quite some time already. Note that in the context of “the law proper”, the
value of experimentation as a tool of inquiry in legal scholarship often remains doubted.
Therefore, Chapter III will also introduce the basics of experimentation and argue that
experimentation – as a complement to classic methods in legal scholarship – is a very
useful tool to study legal problems (Hoeppner, 2014).3 Fifth, employing this rather new
tool necessitates an advanced knowledge of statistical methods to analyze results from
the experiments.
Chapter IV (Hoeppner, 2016b) represents the cornerstone of the substantive part of
the present text. I contend that both contract and statutory law employ four simple
mechanisms to encourage contractual performance or compliance with other legal rules.
2 While the mathematical modeling can be daring for somebody who has not had much exposure to
mathematics, I have taken great care to also emphasize the intuition of what has been modeled. Readers
are kindly invited to rely on the intuition accompanying the model passages and to conveniently skip
the mathematical expressions.
3 Chapter III will not touch on the basics of mathematical modeling or statistical analysis. These
rather technical topics are already covered by a plethora of easily accessible literature. Moreover, even
if a short introduction would be possible, doing so would not improve the persuasive power of the
arguments presented in this research project.
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1. A person can obtain a benefit if she meets a certain performance threshold or fulfills
other stipulated requirements (“bonus” rule). This benefit is not limited to money
but can also comprise a legal right or a legal claim. Examples for this archetype of
performance-contingent are most prominent in labor contracts and widely used to
incentivize executives, car salesmen, production line workers, head-hunters, and
also researchers and teachers. This structure can also be seen in simple permits
issued by an administrative body.
2. A person receives a benefit ex ante, but this benefit is retracted if she fails to
meet the performance threshold (“upfront payment” rule). This mechanism can,
for instance, be found in construction contracts and some professor salaries.4
Permits that are granted under condition and some research grants feature a similar
structure.
3. Costs may be imposed on a person if she does not reach the performance threshold
(“fine” rule). These costs may be of monetary nature but can also encompass
the loss of a right or legal position. Examples are abundant and range from
contractual penalties, to speeding tickets, fault-based liability mechanisms, and
monetary penalties in criminal law.
4. Costs will be imposed on a person ex ante, but these costs are refunded if she meets
the performance threshold (“deposit” rule). Although less prevalent at first sight,
typical examples are rental deposits and other forms of secured transactions.
These four often observed mechanisms can, in principle, be economically equivalent as
long as the benefit or the cost involved have an equal absolute value: in each case, ceteris
paribus, if the person chooses to perform or to be compliant, she is better off by the same
amount. As legal scholars we focus on hermeneutic arguments when we have the choice
of which legal rule to implement. We strive to create a just and coherent system while
simultaneously seeking to balance the interests of all parties involved. Hardly ever do we
take into account behavioral responses of the addressees of these rules – maybe because
the rules, indeed, appear to us as irrelevant for addressees’ behavior. Why should it
matter for the other party whether we employ, e.g., a contractual penalty or a deposit
clause?
Contrary to this intuition, I propose that there are noticable differences in perfor-
mance/compliance under the four rules. While the four rules provide the same absolute
incentive, each is characterized by a unique structure. And this structure matters when
a person exhibits reference-dependent preferences, i.e., when she evaluates her well-being
relative to some salient reference point (cf.: Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Munro and
Sugden, 2003; Stommel, 2013). In Chapter IV, I build upon and also extend previous lit-
erature on the subject. Theoretically, two main factors could cause different performance
levels under each of the four rules: (1) valence framing (see e.g.: Dufwenberg, Gächter,
4 As anecdotal evidence, Prof. Jochen Bigus conveyed to me that professors at the economics department
of Free University Berlin are paid according to this mechanism.
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and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011) and (2) reciprocity motives induced by moral property rights
(see e.g.: Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007). Both factors capture different forms of
reference-dependent preferences. Furthermore, if one theoretically predicts behavior
under the four rules, as I do in Chapter IV, specific prediction patterns occur when (1)
only valence framing, (2) only moral property rights, or (3) both simultaneously influence
behavior. These unique prediction patterns facilitate identification of the potential
drivers in an experiment. Previously, researchers have argued that, due to loss aversion,
the valence frame of the rules leads to different behavioral responses (Armantier and
Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2012;
Hossain and List, 2012). These studies, however, only looked at two of the four rules and,
therefore, systematically overlook the potential impact of reciprocity motives induced by
moral property rights.
I conducted a field experiment to extend the investigation to all four performance-
contingent rules and to expose the interaction of the potential behavioral dynamics.
In a nutshell: based on the experimental evidence the “deposit” rule causes the worst
performance, whereas the “upfront payment” rule is characterised by the highest com-
pliance levels. Simultaneously, individual performance under the “bonus” and “fine”
rules lies between the former two and performance under these rules is statistically
indistinguishable from one another. This experimental evidence suggests that the rules’
valence frame does not matter. By contrast, the behavioral pattern observed in the field
experiment indicates that moral property rights inducing reciprocity motives – or in
other words: fairness concerns – cause the different performance levels. Altogether, the
results suggest that a designer of a rule system can influence performance or compliance
levels of the person under the rule system, although the alternative rules yield the same
absolute incentive.
Chapter V (Hoeppner, 2016a) builds upon the previous part. In a controlled laboratory
experiment, I aim to replicate Hoeppner (2016b)’s findings from the field and seek to track
psychological mechanisms of the observed behavior. This is important for two reasons. For
one, the field experiment is noisy and the strictly controlled decision environment in the
laboratory helps to fully understand cause-effect relationships that may be unobservable
in the field. In the field, controlling both for the psychological processes behind the
observed behavior and for other unobserved variables was impossible. Simultaneously, the
lab serves as robustness check of previous results. The keyword here is “tri-angulation”.
For another, it is crucial to understand the underlying psychological processes to prevent
unintended consequences that endanger successful rule design. As main finding, the
evidence from the laboratory experiment shows that participants under “upfront payment”
rule on average perform best, whereas participants under the “deposit” rule on average
perform worst. Again, minor performance differences between participants under the
“bonus” and “fine” are not statistically meaningful. Thus, I can replicate Hoeppner
(2016b)’s findings from the field. This is an argument for the external validity of the
results. That is, we can have more confidence that the results can be generalized to a
population beyond the particular studies. Unfortunately, I find only mixed evidence that
loss aversion drives observed differences. Moreover, neither participants cognitive abilities
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nor reciprocity tendencies can be associated with the observed performance pattern in
this experiment. The psychological mechanisms behind the robust performance pattern
remain elusive.
As an interesting secondary result, however, I pick up evidence of motivation crowding-
out. Particpants under some performance-contingent systems actually performed worse
than participants under a fixed-payment systemt, i.e., without being incentivised. Pre-
viously, researchers have argued that low performance-contingent incentives crowd-out
intrinsic motivation (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). Interestingly,
I find this effect in the laboratory only in comparison between the lump-sum payment
treatment and the “deposit” rule. The finding raises additional concerns against employ-
ing deposit mechanisms to incentivise performance. To draw final conclusions, however,
more research is required. The experiment was not designed to uncover this effect and,
therefore, the finding has to be treated with care.
Chapter VI (Hoeppner, 2016c) extends the investigation of legal framing beyond
questions of (implicit) contract design. Broadening the scope illustrates that reference-
dependent decision-making crucially informs legal thinking regarding other legal problems.
To this end, I abstract from legal subject areas and focus on legal uncertainty as an
overarching problem in legal scholarship. Legal uncertainty is a relevant problem in
legal scholarship at least since Bentham (1823). Most of the time, as legal scholars we
seek to minimize legal uncertainty based on fairness and justice concerns. Moreover,
in his theory on legalism – a mode of legal thought that arguably found its zenith in
the German Pandectist model – Weber (1978) stressed that legal uncertainty eradicates
activities that are otherwise beneficial to society. Similar to doctrinal legal scholarship,
legal uncertainty is a fundamental problem for the economic theory of law. The famous
Coase Theorem requires “that the rights of the various parties should be well-defined
and the results of legal action easy to forecast” (Coase, 1960, p.19).
Because legal uncertainty is such an overarching problem, there is a need to understand
how people actually behave if the rules that govern their behavior are unclear. The
topic is also a fitting example to illustrate the value of experimentation as a method
of legal inquiry: in real life, we cannot expose members of society to different degrees
of legal uncertainty due to constitutional and ethical constraints. Therefore, we can
never learn about the counterfactual – the regulatory modus that was not adopted –
without experimentation. In Chapter VI, I focus on vague legal standards as a variety
of legal uncertainty. Do increases of the vagueness of a legal standard erode socially
beneficial activities? Interestingly, a standard economic model predicts that this is not
necessarily the case (Craswell and Calfee, 1986). Although low levels of standard vagueness
erode activity levels, a further increase actually increases activity levels. This result
does not bode well for doctrinal arguments against legal uncertainty. However, under
the assumption that persons in an environment of legal uncertainty exhibit reference-
dependent preferences, model predictions capture the intuition from doctrinal legal
scholarship: increases in legal uncertainty unambiguously eradicate socially beneficial
activities. If people exhibit reference-dependent preferences, as legal scholars we can
theoretically rely on our intuition.
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To clarify this theoretical conflict, I conducted a controlled laboratory experiment
to test whether increases in standard vagueness monotonously decrease the extent of
beneficial activities. In short, the experimental evidence is not in line with Weber (1978)’s
concerns about legal uncertainty. Just as the standard economic model predicts, intial
levels of standard vagueness decrease activity levels. Surprisingly however, on average
participants responded to further increasing standard vaguenes by augmenting activity
levels. While this counterintuitive finding holds on average, the analysis reveals a hidden
cost of standard vagueness that is rarely discussed in doctrinal legal scholarship and the
economic theory of law: with increasing standard vaguess individual behavior becomes
more erratic. In other words, the law loses its coordination function. As legal scholars,
we need to be worried about this effect, which supports our urge to reject legal problem
solutions that may increase legal uncertainty.
C. What is the contribution?
For more than 35 years, research on reference-dependent decision-making was tremen-
dously successful at explaining individual behavior in uncertain environments. For
instance, reference-dependency influences saving and investment behavior (e.g.: Genesove
and Mayer, 2001; Dimmock and Kouwenberg, 2010), patients’ treatment choices (e.g.:
van Osch, van den Hout, and Stiggelbout, 2006; Schwarz, Goldberg, and Hazen, 2008),
decisions to insure (e.g.: Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, and Kunreuther, 1993; Kőszegi and
Rabin, 2007), and labor supply (e.g.: Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler, 1997;
Fehr and Goette, 2007). Reference-dependent decision-making also sustains cooperative
behavior through second- and third-party enforcement ermerging from pro-social mo-
tives like reference-dependent fairness (e.g.: Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2000; Cox,
Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008; Ottone, Ponzano, and Zarri, 2008). These theoretical and
empirical results are relevant for legal scholars because they provide a strong descriptive
foundation for regulatory proposals in the domains of, for instance, consumer finance,
health regulation, insurance law, and labor contracts.
While research on reference-dependent decision-making mainly serves as motivation
to take legal action, another stream of the literature investigates framing effects that
directly result from the law or the legal context. Reference-dependent choice matters, for
instance, in bargaining situations (Gächter and Riedl, 2005), for entitlements created by
contract default rules (Korobkin, 1998), and for parties propensity to litigate or to settle
(Korobkin and Guthrie, 1994; Rachlinksi, 1994).
The present research project contributes to the latter research stream: I consider legal
mechanisms not only as solution for other framing related problems in the market but,
rather, as cause for possibly disadvantageous reference-dependent choice (legal framing).
The main contribution is threefold. First, I comprehensively investigate the impact of
legal framing on contractual performance (Ch. IV, i.e.: Hoeppner, 2016b). Previous
contributions in the contract design literature only looked at a subset of alternative
mechanisms to incentivize contractual performance. Second, I aim to explore in depth
the psychological processes that cause the legal framing effects that I observed in the
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contract context (Ch. V, i.e.: Hoeppner, 2016a). Third, I extend the analysis – from
contractual performance to legal compliance – by investigating whether varying degrees
of legal uncertainty in a liability setting trigger different expectation-based reference
points (Ch. VI, i.e.: Hoeppner, 2016c). Moreover, the research project entails smaller
methodological and formal contributions. The project helps to update the understanding
of modern economic theory of law by introducing a more realistic economic paradigm
(Ch. III, i.e.: Hoeppner and Depoorter, 2014). The single studies also exemplify that
experimental methodology can fruitfully be used to answer questions pertaining to legal
scholarship (Ch. III, i.e.: Hoeppner, 2014). Finally, where I use economic models to
derive hypotheses, I extend previously existing formal models and thus advance economic
theory.
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Chapter II
Research Question & Definitions
In its positive form the second question that concerns the social function of the law
asks: what consequences can be expected from different mechanisms available to solve
a legal problem (compare Chapter I)? I investigate a refined version of this question.
On the surface, a set of policies can seemingly differ only in formulation but not in
functionality. For instance, if our social goal was to discourage industrial pollution we
could achieve this goal in two simple ways. We could either discourage potential polluters
to pollute by slapping them with a fine if they are caught polluting. Alternatively, we
could encourage potential polluters to conduct clean business by rewarding them if they
are found not polluting. Given that reward and fine are of an equal absolute amount,
both conventional wisdom as well as traditional economics tell us that which of the two
policies is implemented does not matter for the degree of pollution. A related example
concerns legal standards that we employ in the law. As rule designer, we often can choose
between a minimum standard for desired behavior or a maximum standard for undesired
behavior. For instance, a person has to observe at least reasonable care in order to not
be negligent (minimum standard). On the flipside, we could codify that she will be held
negligent as long as she conducts herself in an unreasonable manner (maximum standard).
Intuitively, the formulation of the benchmark behavior as either maximum or minimum
standard will not matter for her decision on how much care to observe. The refinement,
then, is as follows: Given a set of seemingly equivalent alternative policies to solve a legal
problem, does policy choice still matter for furthering the social function of the law?
Because this refinement is still far to broad for the context of a PhD project, consider
the following overarching research question to center the following research:
Research question: What are the effects of legal framing on individual contractual
performance or individual compliance with statutory rules?
Thus I will focus on legal compliance in general and on contractual performance specifcally
to analyse potential effects of legal framing. To further define the segments of the analysis
and not leave room for ambiguity, one key element of this question – namely, what I
mean by the term “legal framing” – demands clarification.
1
Although “framing” is a technical term in different disciplines, the term is surprisingly
ambiguous. In areas such as political, media, and communication science the term
pertains to how individuals, groups, and societies, perceive, communicate about, and even
construct reality. In these areas, framing speaks to contextualization and by changing the
“frame”, one may selectively influence the mental representations of an underlying problem
and of the meaning that an individual attributes to words or actions (cf.: Tewksbury and
Scheufele, 2008; Scheufele and Iyengar, forthcoming). The finding that decision makers
respond differently to different but objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem
has also intrigued psychologists. They distinguish framing effects according to their
underlying mental processes into goal framing, attribute framing, and valence framing
(cf.: Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 1998; Maule and Villejoubert, 2007). Researchers
argue that framing effects occur because of mental shortcuts, i.e., heuristics. Human
beings are seen as “cognitive misers”, i.e., they default to processing mechanisms of lower
computational expense (cf.: Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Toplak, West, and Stanovich, 2014).
Using less computational capacity for one task means that there is more left over for
another task. As frames provide context they help saving reasoning resources necessary
to process information. This heuristic, however, may well backfire and cause reasoning
fallacies.
When behavioral economists use the term “framing”, by contrast, most often they
refer to valence framing (e.g.: Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). Valence
framing concerns accentuating an objectively equivalent decision problem either in the
positive or the negative. This distinction between “gains” and “losses” was central to the
development of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s Prospect Theory that has become the
predominent positive model of decision-making to date. To illustrate, think about the –
perhaps most famous – scenario that Tversky and Kahneman (1981) presented to more
than 300 participants:
Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programmes to combat the disease
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences
of the programmes are as follows.
(A1) If Programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
(B1) If Programme B is adopted, there is one-third probability that 600 people will
be saved and two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
The two programmes were formulated such that outcomes were accentuated in the
positive, i.e., the outcomes were described as gains. But these positive formulations
were only given to half of the participants in the study. For the other participants, the
programmes were accentuated in the negative, i.e., the outcomes were formulated as
losses:
(A2) If Programme A is adopted, 400 people will die.
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(B2) If Programme B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will
die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.
Which of the two programs would you favor?
In direct comparison programmes A1 and A2 and programmes B1 and B2 obviously
yield the same outcomes. They only differ in how they are framed. Yet, while 72% of
participants chose programme A1 and 28% of participants chose programme A2 under
the gain frame, under the loss frame only 22% chose B1 and 78% chose B2. The pattern
of responses shows a preference reversal. The only trigger for this astounding observation
is the mere presentations of the problem.
This observation constitutes a framing effect and was puzzling to economist at the end
of the 1970s. Consequently, this finding received massive attention because it violated
one of the fundamental axioms of economic decision theory: the invariance axiom. The
invariance axiom prescribes that choice should remain invariant across logically equivalent
versions of the decision options (cf.: Arrow, 1982). Moreover, this violation suggests that
observable choice behavior does not only reflect the fundamental beliefs and values of
the decision-maker. This assumption, however, is the foundation of revealed preference
theory (cf.: Varian, 2006), one of the most influential ideas in economics in the 20th
century.
The understanding of framing in behavioral economics is crucially different from the
heterogenous framing concepts in other disciplines. To clarify the distinction, consider
what Daniel Kahneman wrote – 21 years in hindsight – about the development of Prospect
Theory and framing:
“A significant and perhaps unfortunate early decision concerned the naming of the
new concept. For reasons of conceptual and terminological economy we chose to apply
the label ‘frame’ to descriptions of decision problems at two levels: the formulation
to which decision makers are exposed is called a frame and so is the interpretation
that they construct for themselves. Thus, framing is a common label for two very
different things: an experimental manipulation and a constituent activity of decision
making. Our terminological parsimony was helpful in securing the acceptance of the
concept of framing, but it also had its costs. The use of a single term blurred the
important distinction between what decision makers do and what is done to them:
the activities of editing and mental accounting on the one hand and the susceptibility
to framing effects on the other” (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000, p. xiv; emphasis by
me).
While the other disciplines are concerned with the susceptibility to framing effects and,
therefore, conceptualize framing effects as a heuristic, framing effects in behavioral
economics can be seen as the result of a specific feature in decision-making that defines
how a decision problem is internally represented. This key feature is reference-dependency.
People evaluate outcomes in relation to a reference point. The subjective value of any
objective outcome greatly depends on said reference point. Consequently, the same
decision situation can be framed from different reference points, triggering different
mental representations that, in turn, can lead to inconsistencies in perception and
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choice behaviour. To illustrate, imagine you get home after a rainy day in January in
Belgium and take a shower. The temperature of the water is 35◦C and feels nicely warm.
Now imagine you just leave a hot steam sauna. Taking the same shower with a water
temperature of 35◦C will feel quite cold. As a second example, suppose you receive a
year-end bonus of 7.000 Euro on your salary. If you did not expect this bonus, or, if
you expected less, the 7.000 Euro will be a nice surprise. However, think about how you
would feel if you really expected to get a bonus of 11.000 Euro. Chances are, the actual
bonus will satisfy you much less. Only receiving 7.000 Euro may even sting a bit. In both
examples, the reference point relative to which you evaluate the outcomes – 35◦C and
7.000 Euro, respectively – changed and lead to a different evaluation of the objectively
equal outcomes.
The term “framing” concerns conceptually different ideas. As opposed to their col-
leagues in political science, psychology, and communication science, behavioral economists
generally have a narrower understanding of framing. When people make reference-
dependent decisions, framing effects are triggered by changes in reference points. This
specification allows me to further specify what I mean when I refer to “legal framing” in
the research question:
Definition “legal framing”: Legal framing concerns the manipulation of reference
points by alternative legal rules.
The idea of reference-dependent choice foreshadows that specifying the reference point is
crucial, if one wants to predict behavioral responses to changes of reference points. People
have been found to be potentially susceptible to different reference points, including:
– the status quo (e.g.: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992);
– the well-being of others (e.g.: Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolten and Ockenfels, 2000);
– expectations (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007);
– goals and aspirations (e.g.: Diecidue and Van De Ven, 2008; Hoffman, Henry, and
Kalogeras, 2013);
– or moral property rights (e.g.: Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Cox, Friedman, and
Gjerstad, 2007).
In what follows, I will consider the status quo, expectations, and moral property rights
as potential reference points. I will address the overarching research question by evaluating
and comparing different theories. The specifics about the competing theories and how
they relate to “legal framing” can be found in each substantive chapter of this research
project. Within each chapter, the specific research question is translated into testable
hypotheses. These hypotheses are quantitatively tested in seperate experiments, which
produce replicable data and, thus, provide stepping stones to answer the overarching
research question. Before we turn to each intermediate step, however, some methodological
remarks are in order.
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Not every lawyer, legal policy-maker, judge, or legal scholar conceives legal rules as a
governance instrument that can be employed to coordinate and steer individual behavior
in society. For those who do adopt such an ex ante perspective, however, it is of utmost
importance to hypothesize about and investigate how law and individual human behavior
are interrelated. To pierce the veil of ambivalent plausibility arguments and conflicting
theories, it is even more important to understand what kind of behavior may be caused
by alternative legal interventions.
Yet, legal scholars are often surprised and become quite reserved when they learn that
a colleague is not extensively engaged in doctrinal legal scholarship, but rather adopts a
social science approach. Caution usually rises to suspicion when the straying colleague
conducts experiments, which seem rather alien to legal scholarship. But experiments
can, inter alia, help to understand whether policy proposals – developed through, e.g.,
doctrinal legal scholarship – will function as intended.
Actually, experiments are not a novel method in legal scholarship. They have long
been conducted in the law and psychology as well as in the criminology branches of
legal research (cf.: Engel, 2013a,b). Today, “[t]he only true novelty is the advent of
experimental law and economics” (Engel, 2013b, p. 7).
An experimental approach to law and economics will be the core of the methodolgy
employed to study the research question on which I elaborated in the previous Chapter II.
∗ The methodological thoughts on the development of the paradigmatic foundations of the economic
theory of law and the often very different perception of the discipline by doctrinal legal scholars are
meanwhile published in an extended form in Hoeppner, Sven and Ben Depoorter (2014), “Fast Forward:
Economic and Legal Realism”, in: W. Kaal, M. Schmidt, A. Schwartze (Eds.), Liber Amicorum in
Honor of Christian Kircher: Law in Economic Context, Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen, 879-900. The
introductory parts on experimental law and economics are published with minor changes in: Hoeppner,
Sven (2014), “Experimental Law and Economics”, in: J. G. Backhaus (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics, Springer: New York (NY), DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_172-1. I am grateful for the
critical but inspiring comments by Ben Depoorter, Christian Kirchner, and Mark van Hoecke and
the encouragement by Christoph Engel. Moreover, I want to give special thanks to the organizers
and participants of the 7th IMPRS Uncertainty Summer School held at the Max Planck Insitute
for Economis in Jena from July 14 to August 9, 2014, for providing a stimulating and challenging
environment that facilitated creative reflection and productive exchange of ideas among young and
experienced scholars alike.
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As the reader may be unfamiliar with experimental law and economics, this methodological
part is written with two goals in mind. First, I want to introduce the paradigmatic
assumptions of law and economics. As the experimenter derives testable hypotheses with
the aim to falsify them, every experimental research needs to be thoroughly grounded in
the underlying theory. A scientific paradigm is, however, subject to change. Therefore,
legal scholars, who are not regularly exposed to up-to-date research in law and economics,
may lose sight on how the paradigmatic foundations got extended and enriched in the
past two decades. This unawareness may lead to misconceptions about the predictive
power and possible applications of modern law and economics research. I want to tackle
such looming misconceptions here.
Second, this part serves as introduction to the experimental approach used to advance
the economic theory of law. It is not written as a review of studies using experimental law
and economics. Excellent reviews with a cornucopia of noteworthy examples already exist
(e.g.: Croson, 2002; Arlen and Talley, 2008; Lawless, Robbennolt, and Ulen, 2010). Rather,
this part is written with the intention to confront all too common misunderstanding about
the experimental approach to law – and its economic theory – with information about the
usefulness of experimental methodology for legal scholarship as well as policy-making.
A. Economic & Legal Realism
I. Autonomous Law & Unrealistic Economics
Legal scholarship, in its pure form, is fundamentally concerned with the coherence of the
legal system. When we investigate how the law reads or ought to read, i.e., when we look
at the law descriptively or normatively, we “find” the law so as to avoid frictions in the
legal system. We establish internal coherence of norm texts by textual interpretation, i.e.,
we dismantle vague text with grammatical elements, logical elements, norm-hierarchical
elements, and norm-systematic elements. Often, we go beyond the legal text and look
for coherence with contextual factors by analyzing factual elements, the norm in its
historical context, and the genesis of the norm. Sometimes, we overcome the legal text
by establishing coherence with extra-textual factors. Then, we engage in comparative
analysis, consider teleological arguments in light of the – rather elusive and discretionary,
if not arbitrary – purpose of the norm, and reason with analogies.
But we never – ever! – establish coherence with extra-legal factors. As sophisticated
legal methodologists, we do not disregard the norm text! In a nutshell, we optimize internal
coherence based on plausibility arguments. Therefore, some exceptions notwithstanding,
most traditionally trained legal scholars remain skeptical of the value of the economic
theory of law.
If the law is conceived as a governance instrument to coordinate individual behavior
in society, the policy-maker requires to develop an understanding of how rule-subjected
people decide and behave. Pure legal scholarship is not equipped with a theory to predict
individual behavior, but economics provides one such paradigm. However, perhaps as a
reaction of what might be construed – and dreaded – as “economic imperialism” (Nutter,
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1979; Brenner, 1980; Stigler, 1980; Lazear, 2000), traditional legal scholars defended and
continue to uphold the autonomy of the legal system. Opponents to the economic theory of
law stress the unique features of legal scholarship, point to a fundamental incompatibility
of law with economics, and criticize the economic approach for its reductionism and
methodological deficiencies (e.g.: Singer, 2009; Smits, 2012).
There are, to my knowledge, three main methodological objections that relate to
misperceptions about law and economics or lead to a alleged mismatch of pure legal
scholarship and the economic theory of law.
1. Doctrinal Focus
From a methodological perspective, mainstream legal scholarship – at least in continental
Europe – is first and foremost doctrinal. The doctrinal approach exhibits an internal
outlook on an autonomous, self-standing legal system (cf.: De Geest, 2004; McCrudden,
2006; Smits, 2012). Accordingly, legal scholars are tasked with studying the internal
relationship between legal concepts and exploring developments in case law. When facing
novel legal problems, doctrinal scholars must seek out analogies with existing rules and
locate the best possible fit. In doing so, traditional doctrinal research subscribes to a
numerus clausus of methodological rules by applying logic and reasoning by analogy.
Because the legal system is considered autonomous, legal scholarship necessarily relies
on legal sources to the exclusion of findings in other fields of science (cf.: Posner, 2002;
Ibbetson, 2005; Smits, 2012). The asserted autonomy of legal science creates a form of
path-dependency, where each new development must take place within the limitations
set out by precedent.
Obviously, a strictly doctrinal perspective implies that lawyers should refrain from
engaging in consequentialist reasoning and dynamic analysis (cf.: Rubin, 2010). By its very
nature, a legal system dictated by internal coherence is hostile towards outside interference
(cf.: Weinrib, 1995). In this regard, legal formalism and doctrinal approaches to law
remain hostile to the infusion of economic concepts and methods. In this manner, the
emphasis on doctrinal scholarship and the prevailing conception of law as an autonomous
field of research continue to impede the maturation of interdisciplinary scholarship such
as empirical legal scholarship or the economic theory of law. To the extent that legal
academics combine their university appointment with law firm practice work, a strictly
doctrinal focus is likely to endure. In the current institutional framework at European law
schools (raises and promotions being unrelated to international publications, absence of
lateral hiring, etc.), most legal academics simply lack the incentive to invest the time and
resources to engage in interdisciplinary or empirical research (cf.: Depoorter and De Mot,
2011). Without institutional reform (increased competition between universities, rankings,
international, peer reviewed publications as tenure standards, etc.), no methodological
arguments, no matter how persuasive, are likely to tip the balance towards interdisciplinary
and/or empirical legal research more generally.
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2. Efficiency & Moral Philosophy
Since economic theory of law found its way to Europe, mainstream legal scholars have
associated the discipline with Judge Richard Posner and the Chicago school of economics.
Interestingly, however, for doctrinal legal scholars the discipline is associated not so much
to the methodological and empirical toolset it offers, but rather to a few far-reaching
normative contributions by law and economics scholars in the 1980s and early 1990s.
To date, to many legal scholars the economic theory of law is represented by Judge
Posner’s normative argument in The Economics of Justice that the legal system should
serve nothing else but economic efficiency and wealth maximization (cf.: Posner, 1981).
Other examples of prominent ventures of law and economics scholars in moral philosophy
include, most prominently, Kaplow and Shavell (1994, 2000)’s famous double distortion
argument that the legal system is an inferior way to redistribute income in society. In
Europe, however, the dominant schools of legal thought – legal positivism and legal
formalism – are still strongly influential for legal thinking from a legal theory point of
view. Because normative perspectives about the law therefore traditionally center on
equality, corrective justice, a balance of interest, or fairness, the economic theory of law
was deemed a poor fit in the continental European tradition so far.1
However, a rejection of the normative ideals set out by, e.g., Posner, Kaplow, and
Shavell, hardly justifies a wholesale rejection of the economic theory of law or the economic
methodology. As De Geest (1996) points out, the tools offered by economic methodology
can be applied to pursue normative goals other than efficiency. For a legal realist seeking
to examine the effect of legal rules in society, the science and method of economics
provides a valuable toolkit. Formal models, make explicit otherwise unstated assumptions
and provide a framework that uncovers potential analytical mistakes, while empirical
and experimental analysis help test connections, both correlation and causality, between
legal rules and social changes. In this manner, which in essence resembles the spirit of
Karl Poppers critical rationalism,2 the economic methodology helps explore if and how
a legal rule can be effective to attain whatever hypothetical imperative has been set in
society – be it justice, fairness, some distribution of wealth, a reduction of accidents,
combatting discrimination, etc. Although economic science leaves to moral philosophy
(and the forces of democracy) the task of setting society’s ultimate goals, the scientific
economic method is very valuable to examine whether certain rules or institutions will
accomplish the stated objective and to identify the various trade-offs involved.
1 That efficiency plays a limited role in the normative skeleton of European legal scholarship is also
reflected in one of the empirical measures of Garoupa and Ulen (2008, p. 1570). Their findings
suggest that the normative benchmark of efficiency occurs least often in European law journals –
even when one searches for typical terms from the economic theory of law. Moreover, European legal
methodologists such as Smits (2012) even argue that normative uncertainty is desirable – a difficult
idea for an economist.
2 I shall make ample use of the powerful interaction of formal models and empirical/experimental
analysis in the main body of this research project.
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3. The Narrow Construct of the Economic Man
At European law schools, resistance to the economic theory of law is commonly based on
the perception that the economic model of human behavior is too simplified and unrealistic
to support policy oriented research. To date, many legal scholars and practitioners still
perceive law and economics as bound by both neoclassical economics and the rational
choice paradigm (McCrudden, 2006; Smits, 2012), embodied by the infallibly rational
and completely self-interested homo oeconomicus (cf.: Doucouliagos, 1994; Persky, 1995).
Historically, economic theory’s marginal revolution and subjective value model concep-
tualizes agents that optimize their individual preferences in markets. In order to increase
the explanatory value of economic theory, specifically through the use of mathematics
(cf.: Blaug, 1997), axiomatic assumptions, such as rational behavior and fundamental
self-interest, were crucial to a neo-classical meta-theory that would produce probable
economic theories and deduce unambiguous results (De Geest, 1996; Rubin, 2010). In nec-
essary brief: While the assumption of self-interested behavior posits that economic agents
are solely concerned about their individual utility, the rationality assumption asserts that
preferences are complete, continuous, and transitive (cf.: Arrow, 1986, 1987; Varian, 2010)
and that economic agents possess unconstrained willpower and computational abilities
(cf.: Berg and Gigerenzer, 2010).
Critics of law and economics often fail to recognize that these assumptions were
never intended to describe realistic human behavior, but rather served as a conceptual
framework to analyze the interactions of economic agents in idealized market settings.
These assumptions have an “as-if” character: even in light of evidence and/or arguments
that individuals do not always behave rationally and self-interested, it is nevertheless
beneficial to construct a theory as if they would do so (Friedman, 1953). The reduction of
economic inquiry to market behavior and the functioning of markets facilitated searching
for a model with explanatory power and examining the role of institutional variables
(Coase, 1960). The narrow behavioral assumptions of the neo-classical approach have
long been recognized for its limitations and, to some, were always considered as an
intermediate step in the development of economic science.3
As economic inquiry expanded to areas beyond traditional markets, many economists
explored the boundaries of the neoclassical model of rationality and developed more
attuned models of human behavior (e.g.: Becker, 1976; Kirchgässner, 1988; Frey, 1990).
As Herbert Simon noted early on, “[e]conomics has been moving steadily into new areas
where the power of the classical equilibrium model has never been demonstrated, and
where its adequacy must be considered anew” (Simon, 1959, pp. 255-256).
II. Toward Economic Realism
To the extent that the rejection of the economic theory of law relies on the outdated
narrow conception of the rational, self-interested homo economics, it is severely misplaced.
This research project builds upon an updated economic paradigm. Therefore, here I will
3 It is important to stress that a rational choice approach was also deeply rooted in other social sciences
(cf.: Scott, 2000).
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provide a brief overview of recent advances in economic theory that more accurately
reflect human behavior in its complexity.
1. Cognitive Modifications: Bounded Rationality
Herbert A. Simon stressed the necessity to enrich the behavioral model of economic
agents. Simon developed and coined the term “bounded rationality” to refer to the
limited “capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems”,
noting that individuals’ problem solving skills are “very small compared with the size
of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real
world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality” (Simon,
1957, p. 198).4 Simon contrasts bounded rationality to the neoclassical concept of perfect
rationality as follows:
“[the] rationality of neoclassical [economic] theory assumes that the decision maker
has a comprehensive, consistent utility function, knows all the alternatives that are
available for choice, can compute the [...] utility associated with each alternative, and
chooses the alternative that maximizes [...] utility. Bounded rationality [...] assumes
that the decision maker must search for alternatives, has egregiously incomplete and
inaccurate knowledge about consequences of actions, and chooses actions that are
expected to be satisfactory” (Simon, 1997, p. 17).
The concept of bounded rationality has now gained widespread acceptance in economic
theory (cf.: Klaes and Sent, 2005) and continues to inspire a very active strand of
“behavioral law and economics” scholarship (see e.g. contributions in: Sunstein, 2000;
Zamir and Teichman, 2014). Bounded rationality is firmly rooted in the assumption that
individuals possess incomplete information and have cognitive limitations. At least three
different meanings of bounded rationality can be distinguished.
First, one version of bounded rationality can be described as “as-if rationality in
disguise”. In a sense, bounded rationality is understood as optimization under constraints
(cf.: Arrow, 2004). To illustrate, consider Kreps (1990, p. 745):
“[a] boundedly rational individual attempts to maximize but finds it costly to do so
and, unable to anticipate all contingencies, and aware of this inability, provides ex
ante for the (almost inevitable) time ex post when an unforeseen contingency will
arise”.
Due to fragmented information (Hayek, 1945), acquiring perfect knowledge – omniscience
– is simply too expensive or even impossible as far as future developments are concerned
(cf.: Furubotn and Richter, 2005). Economic agents decide under incomplete information.
Note that this version of bounded rationality does not actually relax the assumption of
4 Herbert A. Simon’s scientific corpus contains an important distinction between his early work, where he
developed the derivative concept of bounded rationality as negation of neo-classical perfect rationality
(cf.: Simon, 1955, 1957, 1959) and his later contributions, which contain the development of a positive
concept of procedural rationality (cf.: Simon, 1976, 1979).
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rationality: economic agents make rational decisions based on their incomplete informa-
tion. The model does imply, however, that individuals can be made better off by reducing
their information costs; for instance when consumer protection regulators mandate the
provision of information to consumers.
A second, stronger version of bounded rationality examines deviations between human
judgment and complete rationality. Empirical findings from cognitive and social psychol-
ogy have revealed mismatches between the predictions of the homo oeconomicus model
and actual behavior in experiments. In this process, specific hypotheses of incomplete
rational behavior have been proposed (cf.: Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and continue
to be investigated. One might summarize this research program as research on cognitive
fallacies in economic decision-making, or research on heuristics and biases (cf.: Kahneman,
1994, 2003). In this view, individuals often rely on heuristics although optimization
would have been within reach. Thus heuristics are understood as second-best strategies,
which often lead to erroneous decisions (cf.: Frank, 2005) and paternalistic intervention.
The third notion of bounded rationality encompasses the concept of ecological rationality
(cf.: Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Smith, 2008). The distinction between neo-classical
rationality, on the one hand, and ecological rationality, on the other hand, was extensively
investigated in Hayek (1988)’s study of spontaneous ordering. Hayek, in turn, borrowed
the idea of interplay between these two forms of rationality from David Hume, Adam
Ferguson, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith (cf.: Smith, 1776, 1790). Ecological
rationality gives shape to the idea that social interactions and structures are the “result
of human action, but not the execution of human design” (Ferguson, 1782, pt. 3, sec.
2, par. 7). This positive model of bounded rationality describes how a judgment or
decision is reached – that is, the heuristic processes or proximal mechanisms – rather than
merely comparing the outcome of a decision to some artificial rationality standard. These
models investigate the interplay between mind and environment and describe the class
of environments in which these heuristics will succeed or fail, hence the term ecological
rationality: “[a] heuristic is ecologically rational to the degree that it is adapted to the
structure of an environment” (Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC Research Group, 1999, p. 13).
A heuristic is a mental process, which ignores part of the available information and does
not optimize. Even if maximizing or minimizing is feasible, relying on heuristics can
sometimes produce superior outcomes (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). In support of
this claim, there is evidence that simple heuristics that ignore information can outperform
optimization strategies that use more information and computation (e.g.: Makridakis and
Hibon, 2000; Brighton, 2006; Gigerenzer, 2008). In this sense, heuristics are not conceived
as a problem per se. Rather, rationality is a function of the match (or mismatch) of the
mental processes employed during decision-making with the structure of the decision
environment. Modern neuro-economic research on law, although in its infancy, may
assist in increasing our understanding of the potential match between environmental
settings and human decision processes (e.g.: Chorvat and McCabe, 2004, 2005; Camerer,
Loewenstein, and Prelec, 2005; Levallois, Clithero, Wouters, Smidts, and Huettel, 2012).
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2. Motivational Modifications: Preferences in a Social Context
Being based in rational choice theory, the reductionist but, nevertheless, very valuable
neoclassical paradigm posits that economic agents, whose individual decisions are analyzed
and predicted, are fundamentally motivated by their self-interest. When examining
decision-making in laboratory experiments in the early 1980s and 1990s, economic
researchers came to a startling conclusion: participants in the lab did not seem to act
as purely self-interested individuals. For instance, participants pass positive amounts
of money in dictator games (e.g. Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994; Hoffman,
McCabe, Shachat, and Smith, 1994; List, 2007) and rejected positive offers in ultimatum
games (e.g. Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze, 1982).
In the dictator game, the first player determines how to split an endowment such
as ¤ 20 between himself and the second player. The second player simply receives
whatever share is decided upon by the first player. The standard solution for this game,
as predicted by the Nash equilibrium concept,5 is that the first player keeps the entire
endowment for herself. Yet, a plethora of subsequent experimental studies replicate the
dictator results and usually find that more than 60% of subjects share a positive amount
of money, with a mean transfer of about 20% of the endowment (Camerer, 2003; Engel,
2011). In the ultimatum game, the first player offers a split of an endowment such as ¤
20 in the first stage of the game. In the second stage, the second player decides whether
to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted by the second player, each player
receives money according to the offer. If the offer is rejected, each player receives nothing.
There is only one Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the more unambiguous solution
concept of subgame perfection.6 The second player would be better off to accept any
offer that gives her any amount whatsoever and, if the first player knows this, she will
give to the second player the smallest amount possible that is different from zero. Yet,
a rich body of experimental results indicates that offers below 20% to 30% are often
rejected (Camerer, 2003). These results are at odds with the neoclassical assumption
about self-interest as participants knowlingly and willingly receive a lower than possible
payoff. In many more examples, participants in the laboratory acted seemingly against
their own self-interest by knowingly reducing the payoff they would receive from the
experiment.
Economic research has since paid attention to the motives for the seemingly counterin-
tuitive actions of participants in experiments.7 Through the interplay of falsification of
an established theory by experiment and the subsequent development of a new theory,
5 A set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium, if all players choose their optimal strategy, given the choice
of the other players. Such an equilibrium of mutual optimal strategies is achieved if no player can do
better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy.
6 A set of strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium if these strategies represent a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame of the original meta-game.
7 Just as the notion of narrow self-interest is no invention by neoclassical economists, but can rather be
traced back to Smith (1776), research about what otherwise motivates behavior of economic agenst is
also linked to early Scottish moral philosophers such as Smith (1790) who, during their inquiry into
ethics, human virtue, and morals, dedicated a lot of work to other motives of behavior than pure
self-interest.
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behavioral and experimental economists have embraced and started to explore motives
such as altruism (e.g.: Andreoni, 1993; Bolton and Katok, 1998), envy (e.g.: Kirchsteiger,
1994), and spitefulness (e.g.: Levine, 1998; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2005). More
influential models with a greater explanatory power about what behavioral economists
today call “other-regarding/social preferences” deal with (perceived) equality and fairness
as driving forces that shape individual decisions (e.g.: Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000).
Moreover, reciprocity is another different, yet related motive that similarly conflicts
with narrow conceptions of self-interest. Individuals behave reciprocally if they reward
kind actions (positive reciprocity) and punish unkind ones (negative reciprocity). For
instance, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) model reciprocity as a behavioral response to
perceived kindness and unkindness, where kindness comprises both distributional fairness
as well as fairness intentions. Reciprocity deserves closer attention because in later
theoretical sections, I will argue that the framing of legal rules and their corresponding
incenctive structures may also trigger different reciprocal impulses. These reciprocal
responses are mediated by and, therefore, related to perceived obligations and entitlements
that constitute “moral property rights” (cf.: Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Cox, Friedman,
and Gjerstad, 2007). Moral obligations refer to subjectively perceived claims rather than
abstract legal claims of others that are accompanied by a motivational dispostition to
respect them. As a counterpart, moral entitlements are subjectively perceived rights
rather than abstract legal rights that are accompanied by a motivational disposition to
defend them (Schlicht, 1998).
A rich body of empirical evidence indicates that reciprocity is a major determinant of
human behavior. In economics, the notion of reciprocity can help explain for instance why
low offers in the ultimatum game are rejected (cf.: Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze,
1982; Camerer, 2003), why people reward kind actions in trust games (cf.: Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe, 1995) and gift exchange games (cf.: Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993;
Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997), and why people engage in individually costly
punishment of defectors (cf.: Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
It is important, however, to distinguish reciprocal behavior that is observed in repeated
interactions from similar observations in one-shot games.8 In an environment that allows
for repeated interactions, observed reciprocity can be very well strategic if future benefits
are expected to ensue from reciprocal actions. It is obvious that a repeated interaction
allows for strategic reputation building through reciprocal behavior. Individuals may,
therefore, be acting cooperatively in order to be reciprocated. By contrast, in an
environment of one-shot games, reciprocation cannot be strategic, since there is no
opportunity for reciprocal benefits to be obtained in future interactions. Given an absence
of present or future benefits, the evidence of reciprocity is stronger when observed in
one-shot games (cf.: Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter, 2002; Bowles and Gintis, 2004).
8 Importantly, one also has to differentiate between direct and indirect forms of reciprocal behavior.
This distinction is less relevant for the present research.
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III. Summary
Methodological objections to the economic theory of law rest upon narrow conceptions
of legal scholarship, erroneous beliefs of what constitutes economic theory of law, or
outdated assumptions from the neoclassical version of law and economics. Advances
in economic theory have long updated the abstract, perfectly rational model of human
behavior to include fallibility, emotions and other human traits that lawyers encounter in
everyday practice. Much less than traditional legal scholarhsip, economic theory of the
law is a moving target: its modus operandi develops with the changes of the paradigmatic
foundations of economics. These advances are intuitively appealing, also in areas where
the rational choice models have traditionally been met with resistance, and have incited
a dynamic and engaging literature of scholarship with a wide range of legal applications
(see e.g.: Sunstein, 2000; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Hoeppner and Depoorter, 2014;
Zamir and Teichman, 2014). As far as theory is concerned, I will employ the updated
economic paradigm to answer the research question outlined in Chapter II.
B. Experimental Method in Law and in Law & Economics
I. Purpose of Experimentation
Generally speaking, in both disciplines – economics and law – there is a strong emphasis
on deductive reasoning. Researchers start with a set of axioms, use rules of logic to
manipulate them, and subsequently derive conclusions about their research question. For
instance, in neoclassical economics, certain assumptions about individual behavior are
used to mathematically model the theoretical construct “market” and to draw implications
for the allocation of resources. As an example for deductive reasoning in law, one core
assumption is ratio legis, i.e., the law makes sense. The major bulk of doctrinal legal
scholarship is devoted to establish the inner logic (coherence) of the law by means of
interpretation and, furthermore, to match real-world facts to these abstract norms by
analytical comparison (subsumption). Thus, doctrinal legal scholarship can conclude that
legal consequences from an abstract, model-like norm are applicable to real-world facts.
A consequence of this heavyweight deductive reasoning is that theories become so
complex and refined that simply observing natural data does often not address the
pressing theoretical questions. Empirical tests of those theories are therefore significantly
more difficult to perform. Experiments are one way to meet such a challenge (Croson,
2002).
The more conducive purpose of conducting experiments in law, in general, and its
economic theory, in particular, is to exploit three advantages of the methodology. The
first main advantage of experiments lies in their possibility to solve the identification
problem. The identification problem arises when there may be bi-directional influence
between dependent and independent variable(s) that makes it difficult to separate cause
and effect. For example, consider crime levels and the number of police. Does an increase
in the level of crime cause a demand for more police? Or: do fewer police forces cause
more crime? Identification is notoriously difficult with field data. To establish causality
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outside of an experiment, at least three steps are necessary (Lawless, Robbennolt, and
Ulen, 2010). First, there needs to be a reliable association – or: strong correlation –
between the variables.9 Second, the researcher needs to credibly show that changes in
the variable hypothesized to be the cause precede the supposed effect variable. Third
and most problematic, other rival explanations for this observation, e.g., the existence of
confounding variables, need to be ruled out. The third step also concerns the rather big
problem of omitted-variable bias, where a driving variable is missing from the statistical
model used for analysis. As a consequence, the effect of variables that enter the analysis
is over- or underestimated.
To the end of separating cause and effect, a laboratory experiment generates an
artificial environment in which participants are randomly assigned to different treatments.
Random assignment facilitates control for unobservable individual differences among
the participants. If carefully designed, the treatments in the experiment differ only by
one dimension. Accordingly, if a treatment effect can be observed, it is a necessary
result from the manipulation. With their distinguishing features – manipulation of one
or more variables of interest, random assignment, and experimental control of other
variables – experiments are specifically designed to test cause-effect relationships (Lawless,
Robbennolt, and Ulen, 2010). The very large degree of control can be used to generate a
laboratory environment that tests theories and separates alternate theories that may not
be separable with naturally occurring data (cf.: Croson, 2002).
The second main upside of laboratory experiments is their replicability. Because
laboratory experiments are replicable, other researchers can reproduce the experiment
and verify the findings independently. A stream of independent replications can test the
robustness of findings. This is very difficult with field data because the environment
is constantly changing such that each observation or dataset is just a snapshot of a
certain combination of conditions. Note, however, that in both economics and psychology,
where experimentation is a major way of scientific inquiry, this clear advantage of
experimentation is not exploited nearly enough because of the difficulty to publish
replication studies.
Especially for legal scholars, experimentation brings about a third important benefit
that is likely to be equally important: experiments enable the study of problems that are
hard or even impossible to observe in the field (Lawless, Robbennolt, and Ulen, 2010),
i.e., even if data are already available from other sources. How would addressees of a
legal rule act if the existing rule would be or would have been replaced by an alternative
rule? Or: What are the behavioral effects of different alternative rules that are under
consideration for being implemented? Many a fact that is relevant for doctrinal lawyers
and legal policy-makers are counterfactuals and never enter into field data (Engel, 2013b).
Experimenters can observe the unobservable (Falk and Heckman, 2009).




The basic logic of an experiment is to create different treatment groups – or: experimental
conditions – by manipulating one or more variables of interest, but always only one at a
time, while every other variable is experimentally controlled for. A treatment without
any variable change often serves as a control group. This experimental manipulation
creates desired differences between the groups, which enables the isolation of the different
variables of interest, reduces confound, and ultimately facilitates identification of cause-
and-effect relations. Participants are randomly assigned to these treatment groups.
Randomization may occur for a lot of aspects in a specific experimental design. With
regard to randomly assigning participants to experimental condition, random assignment,
e.g., assures the initial comparability of the different experimental groups by equalizing the
distribution of non-manipulated participant characteristics, such as age, income, gender,
and education, across the experimental conditions. While participants are then being
exposed to the experimental stimuli, their decision behavior is measured. Afterwards, the
different measurements can be compared across treatment groups. Because after random
assignment the only difference between the groups is their exposure to the treatment,
any measured difference between the treatment and control groups can be attributed to
the treatment.
Beyond this general categorization, experimental methodologies and their best practices
within the social sciences are quite different. Because of different underlying theories,
experiments in a law and economics paradigm differ in their methodology from the earlier
experimental approaches to law in psychology and criminology. Experimental law and
economics is based on the methodology of experimental economics (cf.: Hoffman and
Spitzer, 1985; Davis and Holt, 1993; Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Kagel and Roth, 1997).
Although experimental economics pushes more and more to the field (Levitt and List,
2007, 2009), the standard tool in experimental economics is the laboratory experiment.
The lab offers the possibility to effectively employ controlled variation at relatively low
cost (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Friedman and Sunder, 1994). Decision environments
can be controlled in ways that are very difficult to duplicate in the field. In the lab,
the experimenter knows and controls participants’ material payoffs, the order in which
the different participants can act and interact, and – maybe most importantly – the
informational situation for each single choice.
In experimental economics, one can generally differentiate four types of experiments for
specific purposes: some experiments test theory, others investigate observed deviations
from theory (anomalies), again others establish empirical regularities as the foundation
of new theories, and finally experiments inform policy-making or test-bed new policy
proposals (cf.: Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Roth, 1986; Smith, 1994).10 Each of these
types faces particular methodological challenges (cf.: Croson, 2002).
The decisive difference between experimental economics – and by extension experimental
law and economics – and the other experimental approaches to law involves a number
10 In the context of this research project, there will be two experiments of the first type, i.e., to test
theory, and one experiment of the second type, i.e., to investigate what drives observed effects.
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of distinctive dimensions (cf.: Davis and Holt, 1993; Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Engel,
2013a).
(1) Participants are exposed to a specific incentive structure that matches the payoffs
in the theory underlying the experiment. The choices the participants make in the
experiment determine their compensation. This ensures that participants seriously
contemplate their decision because value is induced (Smith, 1976; Friedman and
Sunder, 1994). This is the main reason why experimenters in economics trust that
“behavior in the laboratory is reliable and real: Participants in the lab are human
beings who perceive their behavior as relevant, experience real emotions, and take
decisions with real economic consequences” (Falk and Heckman, 2009, p. 536).
(2) As real money is at stake, participants do not face a hypothetical, but rather a real
situation. Note that in some cases and contradictory to established experimental
methodology in economics, it may make a lot of sense to not incentivize a participant.
This is the case, for instance, if the participant mimics the role of a judge who
has, ideally, no monetary incentive in the single decision in real life (cf.: Engel and
Kurschilgen, 2011).
(3) The experiment is usually free from context. Economic experiments are very
abstract to facilitate identification (cf.: Ariely and Norton, 2007). Firstly, context
may add variance to the data and blur otherwise clear results. More worrisome,
context may create systematically biased results or demand effects, i.e., when the
participant tries to act according to the perceived expectations of the experimenter.
As a result, the generated dataset would not be reliable. Lastly, avoiding context
is, of course, a requisite when the underlying theories are also free from contextual
cues. Note that context, however, may be a treatment variable as well. If so, the
manipulation of context is the premier goal of the experiment.
(4) Another key distinguishing feature is that experimental economists generally take
great care to not deceive their subjects. This is different, although not undisputed,
in psychology experiments where deception is commonplace (cf.: Hertwig and
Ortmann, 2008). In experimental economics, the validity of the results depends
on the link between expected payoffs and individual behavior. If participants are
deceived about variables establishing this link, the validity of their decisions is
questionable. Moreover, experimental economists usually avoid tainting the local
participant pool, which was carefully build over time. They are “concerned about
developing and maintaining a reputation among the student population for honesty
in order to ensure that subject actions are motivated by the induced monetary
rewards rather than by psychological reactions to suspected manipulation” (Davis
and Holt, 1993, pp. 23-24). Admittedly, however, there is currently an intense
discussion about whether the costs of deception in experimental economics exceed
the benefits (cf.: Bonetti, 1998; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2008; Jamison, Karlan, and
Schechter, 2008; Alberti and Güth, 2013).
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(5) Economic experiments are oftentimes interactive in nature. The reason for interac-
tion between participants is straightforward. Economics experiments mostly employ
some form of social dilemma game as experimental workhorse, and theoretical
predictions focus on the results of social interaction.
(6) Usually, experimenters in economics take great effort to ensure complete anonymity.
As with all the other features, this is done with the aim to facilitate identification,
i.e., to avoid confound. To provide a counterexample, the experimentalist may not
care about absolute anonymity, if the research question addresses reputation effects.
(7) Often, the trials in the experiment are repeated to allow for learning and to study
interactive dynamics.
These features facilitate what an experiment is ultimately all about: complete control.
Only in an environment with extensive control can the claim become credible that an
observed difference in behavior is indeed caused by the treatment manipulation and not
merely the result of correlation or chance.
III. Caution
However promising and rewarding the clear separation of cause and effect, experimenters
face validity concerns. In general, the concept of validity refers to the extent to which
an empirical study produces accurate and credible data. Validity is assessed on three
dimensions. First, internal validity refers to the extent to which the research design
allows making inferences about the relationship of different variables. Internal validity
involves that the experimenter must ensure that the choices faced by the control and
treatment groups differ in the ways the experimenter hypothesizes, but do not differ
in some other ways. This implies accounting for alternative explanations and omitted
variables. Second, external validity speaks to the degree to which the research results
can be generalized to a population beyond the particular study, i.e., to different people,
different settings, different times, and also different measures. Third, construct validity
refers to the extent to which the measures used to observe certain variables sufficiently
capture the construct that the empiricist wants to study (cf.: Lawless, Robbennolt, and
Ulen, 2010).
In order to isolate variables and to identify cause-effect relationships, experimentalists
necessarily trade off external validity for internal validity. The artificial environment
in a laboratory experiment allows the experimenter to make clean-cut inferences, but
raises questions about its congruence with the social phenomenon that is to be studied.
By design, what is measured in a laboratory experiment is only analogous to what the
experimenter wants to understand (Smith, 2010; Engel, 2013a). Just because a hypothesis
is falsified in the lab does not necessarily suggest that it will also be falsified in the field
because there are so many intervening variables that cannot be controlled for. However,
Plott (1982) counters concerns about external validity by pointing out that a theory will
likely not predict outcomes in the real world if it does not (at least) predict outcomes in
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an idealized, controlled laboratory environment. Falk and Heckman (2009) argue that
external validity problems are not a problem unique to experimental methodology.
Whatever the outcome of the validity discussion, especially when legal scholars are on
the hunt for cause-and-effect relationships between legal rules and individual behavior,
they pay an increased price when using experiments because they tend to distance
themselves even more from the traditional doctrinal legal discourse (Engel, 2013b).
IV. Criticism & Concern
Particularly when scholars or members of another audience are unfamiliar with exper-
imental work in general and the specific methodology in particular, a standard set of
skeptical arguments is often held against the experimental results.
Probably the most notorious objection involves limited external validity (see supra).
The gist of this critique is that the experiment cannot tell anything about the real world
because the decisions are made in an artificial environment. As mentioned above, this
is, indeed, reason to be very cautious to interpret experimental findings. However, this
typical reason to disapprove of experimental results is misguided if the experiment satisfies
the assumptions of the tested theory. Theoretical predictions rest on the assumptions of
that theory irrespective of where the assumptions are met – in the lab, in the field, or
in theory (Plott, 1982). The objection about limited external validity may have more
grips, when the experiment concerns legal policy-making. In this context, an isolated
cause-effect relationship matters less than entire institutions, where certainly many of
those relationships work with or against each other. Nevertheless, this implies the need
to understand complex institutions by disentangling the muddle of causes and effects.
Alternatively, legal experimenters may implement sequential designs that investigate
behavior before and after the implementation of the entire legal institution (Engel, 2013a).
Lastly, empirical scholars know that likely none of the available methods will ever fully
address reality. Falk and Heckman (2009) emphasize that it is not so obvious whether
laboratory data or the field data are more informative. The scientific value of a method
ultimately depends on the underlying research question. The empirical methodology
notwithstanding, “eventually, reality is too complex, too little orderly, to be studied in
an objective way” (Engel, 2013b, p. 18). The concern about external validity certainly
puts another emphasis on the complementary nature of different empirical methods, but
it provides no grounds to completely dismiss one of them.
A second standard objection against experimental results concerns the participant
pool. Novices in experimental methodology often criticize the fact that experiments in
law and economics more often than not rely on university students. They argue that
students are certainly very different from the population in the real world and that they
make decisions differently from professional decision-makers outside the lab. Fortunately,
experimental research on this subject is on the rise. Oftentimes, there is no discernible
difference in decision-making between students and professionals. If there is, however,
students sometimes are actually more successful than professionals. There are a number
of reasons why the objection against experimental research based on arguments about the
participant pool seems to have a weak foundation (cf.: Croson, 2002; Falk and Heckman,
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2009). A student sample is as representative as any other sample, as long as it does
not consists of only students with the same academic background, unless this is part of
the manipulation (cf.: Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993, 1996). More importantly, an
experiment is very often not reliant on any specific knowledge or experience so that the
participant background does not matter very much. By contrast, there are also risks in
bringing professionals to the lab. For instance, they may bring in incentives, knowledge,
and experience that do not exist in the experimental design and therefore systematically
bias results. Nevertheless, it is surprising that people often do not complain about
seemingly weak participant pools in other areas of science. This is nicely illustrated with
a not so ironic insight from Gary E. Bolton that he shared with me and others during a
summer school in July 2013:
“In experimental economics, we typically begin our studies with students, pretty
much for the same reasons medical experimenters begin with mice. First, they work
cheap. Second, we can do what we want with them (within institutional rules). And
third, they are genetically similar to real human beings”.
Another prominent critique of experimental work in law and economics is based on
the size of the payoffs in the experiment. It is often argued that the size of payoffs is
too small to induce meaningful behavior. However, experiments have been conducted
with low and high payoffs and, in fact, have even tested differences between low and
high stakes in experimental settings. All in all, there are very few differences on average
behavior when the size of the stakes varies (Smith and Walker, 1993; Beattie and Loomes,
1997; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
Taken together, these common objections can be summarized as the “lack of realism”
challenge. This notion, however, is based on an implicit assumption about the hierarchy
of how relevant data are generated, with field data being deemed superior to data from
the laboratory. Ultimately, however, the issue of realism is not a question of laboratory
versus field data. The real issue is determining the best way to identify the causal
effects in question. In this context, it is also important to stress that empirical methods
are complements to each other (cf.: Arlen and Talley, 2008; Engel, 2013a). Empirical
methods are no substitutes as the “lack of realism” challenge suggests. Paradoxically,
many of these objections also suggest conducting more experiments instead of fewer (Falk
and Heckman, 2009), because the critique itself is often based on a variable that can
be manipulated in a new set of experiments to test the critique. This is, for instance,
true for the aforementioned criticism that stakes are trivial and that participants are
inexperienced students. This is not to suggest, however, that experimentalists should not
take these common concerns seriously. On the contrary, experimentalists should be their
own most austere critics in order to prevent automatic, arbitrary experimental design
that would threaten the credibility of experimental results.
In addition to these standard objections to the experimental method in economics and in
the economic theory of law, Engel (2013b) specifically discusses sets of concerns prevalent
in the legal academic arena. He distinguishes the rather diffuse concerns into five common
categories of specific objections from legal scholars. To traditional doctrinal lawyers,
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the experimental method appears to be (1) too scientific, (2) too individualistic, (3) too
narrow, (4) too anxious, and (5) too small. While cleanly dissecting and acknowledging the
foundations of these concerns, Engel (2013b) humbly refrains from completely resolving –
or, for that matter, rejecting – them. Also, doctrinal legal scholarship and experimental
law and economics can achieve much more, if they work hand in hand.
V. Summary
As legal scholars,
“[w]e will quite likely have to live with some tension between science and doctrine,
between individualistic and social constructions of legal problems, between the condi-
tions for causal inference and lumpy institutional choice, between the responsibility
for legal development and the competitive pressure of peer-review, between intuition
and explication” (Engel, 2013b, p. 29).
Yet, experimenters can bring to light scientific knowledge that matters for the adoption
of new rules, the further development of existing rules, and even the decision of concrete
cases. Therefore, doctrinal legal scholars, lawyers, judges, and regulators should find it at
least useful and relevant to have the generic knowledge available that has been generated
in the laboratory.
In this second part of methodological notes, I have introduced the purpose of conducting
experiments – also in a legal context – and the basic building blocks of the experimental
law and economics paradigm. A cautionary emphasis has been put on the validity trade-
off that is inherent in all experimentation. Finally, criticism and objections have been
briefly surveyed. These need to be taken – objectively – into account, if experimentalists
care for the scientific value of their own method. This part necessarily stayed at the
surface of what can only be called a fascinating methodological challenge. If this text
kindled an initial spark among the readership, it was utterly successful. As is the case for
the other empirical research methods, however, experiments are not to replace traditional
legal discourse. Rather, they are promising and enlightening complements to doctrinal
legal scholarship and the continuous evolution of the law and its economic theory.
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Abstract: Recent experimental evidence indicates that, due to loss aver-
sion, incentives that are framed as “penalty” lead to higher effort investment
and performance than incentives that are framed as “bonus”. However, the
effect has been shown only for reward contracts under which contingent pay
may lead to increases in wealth relative to the fixed wage. I extend the set of
incentive structures from reward contracts to sanction contracts under which
contingent pay may lead to decreases in wealth relative to the fixed wage.
This extension does not only allow to study the framing effect for sanction
contracts but also facilitates to study crucial effects within frames but across
contract types. I derive predictions about the relative effectiveness of all con-
tracts from a formal model and contrast these predictions with a theoretical
concept of moral property rights and reciprocity. To test the predictions in a
field experiment, I hire students for a job. I replicate results from previous
contributions. In addition, I find a framing effect in sanction contracts. The
results indicate that the observed effect is not caused by loss aversion. Rather,
the pattern of results is in line with notions of moral property rights. Surpris-
ingly, the experiment uncovers crowding-out of effort on non-incentivized task
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dimensions (second order crowding-out). I discuss implications for contract
design and, more broadly, the use of incentive framing for rule compliance.
Keywords: reference-dependent preferences; rational and non-rational
expectations; valence framing; field experiment; second order crowding-out
JEL classification: C93, K12, J33, M52
1. Introduction
Contracts and statutory law commonly employ four simple mechanisms to induce con-
tractual performance or compliance with other legal rules. Firstly, often persons obtain
a benefit if they meet a certain performance threshold. Examples for this archetype of
performance-contingent incentives range from executive bonus contracts to commission
contracts or bounties, but can also be seen in simple permits issued by an administrative
body. Secondly, a person may receive a benefit ex ante, but this benefit is retracted if she
fails to meet the performance threshold. This mechanism can, for instance, be found in
Cadillac contracts with upfront payments. Permits that are granted under condition and,
sometimes, research grants feature a similar structure. Thirdly, costs may be imposed on
a person if she does not reach the performance threshold. Examples are abundant and
range from contractual penalties, to speeding tickets, compensation for damages in tort
law, and monetary penalties in criminal law. Finally, a person may suffer costs ex ante,
but these costs are refunded if the agent meets the performance threshold. Although less
prevalent at first sight, typical examples are rental deposits and other forms of secured
transactions.
From a standard economic perspective, these four mechanisms are economically equiv-
alent. In each case, if the person performs or is compliant, she is better off. If the person
breaches or is non-compliant, ceteris paribus, she is worse off.1 Due to incentive equiva-
lence, the general discussion about which mechanism to implement to solve a specific
legal problem focuses on other arguments. As far as economic tools are used to analyze
these problems, researchers study under what conditions the different mechanisms make
economic sense, but assume equal incentive effects (see, e.g.: De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci,
and Siegers, 2009).
The assumption of incentive equivalence, however, is questionable. Even when these
four schemes provide the same monetary incentive, they may induce different behavioral
responses due to valence framing effects. Valence frames change reference points with
regard to where the endowment is allocated initially (Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-
Schmidt, 2011), thereby putting the same essential information in a positive or negative
light (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 1998) and creating a prospect of loss or gain. Ever
since Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory brought attention to the notion of
1 Differences in absolute income between reward and sanction contracts can easily be offset, as I will
show later. Other, more complex incentive mechanisms have recently been studied (e.g.: Ben-Shahar
and Bradford, 2012). These mechanisms are beyond the scope of this study because the incentive
equivalence condition does not hold.
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reference-dependent preferences, gain and loss framing has been of interest to economists
and lawyers alike. Recently, experimental research has turned to investigating framing
effects in contract provisions. Researchers distinguish between “reward/bonus” and
“penalty/punishment” frames for performance contingent pay. The former scheme is
designed such that a person receives a flat payment and an additional payment if she
meets a quality or quantity threshold. Under this payment scheme, a person faces a gain.
The latter scheme is devised in a way that a person receives a flat payment and moreover
the additional payment ex ante. The additional payment is retracted if she fails to meet
the threshold, however. Under this payment scheme, a person is exposed to a prospective
loss. Hossain and List (2012), for instance, conducted a field experiment in a Chinese
factory manipulating the incentives for reaching a certain performance benchmark. They
find that workers under the penalty frame (loss) outperform their colleagues under
the reward frame (gain) by exhibiting an increased productivity. Similarly, Brooks,
Stremitzer, and Tontrup (2012) conducted a controlled laboratory experiment to test
the effects of these reward and punishment schemes and to analyze the psychological
processes behind measured differences. Their results, too, indicate that in the loss frame
participants invested more into effort and even took on higher-than-efficient effort levels.
Moreover, in a set of experiments Armantier and Boly (2012) find similar results: although
economically equivalent, pure penalties (loss) outperform pure rewards (gain) in terms
of effort and performance. Generally, loss aversion – the tendency to weigh losses more
than equivalent gains – is argued to be the driving factor behind these framing effects.
Although recent research studies different important aspects of the link between incen-
tive framing and effort provision, these studies employ only on a subset of economically
equivalent incentive structures. Specifically, previous contributions only investigated
reward contracts. Reward contracts are payment schemes under which contingent pay
may lead to increases in wealth relative to the fixed wage (carrots). By contrast, framing
effects of sanction contracts have not been studied experimentally. Under sanction
contracts contingent pay may lead to decreases in wealth relative to the fixed wage (stick).
Sanction contracts – the other side of economically equivalent payment schemes – have
been systematically overlooked in recent experimental research on the effects of incentive
framing.
The object of this paper is to close this gap. Specifically, I combine theory and
experiment to examine the relative effect on effort investment and, thus, on performance
and compliance levels in these four incentive structures. I analyse and test framing effects
within and across reward and sanction contracts, respectively. The theoretical part derives
predictions from a choice model. To capture framing effects, the model extends the
framework of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) on expectation-based reference-dependent
preferences. Loss aversion induced framing effects, however, cannot explain tentatively
observable differences between such mechanisms with the same frame (within frames). In
this regard, I derive predictions from the moral property rights and reciprocity literature.
Intuitively, an annullable sanction may create a moral entitlement towards lower effort
investment: a person under this mechanism ex ante pays a price for defection and,
therefore, may perceive to be entitled to invest less into effort. On these grounds, one
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may expect that a normal reward leads to higher effort investment than an annullable
sanction. By contrast, an annullable reward may create a moral obligation to higher
effort investment: a person receives the reward for high effort decisions ex ante and may
feel obliged to reciprocate with higher effort investment. Therefore, an annullable reward
may lead to higher effort investment than a normal sanction.
The predictions are tested in an innovative field experiment that builds upon a task
implemented by Belot and Schröder (2014). Students are recruited to identify the value,
the geographic origin, and the date of coinage of Euro coins collected in the Euro zone.
I compare five treatments: the four performance contingent incentive structures and
a baseline treatment without performance-contingent pay. In the field experiment, I
observe that incentives matter. Any kind of performance-contingent contract leads to
higher effort levels than in the fixed pay treatment. I replicate findings from previous
contributions regarding the relative effects of annullable rewards and normal rewards.
Moreover, I observe a framing effect that impacts effort investment in sanction contracts.
Participants under an normal sanction invest significantly more effort than those under
an annullable sanction. Moreover, moral property rights appear to have strong positive
(losses) and negative effect (gains) within frames: participants under an annullable reward
outperform their peers working under a normal sanction and participants under a normal
reward exhibit higher effort levels than those workers under an annullable sanction. The
pattern of observations, however, indicates that reciprocal motives induced by moral
property rights drive behavior. The results are not in line with predictions based on
valence framing and loss aversion. Finally, exploratory analysis reveals a crowding-out
effect of effort on non-incentivized task dimensions (second-order crowding-out). While
participants under any kind of performance-contingent pay exhibit a higher work accuracy
(incentivized) than participants working under fixed pay, the former were more tardy
when returning the experimental materials after task completion.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally derives theoretical predictions
about an agent’s effort choice based on both reference-dependent preferences with
boundedly rational expectations as reference point and reciprocity motives induced by
moral property rights. Section 3 describes the experimental set-up and the procedure.
Section 4 reports the results from the field experiment. Section 5 discusses these findings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Formal Analysis & Predictions
2.1. Framing and Expectation-Based Reference Points
I derive the initial predictions from a formal model. With Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)
I assume that a person exhibits reference-dependent preferences with an endogenous
expectation-based reference point. The formal analysis also builds upon previous work
(e.g.: Gill and Prowse, 2012) that models behavior as choice-acclimating as defined by
Kőszegi and Rabin (2007). Finally, the model is inspired by the work of Herweg, Müller,
and Weinschenk (2010), who employ expectation-based reference-dependent preferences
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in a principal-agent setting. A principal-agent setting appropriately fits the characteristics
of the field experiment that I use to test the theoretical predictions.
Although the framework of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) very successfully reconciled
earlier seemingly contradictory empirical findings (cf.: Barberis, 2013), the authors attest
that the model with perfect rational expectations does not capture some accounts of
reference-dependent choice as reflected by substantial evidence on, e.g., narrow bracketing
and incomplete adaptation (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, fn. 26). Gain-loss framing is another
account that the rational model of reference-dependent preferences with expectation-
based reference points does not capture. Intuitively, in lotteries that merely differ by
how they are framed the change of lottery payoffs is offset by a change of the initial
endowment. When a person forms rational expectations about the final wealth after
these lotteries, framing cannot have an effect because expected final wealth is equal
in each frame. In other words, reference points based on rational expectations cannot
induce framing effects.2 In this regard, I extend previous contributions that model
expectation-based reference points with rational expectations and, in order to capture
gain-loss framing effects, allow expectations to be imperfectly rational.
Consider a fundamentally self-interested, rational person who has to perform some task.
The successful completion of the task depends on her effort level e ∈ [0, 1]. Following
Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk (2010), the agent’s effort level e can be interpreted as
the probability that the task is successfully completed. Her effort choice e is private
information and unobservable. Therefore, the observable signal s ∈ {l, h} is used as
contractible measure of performance. However, signal s is noisy. Let pHs denote the
probability of observing signal s conditional on the task being successfully completed.
Accordingly, let pLs denote the probability of observing signal s conditional on the task
not being successfully completed. Further following Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk
(2010), the unconditional probability for observing signal s for a given effort choice e is
ps(e) ≡ epHs + (1− e)pLs .3










. While the former term describes the intrinsic utility a person obtains from x,
the latter term describes how a person feels about changes in utility obtained from x
relative to the utility obtained from r (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Formally, if overall


















The parameter η > 0 weighs reference-dependent utility relative to outcome-based
utility. For simplicity, I assume η = 1 for the remainder of the paper.4 The reference-
2 Based on the modeling framework employed here, I show this formally in Appendix A.
3 For further technical assumptions and extensions regarding the linearity of the performance measure
compare Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk (2010).
4 This assumption is without loss of generalizability because it does not qualitatively affect the predictions
derived from the model.
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dependent utility function µ(·) satisfies the implicit or explicit assumptions about the value
function in Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory (cf.: Bowman, Minehart, and





)α if mk(xk) > mk(rk)
−λ(mk(rk)−mk(xk))α if mk(xk) < mk(rk) . (2)
Parameter λ > 1 describes how much the agent weighs losses relative to gains. When
λ > 1, µ(·) is steeper for losses than for gains, i.e., the agent is loss averse. Parameter
α measures diminishing sensitivity of the gain-loss utility function. Kőszegi and Rabin
(2007) argue that when moderate amounts of risk are concerned, the effect of diminishing
sensitivity is dominated by loss aversion.5 Similarly, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)
propose that for mixed prospects that consist of both gains and losses, loss aversion at
the reference point is far more relevant than the degree of diminishing sensitivity. For
simplicity, I therefore assume without much loss of generality that µ(·) is piecewise linear,
i.e., α = 1.
Specifically, let an agent derive utility from two dimensions, k ∈ {1, 2}. First, monetary
income contributes to his overall utility, i.e., x1 = W . The agent’s utility of income W is
unbounded, strictly increasing, and (weakly) concave. Formally, m1(x1) = u(W ) with
u′(W ) > 0 and u′′(W ) 6 0. Second, the effort choice e affects the agent’s overall utility,
i.e., x2 = e. Intuitively, the agent generates disutility from exerting effort e and higher
incremental effort leads to a larger incremental increase in disutility. Disutility from
effort is, therefore, assumed to be a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of
effort and, thus, m2(x2) = c(e) with c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) > 0.
To predict behavior it is crucial how the reference bundle rk is specified. Starting
with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most models of reference-dependent preferences
posit the reference point to be deterministic and fixed exogenously. The most prominent
deterministic reference point is the status-quo. Consistently following Kőszegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007), however, I assume a non-deterministic reference bundle, i.e., the reference
bundle is stochastic in the sense that it is formed by a person’s lagged expectations about
the relevant outcomes. Intuitively, a person evaluates any realized outcome by comparing
it to all possible outcomes and each comparison is weighted by the ex ante probability
that the outcome occurs.
I further apply the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (Kőszegi and
Rabin, 2007). Choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE) refers to a specific decision-
timing. When a choice is committed to not only shortly before the outcome is realized,
but long before outcomes occur, “the [lagged] expectations relative to which a decision’s
outcomes are evaluated are formed after—and therefore incorporate the implication of—
the decision” (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007, p. 1058). In other words, a person’s reference
point regarding this choice is endogeneously determined. Herweg, Müller, and Weinschenk
5 In the experiment, participants will have the chance to earn ¤ 10 or ¤ 20. Therefore, in the experiment,
participants are indeed only concerned with small to moderate risk.
6
(2010) argue that CPE is well suited for many principal-agent relationships. Therefore, I
use CPE to study the effects of incentive framing on effort provision. Because under CPE
expectations are formed after the agent’s effort choice e is committed to, her expectations
regarding her effort choice conincide with her actual effort choice. Consequently, there
is neither a gain nor a loss in dimension x2 = e. For the remainder, suppose an agent
chooses e and incurs effort cost c(e).
The agent’s utility and her effort choice e depend on the monetary income W . The
contract is contingent on which signal s ∈ {h, l} is observed. Therefore, the agent’s utility
may be influenced by how the contract is framed. Consider first the case of framing in
reward contracts, which has previously been included in similar models (Herweg, Müller,
and Weinschenk, 2010; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; de Quidt, 2014). Let
wR be the base pay under one type contract and let b be a positive payment contingent
on whether signal s = h is observed. Alternatively, let wR + b be the base pay under
another type of contract and let −b be a negative payment contingent on whether signal
s 6= h is observed. While the former contract structure has previously been called “bonus”
contract, the latter contract structure has been called “penalty” contract (e.g. Armantier
and Boly, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; de Quidt,
2014). Formally, the two different reward contracts can be described by
WR ≡ wR + gb+
{
(1− g)b if s = h
−gb if s 6= h,
(3)
where g ∈ {0, 1} is a reward framing parameter. Because the previously used term
“penalty” may be confused with sanction contracts that I introduce later, I use De Geest,
Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers (2009)’s classification: the contract with g = 0 is a “normal
reward” (NR) and the contract with g = 1 is an “annullable reward” (AR).
Further, consider possible framing in sanction contracts. Let wS be the base pay under
one type of sanction contract and let −b be a negative payment contingent on whether
signal s 6= h is observed. Alternatively, let wS − b be the base pay under another type of
sanction contract and let b be a positive payment contingent on whether signal s = h is
observed. Formally, the different sanction contracts can be captured by
WS ≡ wS − fb+
{
fb if s = h
−(1− f)b if s 6= h
, (4)
where f ∈ {0, 1} is a sanction framing parameter. The contract with f = 0 is a “normal
sanction” and the contract with f = 1 is an “annullable sanction”. To the best of my
knowledge, both the framing effects within sanction contracts and sanction framing in
comparison to reward framing has not been studied by previous research. Figure 1 on
page 8 illustrates the four different performance contingent incentive structures.
Note that for f = g the resulting payoffs under a reward contract are larger than the
payoffs under the corresponding sanction contract. This difference is equal to b, i.e.,
WR −WS = b . For instance, under an annullable sanction (f = 1), a person receives
7

























w − b+ b = w if s = h and w − b if s = l, whereas under an annullable reward (g = 1)
she receives w + b and w + b− b = w, respectively.
The difference in payoffs leads to an income effect. Because I am interested in framing
effects, I remove the income effect resulting from the discrepancy in absolute payoffs by
imposing wS = wR + b.6 Rewriting the formal representation of WS from (4) with this
imposition yields
WS ≡ wR + (1− f)b+
{
fb if s = h
−(1− f)b if s 6= h
. (5)
Comparing (5) with (3), it is convenient to see that the relation of framing parameters
can now be captured by g = 1− f . This suggests that the framing of reward contracts
and sanction contracts is crosswise equal. If income effects are removed, the frame of an
annullable sanction (f = 1) is equal to the frame of a normal reward (g = 0) and vice
versa.
Note again that reference points based on rational expectations cannot induce gain-loss
framing effects.7 However, ever since Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect theory
substantial evidence indicates that gain-loss framing is a strong behavioral force (e.g.:
de Heus, Hoogervorst, and van Dijk, 2010; Goerg and Walkowitz, 2010; Dufwenberg,
6 This imposition also facilitates clean experimental testing. I show in Appendix D that this imposition
does not change results regarding framing effects.
7 Compare above at page 5 and see Appendix A.
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Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). Specifically, previous experimental results indicate
that how a reward contract is framed has a significant effect on effort investment
(Armantier and Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; Hossain and List,
2012). Therefore, participants in these studies either did not form expections about
possible outcomes and solely used the status-quo as reference point, or they did form
expectations but these expectations were not fully rational. Because the modeling
approach with an expectation-based reference bundle (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007)
was tremendously successful in reconciling previously contradictory results, I avoid a model
that only relies on the status-quo to capture valence framing. Moreover, experimental
evidence indicates that expectations play an important role in reference point formation
(Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman, 2011). Finally, Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) mention
that the rational model does not capture some accounts of reference dependent choice
and, moreover, they contend that assuming rational expectations formalizes in an extreme
way the idea that people have some ability to predict their own behavior.
Therefore, let δ ∈ [0, 1] describe how well a person can form rational expectations, with
δ = 1 representing the capability to form perfectly rational expectations. Conversely,
1− δ describes how susceptible a person is to gain-loss framing by relying on the status-
quo. I further assume that the reference point is a linear combination of the rationally
expected outcome and the status-quo.8 Formally corresponding to notation used in (2),
the reference bundle can be described by
m(rk) ≡ δm(rk|RE) + (1− δ)m(rk|SQ)
where m(rk|RE) is a rationally expected utility component and m(rk|SQ) is a status-
quo utility component. By incorporating expectation-based reference points that are
imperfectly formed, the model extends previous expectation-based reference-dependent
preference models.
As a consequence, if actual outcome coincides with the rational expectation the gain-loss
utility does not equate to µ(·) = 0. When s = h and outcome wR+gb+ (1−g)b = wR+ b
occurs from (3), an agent with an imperfect expectation-based reference point has utility
U(e, g, wR, b)
∣∣













δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb)
)]
.
Note that when s = h and when with probability ph(e) a person expected u(wR+b) to some
extent δ, she will be in the gain domain because u(wR+b) > δu(wR+b)+(1−δ)u(wR+gb)
with 0 6 δ 6 1 and g ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, when with probability 1 − ph(e) a person
expected u(wR) to some extent δ she will also be in the gain domain as u(wR + b) >
δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb).
8 Recently, de Quidt (2014) introduced a similar idea in his Appendix A.1. The main part of de Quidt
(2014)’s contribution, however, relies on a model with status-quo reference points only.
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When s 6= h and from (3) outcome wR + gb − gb = wR occurs, an agent with an
imperfect expectation-based reference point has utility
U(e, g, wR, b)
∣∣















δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb)
)]
.
In this case, notwithstanding whether the agent expected u(wR + b) with probability
ph(e) or u(wR) with probability 1− ph(e), each to some extent δ, she will suffer a loss
because u(wR) 6 δu(wR+b)+(1−δ)u(wR+gb) and u(wR) 6 δu(wR)+(1−δ)u(wR+gb),
respectively.
Signal s = h and, therefore, outcome wR + b occur with probably ph(e), whereas signal
s 6= h and, therefore, outcome wR occurs with probability 1− ph(e). An expected-utility











1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2ph(e∗)p′h(e∗)(λ− 1)δ]u(wR) (6)
+ (λ− 1)(1− δ)p′h(e∗)u(wR + gb)
where e∗ = e∗(wR, b, g).9 The optimal effort choice e∗ depends on the framing parameter
g = 1 − f . For instance, under an annullable reward with g = 1 (AR) the right hand
side of expression (6) is larger than under a normal reward with g = 0 (NR). Therefore,
based on gain-loss framing I predict that e∗AR(wR, b, g = 1) > e∗NR(wR, b, g = 0). Because
g = 1− f , the opposite is true for sanction contracts. Under an annullable sanction with
f = 1 (AS) marginal gains in (6) are smaller than under a normal sanction with f = 0
(NS) and, thus, e∗AS(wR, b, f = 1) < e∗NS(wR, b, f = 0). Accordingly, I derive from (6) all
initial effort predictions between the four incentive structures.10 Table 1 provides an
overview for all predictions.
Note that prediction AR > NR reflects previous results from experiments on framing
effects in reward contracts (Armantier and Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup,
2012; Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012). The framing effects
within sanction contracts that have not been studied yet is captured by NS > AS.
Moreover, these two predictions capture vertical comparisons in terms of Figure 1 (page
8). In addition, NS > NR and AR > AS capture between-frame predictions of reward
9 With p′′h(e) = 0, the second order condition EU ′′(e, f, wR, b)
!







< c′′(e). For the remainder of this paper, I will make this assumption.
10 Note that I assume that higher effort translates into higher performance. I believe that in the
experiment, the performance-contingent payment of ¤ 10 is neither small enough to threaten crowding-
out in the effort dimension (e.g. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b,a) nor
so large as to risk choking (e.g. Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar, 2009).
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Table 1: Performance predictions based on gain-loss framing
AR NS NR AS
(g = 1) (g = 0) (f = 0) (f = 1)
AR (g = 1) = > >
NS (g = 0) = > >
NR (f = 0) < < =
AS (f = 1) < < =
and sanction contracts (horizontal comparisons in Figure 1). Finally, AR = NS and
NR = AS are within-frame predictions of opposite contracts (crosswise comparisons
Figure 1).
2.2. Moral property rights and reciprocal behavior
The elimination of income effects between the sanction and reward schemes facilitates
studying other intervening factors. Specifically, according to predictions AR = NS and
NR = AS (crosswise comparisons) any observable and significant difference regarding
effort provision between these mechanisms cannot be caused by income effects and
gain-loss framing because these factors are held constant between the payment schemes.
Similarly, an “expectation communication effect” (Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012,
p. 65) cannot play a role because the effect hinges on framing differences within the
reward/sanction schemes and not between crosswise compared sanctions and rewards.
The only discernable difference is the mere formulation of the of the ex ante situation,
i.e., before the agent makes a decision regarding her effort level e. As far as normal
sanctions versus annullable rewards are concerned (the loss frames), the formulation of
the ex ante situation differs by a positive payment (w vs. w + b). As far as normal
rewards versus annullable sanctions are concerned (the gain frames), the ex ante situation
differs by a negative payment (w vs. w − b).
The formulation before the fact may trigger reciprocal responses not captured by
hypotheses based on gain-loss framing. People do not only care about the final allocation
of wealth, but also how it came about. Assume that an agent exhibits egocentric other-
regarding preferences (Cox and Sadiraj, 2007; Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007): her
utility depends on self-regarding concerns υ but also on the principals well-being y(e)
that is affected the agent’s effort choice e such that y′(e) > 0, y′′(e) < 0. The agent’s
self-regarding concerns υ(·) can be captured by the expectation about U(e, g, wR, b) (see
above). Following Cox and Sadiraj (2007) and Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007),
the principal’s well-being y(e) is connected to the agent’s overall utility by an altruism
coefficient θ that can be interpreted as the agent’s emotional state. Consistently with
the modeling approach so far, I assume that the agent’s overall utility is piece-wise linear
in υ(·) and in y(e). Formally,
V (υ, y) = υ(·) + θ y(e).
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An optimizing individual sets an effort level such that 0 != υ′(·)+θ y′(e). Utility component
υ′(·) can be substituted by (6) and within frames, i.e., for comparisons between AR and
NS and between AS and NR, υ′(·) is equal because g = 1− f .
Note that the agent does not care about the well-being of the principal when θ = 0. By
contrast, the agent’s emotional state can, for instance, correspond to gratitude (0 < θ < 1)
or resentment (−1 < θ < 0). Similar to Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007), I let θ(ρ)
be affected by a reciprocity motive ρ and θ(ρ) = a ρ(x). Coefficient a captures the







m(x) is the maximum payoff the agent can guarantee herself given the principal’s choice
x. m0 is a neutral payoff in some appropriate sense relative to which the agent evaluates
m(x). This reference point can, in particular, reflect moral property rights. A moral
property right is an individual sense of entitlement or obligation (Gächter and Riedl, 2005;
Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007). Moral entitlements are subjectively perceived rights
(rather than abstract legal rights) that are accompanied by a motivational disposition to
defend them and, by contrast, moral obligations refer to subjectively perceived claims of
others that are accompanied by a motivational dispostition to respect them (cf.: Schlicht,
1998; Gächter and Riedl, 2005). The agent’s moral property right is context-dedendent
to the extent that it is gauged relative to the perceived available alternative actions of
the principal (cf. Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007). A similar notion leads to Cox,
Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008)’s reciprocity axiom: actions that are preceived to be more
generous than an alternative action trigger a response more altruistic than the alternative
response. In the present context, it is psychologically intutitive that under AR (AS)
the alternative payment choice of the principal would have been NS (NR). In other
words, the payment structure that obtains without the initial action of the principal is
very salient. By contrast, an agent under NS (NR) will have difficulties to recognize
that the principal could have increased (decreased) the initial payment before the task.
AR (AS) as alternative to NS (NR) is much less salient. This intuition is in line with
the traditional distinction between acts of commission and acts of ommission. Another
person’s intentions are made more salient by an action (AR and AS) that overturns the
status quo than by inaction (NS and NR) that preserves the status quo (Cox, Friedman,
and Sadiraj, 2008).
Because alternative decisions are difficult to imagine under NR and NS, I assume
the reciprocity motive is not triggered:11 for NR m(x) = wR + ph(e) b = m0; for NS




b = m0. In other words, there is no action of the principal
to be reciprocated that differs from the moral property right of the agent. Therefore,
11 One may model a salience degree γ to which the alternative decision can be fathomed and include this
in the model. This, however, does not qualitatively affect the predictions to be generated. Therefore,
for simplicity I assume salience of the alternative decision of the principal to be γ = 0 for both NR
and NS and γ = 1 for both AS and AR.
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θNR(ρ) = θNS(ρ) = 0. A comparison of the agent’s potential payoff with moral property
rights has no influence on effort choice under NS and NR.















For AS with x ∈ {−b; 0}, the agent’s payoff given the principal’s action −b is m(x) =





A comparison of the agent’s potential payoff with moral property rights triggers gratitude
under AR and resentment under AS. Thus moral property rights affect the agent’s effort
choice.
An expected-utility maximizing agent who is susceptible to framing and moreover
exhibits egocentric other-regarding preferences will choose an effort level e such that
marginal costs equal marginal gains, i.e.,
c′(e∗) !=
[







1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2ph(e∗)p′h(e∗)(λ− 1)δ]u(wR) (7)
+ (λ− 1)(1− δ)p′h(e∗)u(wR + gb)
+ θ y′(e)
While the third term in (7) determines the influence of gain-loss framing just as in
(6) and has lead to the predictions in Table 1 (page 11), the fourth term in (7) captures
reciprocal motives. For within contract comparisons between possible incentive structures,
reciprocal motives and moral property rights will strengthen previous predictions. For one,
e∗AR(wR, b, g = 1, θAR = 1) > e∗NR(wR, b, g = 0, θNR = 0). For another, e∗AS(wR, b, f =
1, θAS = −1) < e∗NS(wR, b, f = 0, θNS = 0). Between contracts and between frames,
reciprocal motives either do not play out (NR vs. NS) because θNS = θNR = 0 or
exacerbate the difference (AR vs. AS) because θAR = 1 and θAS = −1. To this point, the
predictions are not qualitatively altered. Consider now the influence of reciprocal motives
for within frame comparisons between incentive structures. Were predictions solely based
on gain-loss framing as in Table 1 (page 11), one would not predict a difference in effort
levels e∗. For the gain frames (NR vs. AS), θNR = 0 and θAS = −1 and, therefore,
e∗NR(wR, b, g = 0, θNR = 0) > e∗AS(wR, b, f = 1, θAS = −1). For the loss frames (AR vs.
NS), θAR = 1 and θNS = 0 and, therefore, e∗AR(wR, b, g = 1, θAR = 1) > e∗NS(wR, b, f =
0, θNS = 0)). As a result, reciprocity motives channelled by moral property rights yield
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important modifications for predictions about effort choices within frames. All predictions
based on gain-loss framing and moral property rights are summarized in Table 2.12
Table 2: Performance predictions based on gain-loss framing and moral property
rights
AR NS NR AS
(g = 1) (g = 0) (f = 0) (f = 1)
AR (g = 1, θ = 1) > > >
NS (g = 0, θ = 0) < > >
NR (f = 0, θ = 0) < < >
AS (f = 1, θ = −1) < < <
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
As an experimental workhorse participants catalog Euro coins. The task has been
designed to study counterproductive behavior in principal-agent settings (Belot and
Schröder, 2013). Participants receive a set of four boxes with Euro coins. The task
consists of cataloging the coins and returning the boxes with the coins by a specified
date. Participants receive a catalogue of current Euro coins. With the help of the
calatogue, they identify the geographic origin, the denomination, and the date of coinage.
Participants report their output on an online identification sheet.
Within a set of boxes, the composition of coins of each box varied with respect to their
value and quantity. Across sets, however, each participant received a total of 787 coins
that sum up to a value of ¤ 114.70. To associate each box to its corresponding entries
on the online identification sheet, the lid of each box specifies a unique code that has
been randomly generated.
Upon collection, participants are asked to specify a time at which they return the
coins on the following day. Participants take the material with them and have about 24h
to complete the identification task. All returned materials are checked regarding coin
composition and mistakes in the identification task.
This task has several advantages over other real-effort tasks. First, the measurement
of compliance, effort, or productivity is not limited to a single variable. Instead, the
coin cataloging task provides several measures for compliance, effort, and productivity:
participants can make (honest) mistakes, inflate and deflate their report, be late, and
even steal coins. Second, the nature of the task prohibits conditioning the payment on
true productivity. Observing productivity immediately is impossible. Therefore, relying
on participants’ self-reports is credible and minimizing experimenter demand effects.
Finally, deviating or engaging in counterproductive behavior is not explicitly induced
and therefore the task corresponds more closely to many real-life situations.
12 Appendix B provides predictions that obtain solely from reciprocity motives induced by moral property.
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3.1. Treatments
The field experiment was based on a 2× 2 factorial design. The first factor with the two
levels “reward” and “sanction” reflected the nature of the contract. The second factor is
the structure of the contract, which can either take a “normal” or an “annullable” form.
Figure 2 illustrates the combination of the factors. The four ensuing treatments cover
the four contingent payment schemes (NS, NR, AS, AR).
Figure 2: 2 × 2 factorial design & ensuing treatments
contract
sanction reward
structure normal NS NRannullable AS AR
In addition, a baseline treatment with fixed pay instead of performance-contingent pay
(BL) was added. This treatment allows to control whether incentives work across the
entire range of possible incentive schemes employed here. It also facilitates to identify
potential crowding-out effects that may enter through moral entitlements and negative
reciprocal behavior.
3.2. Procedure
Participants were recruited to support an ongoing research project concerning data
collection. Offers for small, one-time student jobs were posted across the campus of the
University of Cologne. Moreover, the corresponding flyer was distributed to the student
associations at the University of Cologne with the request to forward the offer to their
fellow students. Potential participants replied to the offer by email to a neutral email
address.
When interested participants replied, they were randomly assigned to one of the five
treatment groups. Once randomly assigned to the treatment groups, participants were
invited to collect the materials, i.e., the four boxes, the catalogue, and detailed task
descriptions.13
Upon collection of the materials, participants received standard instructions. They
learned about the task, the materials, and about how they will be payed. In each
treatment, participants learned that they can earn up to ¤ 20. Because I am interested
in gain-loss framing, the instructions have been carefully designed and employed neutral
language to avoid label effects (cf. Dufwenberg, Gächter, and Hennig-Schmidt, 2011;
Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012) that may otherwise result from terms like “bonus”,
“reward”, “punishment”, or “sanction”. Each particiant was asked to write her name and
13 All instructions and templates for communication with the participants will be made available upon
request.
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date of birth on an envelope, in which his or her payment will be placed and which was
to be collected at a specified date.
Between treatments, the instructions only differed in how a participant’s final payment
was to be determined. In BL, participants were handed 20 Euro and they put the money
into their envelope. In all other treatments, participants in addition learned that upon
return, i.e., after task completion, one of the four boxes will be randomly determined
and that the contents of the box will be controlled for possible mismatches against the
respective entries on their online identification form. In NS, participants then received 20
Euro and put it into their envelope. They were informed that if five or less mismatches
are found, their payment will remain unchanged. However, 10 Euro will be retained and
not paid out if more than five mistakes occurred. In NR, participants received 10 Euro
and put the money into their envelope. They were informed about the random control.
If five or less mistakes would be found, they would receive another 10 Euro. If more than
five mistakes occurred, there would be no additional payment. In AS, participants were
handed 20 Euro. From this amount, however, 10 Euro were provisionally kept before
their task starts. Then they were informed about the random control and that they
would receive the retained 10 Euro, if five or less mistakes are found. If more than five
mistakes occurred, however, their payment would remain unchanged. Finally, in AR
participants obtained 10 Euro which they put into their envelope. They also learned that
they provisionally receive an additional 10 Euro before their task starts. Also this 10
Euro were put into the envelope. Then they were informed about the random control
and that their payment will remain unchanged, if five or less mistakes are found. If more
than five mistakes occurred, however, 10 Euro would be retained and not paid out.
The instructions were repeated in the task descriptions that participants took home
with them. Participants were encouraged to consult the task descriptions in case they
had questions while working on the task.
Upon return of the materials, participants in the performance-contingent pay treatments
randomly determined with the throw of a die, which box will be decisive for their final
payment. After returning the materials, all boxes were checked regarding coin composition
and mistakes in the identification task. Upon collection of their payment, participants
answered a small survey. The survey asked for some socio-demographic data, for an
estimate of how long they worked on the task, and to evaluate the appropriateness of the
payment.
3.3. Sample & Measurements
Overall, 89 students from the University of Cologne where invited to the study. Of these
potential participants, 14 were excluded because they either did not show up or did not
complete the task. Therefore, 75 students, i.e., 15 students in each of the five treatments,
participated in the field experiment.14
14 I set an a priori stopping rule of 75 participants. This threshold was determined by available research
funding. From the data reported in Table 2 of Hossain and List (2012) I determined an average
effect size d̄ = 0.5445. I defined the type I error rate to α = 0.05 and the desired statistical power to
1 − β = 0.8. I used a one-tailed Mann-Wilcoxon-Whitney test as benchmark because the hypotheses
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics per treatment and overall
NS NR AS AR BL overall
# participants 15 15 15 15 15 75
% participants 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 100.00
% female 53.33 60.00 46.67 60.00 40.00 52.00
Age (avg.) 24.4 23.93 23.80 25.73 23.2 24.21
Age (st.dev.) 3.85 3.45 3.03 3.71 2.60 3.38
# semesters (avg.) 4.67 4.93 4.00 3.80 4.53 4.39
# semesters (st.dev.) 3.52 2.99 1.96 1.27 2.03 2.45
Table 3 summarizes descriptive statistics of the sample. Overall, 53% of participants
were female, participants on average were 24.41 years old, and on average had finished
their fourth semester of studies. Based on a Pearson’s Chi-squared test (χ2 = 3.1713,
p = 0.9998), I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the characteristics of the treatment
samples are different from those of the overall sample, i.e., randomization worked.
Participants’ study background was very heterogenous. 17 different study programes
were represented. Only 8 participants with a background in medicine, both human and
veterinary, had a share among all participants of more than 10%. On average, participants
earned ¤ 17.20.
The main measurement is accuracy exhibited during the identification task as measured
by the number of mistakes participants made as compared to their entire report. Accuracy
is also the task dimension, which is monitored and determines payment. The identification
task further measures coins that are not returned (theft) and time difference between
stated and actual time of return (tardiness). Moreover, in addition to control variables
the exit survey elicits a subjective estimate of work hours put into the task. Finally, the
exit survey asked individual evaluation about the appropriateness of the payment on a
7-point Likert scale.
4. Results
Table 4 (page 18) reports summary statistics for the measures of interest across the five
treatments. From looking at Table 4, the data appears to vary substantially between
treatments, except for theft. In fact, based on a Fisher’s exact test (p = 1.00), the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected that theft is equally likey among treatments. Therefore
and because the extent of theft appears minimal, the remainder of the analysis will not
take theft into account.
To proceed with confirmatory testing of the research hypotheses, I focus on the
main measure of work accuracy, i.e., the number of mistakes participants made in
are directional. On these grounds, an a priori power calculation returns a group size of 45 participants
for equally large groups. To give the effect slightly bigger chance and to account for the possibility of
unusable observations, the ultimate goal is to obtain 50 observations per treatment. I will continue
data collection once more research funding will be available.
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Table 4: Summary of results
BL NS AR NR AS
Accuracy:
# mistakes (avg.) 52.87 21.47 7.13 21.20 33.47
# mistakes (st.dev.) 18.14 9.13 3.72 8.52 19.22
Theft:
# thieves 1 0 0 0 1
swag 2.15 – – – 2.30
Tardiness:
# minutes (avg.) -14.27 10.40 13.4 7.67 48.53
# minutes (st.dev.) 22.27 19.70 41.88 35.26 48.79
# late participants 2 12 10 9 12
Stated Work Time:
# hours (avg.) 3.35 3.50 3.80 3.37 4.13
# hours (st.dev.) 0.63 1.10 0.68 0.79 1.12
Stated payment satisfaction:
Likert score (median): 1 0 1 -1 2
Likert score (IQR): 3 3.5 2.5 1.5 1
the identification task. Because treatment samples are small, I rely on nonparametric
bootstrapping for the remainder of the analysis.15 Figure 3 on page 20 depicts the
distribution of bootstrapped means of mistakes for each treatment.16 Visually, there are
strong differences between BL and the performance-contingent pay treatments. Moreover,
within the performance-contingent pay treatments AR clearly exhibits the smallest mean
(m̂AR = 7.12) and also the smallest spread (σ̂AR = 0.93) of the bootstrapped data. By
contrast, AS visually exhibits the largest mean (m̂AS = 33.39) and also the largest spread
(σ̂AS = 4.80) among the performance-contingent pay treatments. Central tendency and
spread of the bootstrapped mean mistake distributions for treatments NS (m̂NS = 21.45,
σ̂NS = 2.31) and NR (m̂NS = 21.18, σ̂NS = 2.13) are only difficult to discern visually.
To analyze in detail the pattern of bootstrapped means of mistakes conditional on
treatment, I compare each treatment pair using a one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-test.
Table 5 (page 19) reports differences between means of the sample data and the achieved
significance level of each pairwise comparison.
As first result that deserves emphasis, I can reject the null hypothesis that the
performance-contingent pay treatment samples (AR, NS, NR, AS) and the baseline treat-
ment with fixed pay (BL) originate from identically distributed populations. Participants
in BL commit significantly more mistakes on average than in the other four treatments.
15 Bootstrapping facilitates exploiting the information in the treatment samples as much as possible,
is independent of parametric assumptions, and is especially useful when sample sizes are small. I
provide a detailed explanation of why I use the bootstrap in Appendix C.
16 Note that I reversed the scale of the mistake axis because I equate lower mistakes with higher
performance.
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Table 5: Pairwise treatment comparisons regarding work accuracy
BL AR NS NR AS
BL – 45.73∗∗∗ 31.40∗∗∗ 31.67∗∗∗ 19.40∗∗
AR – – −14.33∗∗∗ −14.07∗∗∗ −26.33∗∗∗
NS – – – 0.27 −12.00∗
NR – – – – −12.27∗
AS – – – – –
∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗: p < 0.01; ∗∗∗: p < 0.001.
Incentives matter across the board of possible incentive structures. This foundational
economic insight has become conventional wisdom, but is rarely backed-up with data.
The data therefore also suggests the absence of a crowding-out effect on the monitored
task dimension. Introducing incentives did not backfire in a way that intrinsic motivation
was excessively pushed aside (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).
Result 1 (incentives matter): Participants in performance-contingent pay treatments
(AR, NS, NR, AS) on average committed significantly less mistakes than participants
in BL.
Next, I compare different incentive frames within the same contract structure, i.e.,
reward or sanction contracts. I unambiguously predicted from the formal model that
people under AR will show higher effort levels than people under NR. In terms of gain-loss
framing, the loss frame in the AR contract leads to higher performance predictions than
the gain frame in NR. In terms moral property rights, the additional upfront payment in
AR triggers a positive reciprocity element absent in NR that leads to higher performance
predictions. Table 5 shows that the mean of mistakes in AR is significantly smaller
than the mean of mistakes in NR (T = 3.997, p < 0.0001). Therefore, I reject the null
hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from identically distributed populations. In
other words, participants under AR committed significantly less mistakes on average than
participants under NR. This result resembles the previous findings that “punishment”
frames lead to higher effort or performance than “reward” frames (Armantier and Boly,
2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012).
The effect of different incentive frames within sanction contracts has not been tested
so far. Results from the formal analyses again unambiguously predict that people under
AS choose lower effort levels than people under NS. Based on gain-loss framing, this
prediction is driven by the loss frame in NS as compared to the gain frame in AS. Effects
of moral property rights on reciprocal motives lead to the same prediction because AS
entails a negative reciprocity element. Table 5 shows that the mean of mistakes in AS was
significantly larger than the mean of mistakes in NS (T = 2.054, p = 0.0138). Therefore,
I can reject the null hypothesis that AS bootstrap sample and NS bootstrap sample
are drawn from identically distributed populations. Participants under AS committed
significantly more mistakes on average than participants under NS and, thus, show lower
performance.
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Result 2 (effects within contracts): Participants in AR on average committed
significantly less mistakes than participants in NR. Participants in NS on average
committed significantly less mistakes than participants AS.
Further, consider mistakes in different frames between contract structures, i.e., com-
parisons between AS and AR on the one hand and NS and NR on the other hand. The
formal analysis yielded the unambiguous result that participants under AR choose higher
effort levels and, therefore, commit less mistakes than people under AS. This prediction is
driven by the loss frame in AR as compared to the gain frame in AS. In addition, effects
of moral property rights lead positive reciprocity motives in AR and negative reciprocity
motives in AS, which strengthens the prediction. The results in Table 5 (page 5) indicate
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that the mean of mistakes in AS was significantly larger than the mean of mistakes in AR
(T = 3.778, p < 0.0001). Therefore, one can reject null hypothesis that the AS bootstrap
sample and the AR bootstrap sample are drawn from identically distributed populations.
As predicted, participants under AR committed significantly less mistakes on average
than participants under AS.
So far, the results from the field experiment are in line with the predictions driven
by loss aversion but also with predictions from reciprocal motives. The comparison
of NR and NS serves as an important indicator that facilitates identification of which
effect is at play. According to the framing model (see Table 1), participants in NS (loss
frame) would invest higher effort and thus commit less mistakes than their peers in NR
(gain frame). This prediction does not change if one assumes that both effects, gain-loss
framing and reciprocity motives, are at work (see Table 2). However, if gain-loss framing
does not matter but individuals only exhibit reciprocity tendencies, one would predict
that there is no discernible difference between NS and NR because reciprocity motives
are not triggered by moral property rights (see Table 7 in Appendix B). Interestingly,
I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the NS sample and the NR sample are drawn
from identically distributed populations (T = −0.084, p = 0.5321). Participants in NS,
although under the loss frame, did not commit significantly more mistakes on average
than participants in NR.
Result 3 (effects between contracts): Participants in AR on average committed
significantly less mistakes than participants in AS. However, participants in NS on
average did not commit significantly less mistakes than participants in NR.
Behavioral responses within frames are another crucial indicator to differentiate which
effect is at work. If gain-loss framing is the major driving factor for behavior under the
different incentive structures, there should be no statistically significant difference in
performance within frames but between contracts, i.e., between AR and NS for losses and
between NR and AS for gains (see Table 1). By contrast, the formal analysis about moral
property rights inducing reciprocity motives predicts statistically significant differences
between incentive structures with equal frames (see Table 2 and Table 7 in Appendix B).
Specifically, the theory predicts (1) persons in AR to exhibit higher effort/performance
than persons in NS and, conversely, (2) persons in AS to exhibit less effort/performance
than persons in NR. The statistical results in Table 5 (page 5) back-up these predictions.
There are significant differences between those incentive structures that have equal frames
but that differ in how the situation before task execution is formulated. Specifically,
persons in NS committed significantly more mistakes on average than persons in AR
(T = 3.924, p < 0.0001). Similarly, in AS persons committed significantly more mistakes
than in NR (T = 2.115, p = 0.0114). Therefore, I can reject the null hypotheses that AR
and NS, respectively, and AS and NR, respectively, are drawn from identically distributed
populations.
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Result 4 (effects within frames): Participants in NS on average committed sig-
nificantly more mistakes than participants in AR. Participants in AS on average
committed significantly more mistakes than participants in NR.
Table 6: Regression analysis
Task Accuracy Tardiness Late-comer Payment Satisfaction
(Poisson Model) (OLS Model) (Probit Model) (Ordered Logistic Model)
AR −2.051∗∗∗ 32.824∗∗ 3.733∗∗ 0.572
(0.189) (14.317) (5.594) (0.877)
NS −0.933∗∗∗ 26.792∗∗∗ 4.389∗∗ −0.164
(0.162) (7.894) (6.738) (1.054)
NR −0.882∗∗∗ 25.095∗∗ 3.431∗ −1.370
(0.151) (11.373) (6.122) (0.829)
AS −0.488∗∗∗ 65.042∗∗∗ 4.239∗∗ 1.452
(0.158) (13.562) (6.700) (0.852)
female −0.113 −18.412∗∗ −2.277∗∗∗ −0.552
(0.120) (7.405) (3.905) (0.560)
age 0.013 0.077 −0.015 0.0.079
(0.021) (1.294) (0.574) (0.085)
semesters −0.042 1.936 0.008 0.092
(0.034) (1.970) (0.241) (0.141)
(intercept) 3.894∗∗∗ −17.528 −1.434 –
(0.460) (27.340) (15.127) –
∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
To reinforce these results and to further explore the data while controlling for observable
characteristics of the participants, I conduct a regression analysis of the number of
mistakes, tardiness, and subjective evaluations of payment appropriateness. All regressions
are based on case resampling to account for small sample size. Table 6 reports bias
corrected coefficient estimates and standard errors.17 Starting with work accuracy, a
Poisson regression supports the earlier findings that treatments AR, NS, NR, and AS
have a significant negative effect on the number of mistakes. In addition, the results
reveal that the three control variables gender, age, and number of semesters had no
significant effect on accuracy in the identification task.
Further, I find that tardiness as measured by the difference between the actual and the
announced time of returning the materials is significantly higher in the four performance-
contingent pay treatments as compared to the baseline treatment with fixed pay. It is not
clear, whether these differences in tardiness occur because participants in AR, NS, NR,
and AS put more effort into the identification task. In the exit survey, participants were
asked for their individual estimate of how much time they spent on the task. On average,
participants reported a working time of 3.35 hours in BL, 3.8 hours in AR, 3.5 hours
17 P-values are calculated based on the bias corrected results.
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in NS, 3.37 hours in NR, and 4.13 hours in AS. Based on a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum
test I cannot reject the null hypothesis that these differences originate from the same
distribution (χ2 = 6.743, p = 0.1501). The delay therefore appears not to be related
to longer working hours. Moreover, female participants returned significantly less late
(p < 0.05). Age and number of semesters had significant no effect on tardiness.
In a next step, I differentiate between early and late comers and estimate the probability
that participants return the materials late. I only find significant differences in the
probability of being late. The results are in line with the average findings on tardiness:
participants in the performance-contingent pay treatments are significantly more likely
to be late, female participants are significantly less likely to be late, and participants’
age and their number of semesters have no significant effect.
Result 5 (2nd order effort crowding-out): Participants in performance-contingent
pay treatments (AR, NS, NR, AS) are more likely to and also returned significantly
later than participants in BL.
Finally, I turn to participants evaluation of the appropriateness of their final payment.
On the exit survey, they could indicate their evaluation on a 7-point Likert scale that
ranged from “absolutely inappropriate” to “absolutely appropriate”. I did not label any
steps in between the extremes and coded the responses on a scale from −3 to 3. Based
on a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, I can reject the null hypothesis that the evaluations
conditional on treatment are drawn from the same distribution (χ2 = 15.632, p = 0.0036).
Therefore, I estimate an ordered logit model. Compared to BL, however, I find no
significant effects of any treatment or control variable.
5. Discussion
How economically equivalent incentives are formulated before task execution clearly
matters for how much effort an agent puts into a task. In the field experiment, within
reward contracts and sanction contracts, respectively, I found strong evidence that loss
framed incentive structures had a positive effect on work effort. Also for annullable
sanctions versus annullable rewards, I find that participants made less mistakes and
thus exhibited more effort under the loss frame, i.e., under an annullable reward. This
resonates with prior research on framing effects in contracts and, in particular for the
AR vs. NR comparison, I replicate results from previous contributions (Armantier and
Boly, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012).
However, the question is whether these results are indeed driven by the feature com-
monly associated to gain-loss framing: loss aversion. For these comparisons, reciprocity
motives triggered by moral property rights yield the same predictions. That I find no
effect between NS (loss) and NR (gain) is surprising from a gain-loss framing perspective.
However, it may be an artefact of this specific field setting. How robust this null result is
remains unclear. A more controlled environment may provide a suitable test bed to shed
more light on this question.
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Moreover, the results show strong and significant differences regarding work effort where
the gain-loss frame was not different, i.e., between AR and NS for losses and between
NR and AS for gains. The evidence indicates more work effort in AR as compared to
NS and less work effort in AS as compared to NR. Notions of moral property rights
and reciprocal behavior predicted these differences between incentive structures with
equal frames. In comparison to NS, because participants received an additional ¤ 10
ex ante (that may be retracted later) in AR they either have reciprocated in kind or
they perceived an obligation to put more effort into the task. Similarly, participants that
needed to deposit ¤ 10 of their initial endowment responded in unkind or they perceived
the entitlement to exert less effort.
To the extent that previous studies attribute differences between annullable rewards
and normal rewards to gain-loss framing, this conclusion may be wrong. These studies
have a blind spot towards reciprocal behavior, which yields the same predictions as
gain-loss framing if one only compares behavioral responses within contracts but between
frames. Taken together, the results in this paper are in line with the pattern predicted
by moral property rights alone. Gain-loss framing does not seem to matter much. As a
cautionary note: to perfectly identify these potential drivers was not possible in this field
experiment. Such identification would be a worthwhile endeavour for more controlled lab
studies that clearly expose the underlying decision processes.
Nevertheless, the results here overall emphasize that rule designers – for contract or
statute – need to account for framing effects as a result of reference-dependent decision
making if they want to strengthen commitment to contract performance or rule compliance.
In this way, behavioral insights should be integrated in standard legal arguments when
we reason about which incentive mechanism to employ for a specific (legal) problem.
In addition, the field experiment uncovered the interesting result, that participants in all
performance-contingent pay treatments were significantly late on returning the materials.
Even after controlling for other factors like gender and study progress, participants
who were paid paid according to their performance were much more likely to be late as
compared to their peers who received a fix payment. I found no indication that this was
driven by more effort and, thus, longer working hours. This appears to be an unintended
consequence of performance-contingent pay that requires monitoring at least one effort
dimension. Seemingly, agents perceive the monitoring as unkind and retaliate by putting
less effort in the dimension that is the least costly for themselves (cf.: Belot and Schröder,
2014). Therefore, performance-contingent pay may positively effect one effort dimension,
but crowd-out others (second order crowding-out). From the perspective of institutional
design, this is relevant for the decision about which and how many task dimensions to
monitor. This decision then depends very much on the nature of the task. Because the
focus of this field experiment was on framing effects of incentives, I refrain from further
educated speculation on this matter. The observation, however, is an important venue
for further research. Nevertheless, these exploratory results remind us to be mindful of
potential, unintended consequences of implementing specific incentives.
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6. Conclusion
Recent experimental evidence (e.g. Armantier and Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and
Tontrup, 2012; Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012) suggests
that the framing of incentives impacts contractual performance specifically and rule
compliance in general. Loss frames seemingly lead to more effort than gain frames. This,
however, was only empirically validated for reward contracts, i.e., normal rewards and
annullable rewards, under which people stand to increase their final wealth relative to
their initial wealth. In this field experiment, I could replicate these findings. In addition,
I extended the experimental investigation to sanction contracts under which people face
a reduction of their final wealth relative to their initial wealth. In this respect, I found
corresponding effects. Under normal sanctions, participants exerted more effort and
committed less mistakes that their peers under an annullable sanction.
In addition, extending the set of contracts facilitated to study differences when gain-loss
frames are equal. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that there are meaningful differences
in effort provision within frames, i.e., between annullable rewards and normal sanctions
and between annullable sanctions and normal rewards, respectively. These differences
were predicted based on theory about moral property rights and reciprocity. Notably,
the emergent pattern of results are in line with the predictions solely based on moral
property rights triggering reciprocity motives. I do not find differences in effort provision
where incentive structures differ in gain-loss framing and where no reciprocity motive is
triggered. This finding draws into question the overarching conclusion of previous studies
that loss aversion is the main driver for higher effort provision. In addition to gain-loss
framing, triggering reciprocity motives through moral property rights can be harnessed
to design more effective institutions.
Finally, the field experiment also uncovered evidence on second order crowding-out
of effort. While under all performance-contingent pay mechanisms effort regarding
the incentivized dimension increased in comparison to a fixed pay rule, effort on non-
incentivized task dimension decreased. Specifically, while incentivization increased work
accuracy it also reduced work punctuality. This suggests that optimal institution design
hinges on the specificity of the task to be governed.
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Appendix A. Gain-loss Framing & Rational Expectations
Note again, that the difference between a reward contract WR as in (3) and a sanction
contract WS as in (5) lies only in the framing parameter, i.e., g = 1 − f . To see that
rational expectation reference-points do not induce gain-loss framing effects, consider
only a reward contract WR. If a person forms rational expectations, she correctly predicts
her choice set, how her choice influences the distribution of possible outcomes, and her
hedonic response to this decision environment.
As in the main part, let utility of income u(WR) and effort cost c(e) be the two utility
dimensions of interest and let lagged expectations be formed after the effort choice e is
committed to (CPE). For s = h, reference-dependent utility with reference points based
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for the maximization of expected utility framing has no consequence. In other words,
reference points based on rational expectations do not induce framing effects.
Appendix B. Pure Predictions from Moral Property Rights
Assume an agent does not exibit expectation-based reference-dependent preferences.
Rather, she only has an egocentric other-regarding preference structure and her utility
over her own final wealth m = u(w) − c(e), u′(w) > 0, u′′(w) < 0, and the principal’s
final wealth y(e), y′(e) > 0, y′′(e) < 0 is
u(m, y) = m+ θ y(e).
Her expected utility is
Eu(m, y) = ph(e)u(wR + b) + [1− ph(e)]u(wR)− c(e) + θ y(e)
= ph(e)u(wR + b) + u(wR)− ph(e)u(wR)− c(e) + θ y(e)
= ph(e) [u(wR + b)− u(wR)] + u(wR)− c(e) + θ y(e)
Using the first order condition, marginal costs and marginal gains are
c′(e∗) = [u(wR + b)− u(wR)] p′h(e∗) + θ y′(e∗)
Relevant for the different incentive structures is only that the optimal effort choice
is also a function of the altruism coefficient, e∗ = e∗(wR, b, θ). With θi = {1, 0, 0,−1},
i ∈ {AR,NR,NS,AS} the following prediction obtains
e∗AR > e
∗
NR = e∗NS > e∗AS.
Alternatively, in tableform as in the main text:
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Table 7: Performance predictions based on moral property rights
AR NS NR AS
(θ = 1) (θ = 0) (θ = 0) (θ = −1)
AR (θ = 1) > > >
NS (θ = 0) < = >
NR (θ = 0) < = >
AS (θ = −1) < < <
Appendix C. Statistical Analysis and Bootstrapping
To statistically analayze the mistakes measure across treatments with small sample sizes,
one could use a simple nonparametric test such as the Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test. Note
that there has recently been some criticism about relying on such and similar tests (see:
Schlag, 2015). Moreover, because here I deal with simultaenous statistical inference
(multiple testing problem), one would prudently have to adjust otherwise exaggerated
p-values. To make this adjustment, several methods are available and heavily debated.
Even after such adjustment, however, the sample size remains small and, therefore, one
cannot be entirely confident that the statistic of interest from that sample is close to the
corresponding population statistic.
A way one may learn more about the latter is to take additional samples from the
population again and again, calculate the statistic of interest, and see how variable the
sample statistics tend to be. When this is not possible (e.g., due to limited research
funding), one can either make assumptions about the shape of the population distribution
or one can use the information in the sample that is actually available.
Making assumptions is convenient fiction and increases precision only if the assumption
is correct, which is impossible to control. An alternative is to take the available sample
and sample from it instead. Specifically, in the analysis above I have resampled from the
treatment samples 10.000 new samples for each treatment. For each of the resampled
samples, I calculated the mean. The 10.000 means of the resampled samples facilitate
understanding how this particular statistic varies when samples are redrawn from the
actual observations. By contrast, without resampling a limited amount of information is
condensed into one rather arbitrary number.
Bootstrapping is a reasonable method to use because not only is the actual sample the
best available sample, but also because most samples will, if they are randomly chosen,
look quite like the population they came from. For intuition it is important to think
about how one can learn about variability by aggregating sampled information that is
generated in various ways and on various assumptions.
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Appendix D. Imposition to avoid Income Effects
I have used the imposition wS = wR+b to remove income effects between reward contracts
and sanctions contracts. Disregarding this imposition and using a single fixed pay w,
I can also determine the impact the of the frame for each, reward contracts WR and
sancion contracts WS , separately.
Consider first reward contracts as described by (3). When s = h, outcome w + gb+
(1− g)b = w + b occurs. An agent with boundedly rational expectations has utility
U(e, g, w, b) = u(w + b)− c(e)
+ ph(e)
[





u(w + b)− (δu(w) + (1− δ)u(w + gb))].
Note that notwithstanding which outcome the agent expected, she will remain in the
gain domain because u(w + b) > δu(w + b) + (1− δ)u(w + gb) and u(w + b) > δu(w) +
(1− δ)u(w + gb). How the contract is framed with g ∈ {0, 1} only determines the size of
the total gain. When s 6= h, outcome w + gb− gb = w occurs. An agent with boundedly
rational expectations has utility
U(e, g, w, b) = u(w)− c(e)
+ ph(e)λ
[







u(w)− (δu(w) + (1− δ)u(w + gb))].
In this case, notwithstanding which outcome the agent expected, she will remain in the loss
domain because u(w) 6 δu(w+b)+(1−δ)u(w+gb) and u(w) 6 δu(w)+(1−δ)u(w+gb).
How the contract is framed with g ∈ {0, 1} only determines the size of the total loss.
Consider next sanction contracts as described by (4). When s = h, outcome w − fb+
fb = w occurs. An agent with boundedly rational expectations has utility
U(e, f, w, b) = u(w)− c(e)
+ ph(e)
[





u(w)− (δu(w − b) + (1− δ)u(w − fb))].
Again for s = h the agent will remain in the gain domain: u(w) > δu(w)+(1−δ)u(w−fb)
and u(w) > δu(w− b) + (1− δ)u(w− fb). The frame f ∈ {0, 1} only determines the size
of the total gain. When, however, s 6= h, outcome w − fb− (1− f)b = w − b occurs. An
agent with boundedly rational expectations has utility
U(e, f, w, b) = u(w − b)− c(e)
+ ph(e)λ
[







u(w − b)− (δu(w − b) + (1− δ)u(w − fb))].
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Under a sanction contract and when s 6= h occurs the agent will remain in the loss
domain: u(w−b) 6 δu(w)+(1−δ)u(w−fb) and u(w−b) 6 δu(w−b)+(1−δ)u(w−fb).
The frame f ∈ {0, 1} only determines the size of the total loss.
Under a reward contract as well as under a sanction contract, if s = h a person will
experience a gain and the frame determines the size. By contrast, if s 6= h she will feel
a loss. This results in the same framing pattern as in the main text where I used the
imposition wS = wR + b to remove income effects. Therefore, the imposition is innocent.
Referee Appendix.
Part 1.
As shown in the main text, when s = h and an outcome wR + (1− f)b+ fb = wR + b
occurs from (5), and framing parameter g = 1 − f is used, an agent with boundedly
rational expectations has utility













δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb)
)]
.
Similarly, when s 6= h and an outcome wR + (1− f)b− (1− f)b = wR occurs from (5),
an agent with boundedly rational expectations has utility















δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb)
)]
.
The signal s = h, and therefore payment wR + b, occurs with probably ph(e). The
signal s 6= h, and therefore payment wR occurs with probability 1 − ph(e). The agent
has the expected utility function
EU(e, f, wR, b) = ph(e)
[


































δu(wR) + (1− δ)u(wR + gb)
)]]
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This expression can be simplified as follows
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Differentiating expected utility EU(e, f, wR, b) with respect to effort e yields
EU ′(e, f, wR, b) =
[







1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2ph(e)p′h(e)(1− λ)δ]u(wR)
−
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1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2ph(e)p′h(e)(1− λ)δ]u(wR)
− (1− λ)(1− δ)p′h(e)u(wR + gb)
− c′(e)
and therefore the first order condition for an expected utility maximizing choice is











1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2ph(e∗)p′h(e∗)(1− λ)δ]u(wR)
− (1− λ)(1− δ)p′h(e∗)u(wR + gb)
− c′(e∗)
and the optimal effort choice e∗ = e∗(wR, b, g) solves this first order condition. The
second derivative with respect to effort is
EU ′′(e, f, wR, b) =
[







1 + δ + (1− 2δ)λ)+ 2p′h(e)p′h(e)(1− λ)δ + 2ph(e)p′′h(e)(1− λ)δ]u(wR)
− (1− λ)(1− δ)p′′h(e)u(wR + gb)
− c′′(e).
Because the second derivative of ph(e) = epHh + (1− e)pLh is p′′h(e) = 0, EU ′′(e, f, wR, b)
simplifies to












and the appropriate second order condition is
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1. Introduction
The validity of implications from economic contract theory is increasingly and system-
atically tested against insights revealed by behavioral research. The emerging field of
behavioral contract design is especially important for legal practice. In an average law
firm, arguably, structuring transactions rather than litigation (1) constitutes the main
service to a client, (2) results in the main share of total workload, and (3) generates
the overwhelming share of billables.1 Similarly, the field of institutional design uncovers
more than just useful insights for regulators and anybody else who is in the business of
creating rule systems.
In this paper, I focus on the choice of incentive structure to be implemented in a
contract. To incentivise performance or compliance of a rule-subjected individual (agent),
institution and contract designers (principal) can implement four distinct, yet payoff
equivalent structures that revolve around performance or compliance benchmarks and
that are commonly used across different legal contexts. First, the principal can choose
to pay the agent some fixed wage wR > 0 and an additional amount b, if the agent
meets some specified performance benchmark. This “normal reward” is most apparent in
context of labor contracts.2 For instance, normal bonuses are widely used to incentivize
executives, car salesmen, production line workers, head-hunters, and also researchers
and teachers. Second, the principal could pay the fixed wage wR and award the positive
amount upfront, i.e., before the agent commences the task. If the agent, however, does
not meet the performance benchmark, the upfront reward b will be revoked. “Annullable
rewards” can be found, for instance, in construction contracts, permits with condition,
research grants, and salaries of professors. Third, the principal can choose to pay the
agent a fixed wage wS > 0 but reduce the final payoff by b, if the agent does not
meet the performance benchmark. This “normal sanction” comes very easy to mind
when thinking about the law. Fines, contractual penalties, and fault-based liability
mechanisms are examples following this structure. Finally, the principal could pay the
fixed wage wS and also impose the payoff reduction b upfront. If the agent does meets the
performance benchmark, the upfront reduction will be revoked, i.e., the agent received
an additional b. “Annullable sanctions” are widely used as deposits in rental contracts
and can also be recognized in any form of collateral or other means of security. Note that
the four performance-contingent structures are payoff-equivalent under the condition
wS = wR + b.3
1 The notion of the lawyer’s role becoming increasingly distinct from the black-letter litigation expert is
well-known at least since Holmes (1897, p. 469)’s famous words that “the man of the future is the
man of statistics and the master of economics”. Following Holmes (1897), the dominant social role
of the lawyer has been conceived in the literature as transaction engineer by, e.g., Bernstein (1995),
Gilson (1998), and Howarth (2013).
2 To avoid terminological and conceptual confound, I will use the terminology established by De Geest,
Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers (2009) throughout the paper.
3 Hoeppner (2016) provides a formal positive examination of incentive effects of the four structures
and De Geest, Dari-Mattiacci, and Siegers (2009) formally study how the four structures effect other
economic choices such as monitoring and risk-taking. They, however, assume that the four structures
provide equal economic incentives.
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Previous contributions have experimentally investigated individual effort choices under
the two reward contract structures (Armantier and Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and
Tontrup, 2012; Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012). These
studies consistently find that persons under an annullable reward invest more effort into
their task than persons under a normal reward. Therefore, the former achieve higher
performance levels. For instance, Hossain and List (2012) increase productivity of workers
by 2% through changing the contract. The annullable reward is framed as a loss whereas
the normal reward is framed as a gain. The effect is commonly argued to result from loss
aversion that is triggered only under the annullable reward. Hoeppner (2016) theoretically
shows that the same behavior can also result from reciprocity motives that are induced
by perceived legal entitlements or obligations (moral property rights). To disentangle the
different effects, Hoeppner (2016) consequently tested all four possible contract structures
in a field experiment. While results for the subset of reward contracts are in line with
previous research, participants’ performance across all contract structures – normal and
annullable rewards as well as normal and annullable sanctions – resembles predictions
solely based on the reciprocity account.
In this paper, I aim to replicate Hoeppner (2016)’s findings from the field and investigate
potential drivers of the observed effects in a controlled laboratory experiment. As main
finding, the evidence from the experiment shows that participants under annullable
rewards on average perform best, whereas participants under annullable sanctions on
average perform worst. Minor performance differences between participants under normal
sanctions and normal rewards are not statistically meaningful. The resulting performance
pattern replicates Hoeppner (2016)’s findings and is in line with theretical predictions
based on reciprocity motives rather than loss aversion. I find only mixed evidence
that loss aversion drives observed differences. Moreover, neither participants cognitive
abilities nor reciprocity tendencies can be associated with the observed performance
pattern in this experiment. Finally, I find evidence of motivation crowding-out (Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001).
The results speak to the importance of contract and institution design. While standard
economic incentives remain equal across the four incentive structures, the incentive
structure determined participants behavioral response as to how much effort to put
into task performance or compliance. As contractual performance and compliance have
normative importance in both contract design and regulatory practice, the choice of
incentive structure – although not often discussed in the legal academic context – is a
crucial one. What drives observed behavior, unfortunately, remains elusive and requires
further study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theretical
background and derives hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the experimental design. Section
4 reports results of the study. Section 5 discusses some aspects pertaining to the results
and the experiment before Section 6 concludes.
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2. Theoretical background & predictions
Why and how the expression of a contract by a principal may influence the behavior
of the agent is not immediately obvious. The four performance-contingent contract
structures under investigation lead to the same final payoffs. After correcting for income
differences between the class of reward contracts and the class of sanction contracts by
imposing wS = wR + b, each contract yields a final income of wR + b when achieving the
performance benchmark and wR otherwise. In other words, the expected value from the
different contract structures is equal. Therefore, also standard utility functions do not
change this result as they are order-preserving.
This contract-equivalence result rests on the assumption that the context of choice
is irrelevant. Only incentives matter. Behavioral research, however, brought attention
to the fact that human decision-making is very much context-dependent. As incentives
matter in context, behavioral effects such as valence framing, fairness, and morality may
be triggered although incentives remain otherwise equivalent. Behavioral economists
capture contextual cues by conceptualizing a persons choice as reference-dependent.
An early and probably the most well-know class of reference-dependent preferences
is one of the key elements of Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992), which is widely viewed as the best available description of how
people evaluate opportunities and decide (Barberis, 2013). As a positive theory, Prospect
theory posits (among other things) that final outcomes w are evaluated in relation to
some neutral reference point r. Therefore, the reference point splits the outcome space
into gains (w− r > 0) and losses (w− r < 0). Most models assume reference points to be
deterministic and fixed exogenously. The most prominent deterministic reference point
is the status-quo. More recent models brought attention to stochastic and endogenous
reference points such as a persons expectation about future outcomes (Kőszegi and Rabin,
2006, 2007). Another key element in Prospect theory is based on the robust empirical
finding that people systematically weigh losses heavier than gains (loss aversion). In
combination, reference-dependent outcome evaluation and loss aversion lead to possible
valence framing effects (Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth, 1998; Dufwenberg, Gächter, and
Hennig-Schmidt, 2011). Therefore, incentive-equivalent contracts may be expressed with
high reference points in combination with losses (loss frames) or, alternatively, with low
reference points in combination with gains (gain frames). Because losses loom larger
than gains, parties to a contract framed as loss may invest more effort into fulfilling
the contract. Regarding the four contract structures under investigation, note that
annullable rewards and normal sanctions involve a loss frame, whereas normal rewards
and annullable sanctions involve a gain frame. Hoeppner (2016) derives this result in a
formal model. Consistent with this explanation, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a (valence framing): Participant’s effort choices contingent on
incentive treatment lead to the performance pattern: [AR = NS] > [NR = AS].
Another class of reference-dependent preferences that capture contextual cues model
reciprocity motives (cf.: Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Important
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in the present context, Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) model an agent’s reciprocity
motive as dependent on the previous behavior of others given the set of available actions
of others.4 The evaluation of experienced actual behavior of others m(x) relative to some
available neutral action m0 shapes the reciprocity motive. In particular, m0 can represent
the moral property rights that an agent holds (cf.: Konow, 2001; Gächter and Riedl,
2005). If m(x) − m0 > 0 the agent’s reciprocity motive is positive. As a consequence,
she generates utility from increasing the other person’s well-being (reciprocation in
kind). Conversely, if m(x) −m0 < 0 the agent’s reciprocity motive is negative such that
she generates utility from harming other person (reciprocation in unkind). Perceived
entitlements may therefore induce reciprocity motives in otherwise incentive equivalent
contracts when payment alterations are expressed already before the performance stage.
Specifically, the upfront payment under an annullable reward may trigger a positive
reciprocity motive. An agent may respond by increasing effort in this contract. Conversely,
the upfront reduction under an annullable sanction may trigger a negative reciprocity
motive that may decrease an agent’s effort choice. Note that under normal rewards and
normal sanctions, a payment alteration is not expressed ex ante. Due to this omission,
alternative actions that the principal could hypothetically take are hence much less
salient. Then a reciprocity motive is less likely to be triggered. Again, Hoeppner (2016)
derives these results in a formal model. Consistent with this explanation, I alternatively
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b (reciprocity motives): Participant’s effort choices contingent on
incentive treatment lead to the performance pattern: AR > [NS = NR] > AS.
In his field experiment, Hoeppner (2016) finds evidence supporting the influence of
reciprocity motives. Finally, under the hypothetical that both valence framing and
reciprocity motives induced by moral property rights, Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b
combine to:
Hypothesis 1c (valence framing & reciprocity motives): Participant’s effort
choices contingent on incentive treatment lead to the performance pattern:
AR > NS > NR > AS.
Note that from all of these behavioral perspectives a person under an annullable
reward can always be expected to invest more effort than a person under a normal
reward. Previous contributions investigating the behavioral effects of contract design are
inclonclusive to the extent that they only look at reward contracts and claim that loss
aversion is the main driver of observed higher performance under an annullable reward.
In this paper, my main interest is to identify potential mechanisms behind the selection
of different effort levels in four contract schemes. The crucial driver behind valence
framing effects is loss aversion. As loss aversion is only triggered under those contracts
that are framed as loss, I hypothesize:
4 For a generalization, see Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008).
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Hypothesis 2 (loss aversion): In loss treatments (AR and NS), highly loss-averse
participants exhibit higher performance levels than slightly loss-averse participants.
Converseley, highly loss-averse participants and slightly loss-averse participants
exhibit equal performance levels in gain treatments (AS and NR).
Hoeppner (2016)’s model suggests that the extent of valence framing effect depends on
the cognitive capabilities of a person. Responses to valence framing is less pronounced
when persons have a high capability to form rational expectations. Conversely, framing
effects are stronger when persons find it difficult to distance themselves from the status-
quo reference point suggested by the contract. This proposition speaks to the cognitive
capabilities of a person. Previous contributions in contract design find confirming
evidence that low-cognitive-reflection types choose higher effort levels in loss frames
(Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012). Research in cognitive psychology, however,
did not produce clear results on the interaction of cognition and framing susceptibility.
Some researchers find evidence that individuals with lower cognitive ability are more
susceptible to valence framing effects (Frederick, 2005; Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati,
and Hamilton, 2015). The results, however, are not consistent (Toplak, West, and
Stanovich, 2014). I use a measure of cognitive reflection to test participants cognitive
ability and hypothesize that highly reflective types are less driven by the loss frame.
Specifically:
Hypothesis 3 (cognition): In loss treatments (AR and NS), participants with high
cognitive reflection will exhibit lower performance levels than participants with low
cognitive reflection.
In their study of framing effects between normal rewards and annullable rewards,
Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup (2012) argue that chosen frames also communicate
social information. This expectation communication effect obtains because a reward (the
gain frame) is commonly interpreted as recognition for voluntary overperformance. That
is, achieving the performance benchmark is less important. Converseley, a punishment
(the loss frame) is likeley to be perceived as sanction for not meeting the expectations.
That is, achieving the performance benchmark is crucial. In line with Brooks, Stremitzer,
and Tontrup (2012) and consistent with the cognitive explanation, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4 (expectation communication): Participants under loss frames (AR
and NS) will have higher beliefs about performance expectations than participants
under gain frames (AS and NR).
In contrast to previous studies, Hoeppner (2016) argued that another effect than valence
framing may drive differences in observed behavior. Positive reciprocity motives may cause
similar behavioral responses in that people under an annullable rewards invest more effort
and thus show higher performance levels than people under a normal reward. Similarly,
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people under an annullable sanction may invest less effort and exhibit lower performance
levels than people under a normal sanction because negtive reciprocity motives are
triggered in the former contract structure (compare Hypothesis 1b). Therefore, I elicit
peoples tendency for positive and negative reciprocation and compare performance within
frames but contingent on possibly triggered reciprocity motives. Regarding positive
reciprocity motives, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5a (positive reciprocity): Under annullable rewards, participants with
a higher tendency for positive reciprocity exhibit higher performance levels than
participants with a lower tendency for positive reciprocity. Under normal sanctions,
performance levels will not depend on participants’ tendency for positive reciprocity.
Regarding negative reciprocity motives, I similarly hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5b (negative reciprocity): Under annullable sanctions, participants
with a higher tendency for negative reciprocity exhibit lower performance levels than
participants with a lower tendency for positive reciprocity. Under normal rewards,
performance levels will not depend on participants’ tendency for negative reciprocity.
To sum up, I derived the hypotheses with two goals in mind. First, I aim to replicate
Hoeppner (2016)’s results from the field on performance under the four contract structures
or, alternatively, understand how the performance pattern differs between the field and
the lab. Second, I seek to identify potential drivers of the observed effects. To this end, I
conduct a controlled laboratory experiment.
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
I conduct a laboratory study investigating the four basic patterns for performance-
contingent incentives. In the main part of the experiment, participants have to work
on a real-effort task. Within 15 minutes, participants repeatedly count the number “7”
in blocks of 15 × 6 randomly generated numbers ranging from zero to nine (Berger,
Harbring, and Sliwka, 2013). Participants enter their count and advance to the next
block. When time is over, each participant receives feedback about how many blocks she
has worked on, how many counts have been correct, and how many counts have been
incorrect. Moreover, participants also learn about their earnings at the end of the main
task. After the main part of the experiment, participants played a few additional decision
games and answered some questionnaire questions.
I use this task for the same reasons as Berger, Harbring, and Sliwka (2013): first,
the task is tedious and requires real-effort; second, outcomes are observable and the
experimenter has a precise measure of performance between otherwise identical treatments;
third, in contrast to field studies (Hossain and List, 2012; Hoeppner, 2016) noise does not
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play a substantial role for performance and can be ruled out as explanation for observed
differences.
3.1. Treatments
The experiment is based on the same 2 × 2 factrial design employed by Hoeppner (2016).
The first factor with the levels “reward” and “sanction” reflects the nature of the contract.
The second factor resembles the structure of the contract that can either take a “normal”
or an “annullable” form. Figure 1 illustrates the combination of the factors. The
four ensuing treatments thus cover the four contingent payment schemes (NS, NR, AS,
AR). Moreover, I include a treatment with fixed pay (BL) as a control treatment that
establishes a clean baseline.
Figure 1: 2 × 2 factorial design & ensuing treatments
contract
sanction reward
structure normal NS NRannullable AS AR
In each treatment, participants work on the counting task and depending on how
they perform will earn either ¤ 10 (high performance) or ¤ 5 (low performance).
Because poorly selected performance thresholds have been found to reduce effort (Brooks,
Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2013), I aimed at a performance benchmark that is neither too
simple nor too difficult to achieve. After pilot testing, the cutoff between high and low
performance was set at 50 correctly solved blocks. To meet the performance threshold,
therefore, participants had to correctly solve one block at least every 18 seconds.
The difference between the treatments only concerns how participants’ final payoff
comes about. In NR and AR, participants are endowed with ¤ 5. Participants in NR
work for another ¤ 5, whereas participants in AR receive an extra ¤ 5 before they
commence the task and work not to lose ¤ 5. In NS and AS, by contrast, participants
are endowed with ¤ 10. Participants in NS work not to lose ¤ 5, whereas participants in
AS experience the initial deduction of ¤ 5 before they work on the task, but receive ¤ 5
if they meet the performance benchmark. In BL, participants receive ¤ 10 at the end of
the experiment independent of their performance.
3.2. Procedure
The experiment took place in October 2015 and consisted of 4 sessions. All five treatments
were included in each session. Each session involved 25 participants. The procedure
was double-blind and neither me nor the participants had any contact with each other.
After participants arrived in the laboratory, they were randomly allocated to one of four
treatments and seated in separate cubicles. Participants received the instructions for
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the main part of the experiment. They learned about the task and received a sample
block. Participants were instructed not to communicate. The experiment started after all
participants had read the instructions and after the executing lab assistant had answered
remaining questions. To familiarize participants with the real-effort task and to measure
individual task ability, I let participants practice in an initial trial round. In the trial
round, participants had 3 minutes to correctly solve as many blocks as possible. In the
trial, participants earn ¤ 0.25 for each correct answer. All participants practiced on the
same set of blocks and received feedback about their performance at the end of the trial.
After the trial, participants advanced to the main task. Participants in each NR and
AR learned that they receive an endowment of ¤ 5. In NR, participants learned that
they earn another ¤ 5, if they correctly solved 50 ore more blocks. In AR, participants
were informed about their provisional extra endowment of ¤ 5. Finally, they also learned
that their final payoff will be reduced by ¤ 5, if they solved less than 50 blocks. In each
NS and AS, participants were informed about their endowment of ¤ 10. Participants
in NS learned that their final payoff will be reduced by ¤ 5, if they solved less than 50
blocks. Participants in AS first learned that ¤ 5 will be provisionally deducted. Finally,
they learned that they earn ¤ 5, if they correctly solve 50 ore more blocks.
Instructions for the second part of the experiment followed after all participants had
completed the main part. Participants learned that the second part conists of a number
of other decision games and a questionaire. To avoid hedging, the instructions informed
participants that from the payoff-relevant stages only one would be randomly selected
and paid out. Participants also learned that this random selection will be made after
everybody completed the second part of the experiment. The order of the payoff relevant
stages was randomized. Further detailed instructions accompanied each subsequent stage
in the second part.
The final payoff for each participant thus consisted of her earnings in the main part,
her choices in one randomly selected task in the second part, and her show-up fee. On
average, sessions lasted about 67 minutes and participants earned ¤ 13,55. The payoffs
were anonymously distributed in cash at the end of each session. The experiment was
conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. All sessions were computer-
based using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants were
recruited with the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
3.3. Sample
In total, 100 student participants took part in the experiment, i.e., 20 per treatment.
Table 1 on page 10 summarizes descriptive statistics of the sample. Exactly 50% of
participants were female. Participants on average were 23.84 years old. The sample is
heavy on business and economics students. A simple MLE regression, however, confirms
that study background has no effect on standardized performance in the main task (see
Appendix A).
From the total sample I excluded one participant in BL from further analysis. This
participant had burned through the main task and worked on all 100 available blocks way
ahead of time. While the participant performed above average in the trial, the entries in
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics per treatment and overall
AR NS NR AS BL overall
# participants 20 20 20 20 20 100
% participants 20 20 20 20 20 100
% female 45 45 60 40 60 50
Age (avg.) 23.90 24.75 23.20 23.95 23.40 23.84
Study background:
% business & economics 35 45 30 40 40 38
% law 10 5 10 0 10 7
% political science 5 15 10 5 0 7
% mathematics 0 0 5 10 0 3
% psychology 0 0 5 0 0 1
% computer science 0 5 0 0 0 1
% other 50 30 40 45 50 43
the main task include counts such as 1051 or 9999. Recall that each block comprises a
total of random 90 numbers between 0 and 9. Therefore, the entries demonstrate that
the participant did not work seriously on the task.
4. Results
Recall Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c. Each theoretic combination of reference-dependent
preferences and reciprocity motives induced by moral property rights yields a unique
pattern of behavioral responses. As first performance measure, I consider the absolute
quantity of correctly solved blocks in the main task. The left panels of Figure 2 on page 12
displays the distributions of the bootstrapped mean quantity of correctly solved blocks for
each treatment. Visually, there are strong differences between the performance-contingent
pay treatments: the average bootstrapped mean decreases from AR (µ̂AR = 66.63)
over NS (µ̂NS = 60.18) and NR (µ̂NR = 54.75) to AS (µ̂AS = 49.35). Interestingly,
the distribution in BL (µ̂BL = 65.10) looks very similar to the one in AR. As average
performance in BL and AR is higher than in NS, NR, and AS, this similarity indicates
potential motivation crowding-out effects in the performance-contingent pay treatments
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001).
I compare each treatment pair using a one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-test. The
upper panel of Table 2 on page 11 reports differences between means of the quantity of
correctly solved blocks and the achieved significance level of each pairwise comparison.
For example, consider the comparison of BL and AR: the mean absolute quantity of
correctly solved blocks in BL was 1.55 smaller than in AR and this difference was not
significant. Focusing on the comparisons of the performance-contingent pay treatments,
the test results indicate the performance pattern AR > NS > NR > AS. This pattern
represents confirming evidence of Hypothesis 1c, i.e., that both gain-loss framing and
reciprocity motives influenced performance in the experiment.
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Table 2: Performance comparisons across treatments
BL AR NS NR AS
absolute performance
BL – −1.55 4.96∗ 10.36∗∗∗ 15.76∗∗∗
AR – – 6.50∗∗ 11.90∗∗∗ 17.30∗∗∗
NS – – – 5.40∗ 10.80∗∗∗
NR – – – – 5.40∗∗
AS – – – – –
standardized performance
BL – −0.87∗∗∗ 0.19 0.11 1.20∗∗∗
AR – – 1.07∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
NS – – – 0.02 1.01∗∗∗
NR – – – – 0.98∗∗∗
AS – – – – –
∗: p < 0.1; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
However, it is questionable whether the absolute quantity of correctly solved blocks is
the best performance measure available. As participants had only a limited time available
to work on the main task, taking innate individual task skill into account appears
preferable. Doing so also enhances comparibility to studies that employed tasks without
explicit time constraint (e.g.: Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012; Hossain and List,
2012; Hoeppner, 2016). As second performance measure, I therefore consider the quantity
of correctly solved blocks in the main task standardized by the quantity of correctly
solved blocks in the trial task. The distributions emerging from bootstrapping the mean
quantity of correctly solved blocks for each treatment are displayed in the right panels
of Figure 2 on page 12. Accounting for the individual skill measure crucially changed
the emerging pattern. First, the bootstrap samples of mean standardized performance
in BL ((µ̂∗BL = 5.53)) clearly lie in between the range of the bootstrap samples of
mean standardized performance of the performance-contingent pay treatments. In fact,
one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-tests allow rejecting the null that participants in AR
perform equally well as participants in BL (t = 2.2418, p = 0.0097) and that participants
in BL perform equally well as participants in AS (t = 3.2722, p = 0.0004). This results
that participants in AR perform better than those in BL and that participants in BL
perform better than those in AS still indicates motivation crowding-out tendencies (Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001) and contrasts Hoeppner (2016)’s result:5
compared to non-incentivized pay in BL, performance incentives in AS apparently did not
improve performance. Although intriguing, I will not further elaborate on the results in
BL as this paper is primarily concerned with differences between performance-coningent
pay treatments.
Within the performance-contingent pay treatments, AR clearly exhibits the highest
mean (µ̂∗AR = 6.41) of the bootstrap samples whereas AS, by contrast, exhibits the
5 The result may be caused by the lower payoffs in the laboratory experiment as compared to the field
experiment. However, participants in the field also worked substantially longer.
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smallest mean (µ̂∗AS = 4.33). Visually, the distributions of the bootstrapped mean
standardized quantity of correctly solved blocks in NS and in NR are very similar
(µ̂∗NS = 5.34 and µ̂∗NR = 5.31, respectively). The lower panel of Table 2 on page 11
summarizes results of statistically comparing the treatment samples. Results are again
based on one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-tests. I can reject the null that participants
in AR solve equally many blocks as participants in NS (t = 2.5287, p = 0.0033), in NR
(t = 2.6287, p = 0.0031), and in AS (t = 4.1499, p < 0.0001). I can also reject the null
that participants in NS (t = 2.6748, p = 0.0021) and in NR (t = 2.6965, p = 0.0030)
solve equally many blocks as participants in AS. However, I cannot reject the null that
participants in NS perform equally well or worse than in NR (t = 0.0670, p = 0.4737).
Using the standardized performance measure, the results indicate the performance pattern
AR > [NS = NR] > AS. In line with the main result of Hoeppner (2016), this pattern
represents confirming evidence of Hypothesis 1b, i.e., that only reciprocity motives
induced by moral property rights influence individual performance. As the standardized
12
performance measure accounts for individual task skill, I will focus on this performance
measure for the remainder of the paper.
Result 1 (performance pattern): Participants in AR on average performed best,
whereas participants in AS on average performed worst. Performance differences
between participants in NS and NR are not meaningful. The resulting performance
pattern AR > [NS = NR] > AS is in line with theretical predictions based on
reciprocity motives.
Regarding potential drivers of the main effects, I hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that
highly loss-averse participants will exhibit higher performance levels than slightly loss-
averse participants in loss treatments compared to gain treatments. I elicited a measures
of loss aversion in the second part of the experiment by providing participants with the
opportunity to participate in two lotteries A and B. Lottery A is designed such that, in
expectation, the lottery yields a gain. Nevertheless, participants can loose parts of their
earnings. Lottery B performs lottery A six times, using the same payoffs. This test was
originally designed by Fehr and Goette (2007, p. 313) with the following lottery A: “win
CHF 8 with probability 12 , lose CHF 5 with probability
1
2”. Participants rejecting lottery
A receive no payoff. Let γ be the first measure of loss aversion. Fehr and Goette (2007)
prove that persons with consistent loss-averse preferences will reject both A and B when
γ > 4.13̄, reject only A but play B when 4.13̄ > γ > 1.6, and play both A and B when
γ < 1.6. A person who participates in lottery A but rejects lottery B has inconsistent
loss-averse preferences. The loss aversion measure γ thus allows to form four types.
I excluded participants with inconsistent loss-averse preferences from the analysis. I
split the remaining participants into slightly loss-averse types who played both lotteries
and strongly loss-averse types who rejected either lottery A or both lotteries. This
division yields a nearly perfect median split, 40 slightly and 41 strongly loss-averse
participants, respectively (compare Table 3 on page 15). With this classification, I look
at the standardized performance measure in loss treatments (NR and AS) and in gain
treatments (NS and AR) seperately as one would expect loss aversion being triggered in
the loss treatments but not in the gain treatments. Figure 3 on page 14 illustrates the
result. After conducting a one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-test (t = 2.2788, p = 0.0099),
I reject the null that high types correctly solve equally many or fewer blocks in loss
treatments where highly loss-averse participants on average perform better (6.41) than
slightly loss-averse types (5.35). I cannot reject this null in gain treatments, however
(t = −0.6430, p = 0.7308). Importantly, I cannot reject the null that highly loss-
averse types correctly solve equally many or fewer blocks in the pure loss treatment NS
(t = 1.3935, p = 0.097). I cannot do so in the gain treatment NR as well (t = −1.4204,
p = 0.9610). Across gain and loss categories, however, these results provide evidence that
highly loss-averse participants performed better in loss treatments overall as opposed to
gain treatments overall. Although it does not amount to a treatment effect, the result
also suggests that valence framing matters.
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Figure 3: Performance of high and low loss averse participants










Loss aversion category: high low
Result 2 (loss aversion): In loss treatments overall, strongly loss-averse participants
perform better than slightly loss averse participants. This difference is not observable
in gain treatments overall. The result does not hold in pure loss treatment NS.
As how susceptible persons is to valence framing may depend on her cognitive capa-
bilities, I hypothesized (Hypothesis 3) that, in loss treatments, participants with high
cognitive capabilities will exhibit lower performance levels than participants with low
cognitive capabilities. High-cognition types may find it easier to form rational expecta-
tions. Converseley, low-cognition types may find it difficult to distance themselves from
the status-quo reference point suggested by the contract. I used an extended version of
Frederick (2005)’s cognitive reflection test (CRT) to elicit a measure for participants’
cognitive capabilities. The extended test consists of six questions (Primi, Morsanyi,
Chiesi, Donati, and Hamilton, 2015). Each question is designed such that a person
is likely to respond incorrectly, if she cannot resist her intuitive response tendencies.
Conversely, a person who exerts more cognitive effort and reasons more reflectively is
likely to give correct answers. As an example, the most prominent of the original three
questions is this: “A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?”. The intuitively compelling response is “$ 0.10”.
This answer, however, is wrong. Who engages in further reflection will soon discover that
the correct answer is “$ 0.05” (compare Appendix C).
On the basis of the number of correctly answered CRT questions, I split the data
into high- and low-cognition types. Participants with two or less correct answers was
classified as low-cognition type, whereas participants with four or more correct answers
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Table 3: Participant classifications
Loss Cognitive
aversion reflection
high low high low
Overall 41 40 65 25
BL 13 4 9 8
AR 8 8 12 5
NS 6 9 17 3
NR 7 11 11 7
AS 7 8 16 2
was classified as high-cognition type. Dichotomizing the data accordingly leads to 25
low-types and 65 high-types across all treatments (compare Table 3). To test whether
high-cognition types exhibit lower performance levels than low-cognition types in loss
treatments (AR and NS), I use a one-sided two-sample bootstrap t-test. I cannot reject
the null that high-cognition types perform equally well as or worse than low cognition
types (t = −0.3380, p = 0.6176). As AR arguably contains a positive reciprocity element
in addition to the loss frame, I perform the same test for participants in NS only. The
same test returns an insignificant result (t = −1.0111, p = 0.8534), however, not rejecting
the null that high-cognition types perform equally well as or worse than low cognition
types. This result does not support Hypothesis 3 that participants with high cognitive
capabilities exhibit lower performance levels than their low type peers under a loss frame.
In contrast to previous studies (Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012), cognition does
not appear to be the channel for observed treatment effects.
Result 3 (cognition): High- and low-cognition participants did not perform differently
between gain and loss treatments. Specifically, high-cognition types did not exhibit
lower performance levels in loss frames.
Because Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup (2012) argue that chosen contract frames
communicate different expectation defaults, in line with their findings I hypothesize
(Hypothesis 4) that participants in loss frames will have higher beliefs about performance
expectations than participants in gain frames. Whereas Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup
(2012) try to directly manipulate participants default expectations in an additional
treatment, in the second part of this experiment participants were asked for their
beliefs about the experimenters expectations regarding their performance in the main
task. Specifically, participants completed the following statement: “I think that the
experimenters expect me to correctly solve [data entry] tasks.”
As initial step I analyse whether participants beliefs about performance expectation
defaults differ at all across performance-contingent pay treatments. I perform a Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test of the null that the location parameters of the belief distributions
are the same in each treatment group. The test statistic returns an insignificant result
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(χ2 = 0.8136, p = 0.8462), however, and I cannot reject the null. This result does not
support Hypothesis 4 that the different contract structures cause different beliefs in
performance expectation defaults.
Result 4 (expectation default): Performance-contingent contract structures had no
systematic effect on participants’ beliefs about performance expectations.
I proceed with the analysis of evidence regarding the last set of hypotheses. Hypothesis
5a and 5b pertain to this study’s crucial argument that observed differences in performance
do not result from gain-loss framing but rather from reciprocity motives. I hypothesize
(Hypothesis 5a) that participants with a higher tendency for positive reciprocity exhibit
higher performance levels in AR than participants with a lower tendency for positive
reciprocity. By contrast, I expect no difference in performance levels between these groups
in NS due to the absence of the upfront payment of the performance-contingent incentive
component. The appropriate comparison for reciprocity is between groups in AR and
NS because these treatmens have the same valence frame (loss). I elicit participant’s
tendency for reciprocation in kind with one quantitative and two qualitative measures.
The quantitative measure consists of a participant’s strategic response profile as second
mover in a hypothetical trust game (compare Appendix B). For the two qualitative
measure, I asked participants: “How would you assess your willingness to return a favor
to a stranger?”; and “How well does the following statement describe you as a person? I
go out of my may in order to help somebody who has helped me before.” Participants
indicated their response on a continous scale from 0 (“not willing to return a favor” and
“does not describe me at all”, respectively) to 10 (“very willing to return a favor” and
“describes me perfectly”).
Regarding differences between NR and AS (gain frames), I hypothesize (Hypothesis 5b)
that participants with a higher tendency for negative reciprocity exhibit lower performance
levels in AS than participants with a lower tendency for negative reciprocity. I expect
no difference in performance levels between these groups in NR because participants in
NR do not incur the negative performance-contingent incentive component prior to the
main task. Consistently, I use one quantitative and two quantitative measures to elicit
participants’ tendency to negatively reciprocate. The quantitative measure consists of a
participant’s minimum acceptable offer in an hypothetical ultimatum game (compare
Appendix B). For the two qualitative measure, participants answered the following items:
“Are you a person who is generally willing to punish unfair behavior even if this is costly?”;
and “How well does the following statement describe you as a person? If somebody hurts
me on purpose, I will try to hurt them back.” Participants again indicated their response
on a continous scale from 0 (“not willing to return a favor” and “does not describe me at
all”, respectively) to 10 (“very willing to return a favor” and “describes me perfectly”).
Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde (2013) find that each item in both preference
modules reliably correlate positively and significantly with the type of reciprocal behavior
that each intends to measure.
To test Hypotheses 5a and 5b, I compare the distribution of the elicited responses
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between gain treatments (NR and AS) and between loss treatments (AR and NS) using a
two-sided two-sample bootstrap-t test. For positive positive tendencies between AR and
NS, I cannot reject the null that that the samples are drawn form the same population
in all three categories, i.e., for the quantitative measure (t = 0.0453, p = 0.9618), the
first qualitative measure (t = 0.5921, p = 0.5558), and the second qualitative measure
(t = 0.9796, p = 0.3390) of positive reciprocity. Similarly for negative reciprocity
tendencies between NR and AS, I cannot reject the same null for the quantitative
measure (t = 0.1049, p = 0.9158), the first qualitative measure (t = 0.0708, p = 0.9478),
and the second qualitative measure (t = 0.5830, p = 0.5613). I conclude that reciprocity
tendencies are not systematically different in gain treatments and in loss treatments. I
proceed to test Hypotheses 5a and 5b by regressing standardized performance (stper) on
the three items (quan, qual1, qual3) of the corresponding preference module in each of
AR, NS, NR, and AS with the following linear model:
stper = β1 × quan + β2 × qual1 + β1 × qual2 + ε
Table 4 reports the results. In line with Hypothesis 5a, I do not find a positive effect of
any item in the positive reciprocity module in NS. However, I also do not find significant
positive effects of positive reciprocity measurements on standardized performance in AR.
This is evidence against Hypothesis 5a. Similarly, regression results in NR are in line with
Hypothesis 5b as there is no meaningful effect of negative reciprocity items. However,
the absence of a significant negative effect of negative reciprocity measurements on
standardized performance in AR is evidence against Hypothesis 5b. I can only conclude
that either reciprocity motives were not triggered in AR and AS compared to NS and
NR, respectively, or they had no effect on standardized performance.
Table 4: Influence of reciprocity tendencies by treatment
Positive reciprocity Negative reciprocity
(loss frames) (gain frames)
AR NS AS NR
quan 0.050 0.006 0.023 0.023
(0.054) (0.035) (0.014) (0.015)
qual1 −0.090 0.090 −0.181 0.077
(0.194) (0.336) (0.123) (0.121)
qual2 −0.127 −0.085 0.145 0.055
(0.170) (0.181) (0.134) (0.122)
(intercept) 7.261∗∗∗ 5.107∗∗∗ 3.391∗∗∗ 3.871∗∗∗
(1.757) (2.193) (0.845) (0.912)
∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
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Result 5 (reciprocity motives): Performance levels are neither associated to partici-
pants’ tendency to reciprocate in gain treatments (NR and AS) nor in loss treamtents
(NS and AR). Specifically, positive (negative) reciprocity motives did not lead to
higher (lower) performance in AR (AS) compared to NS (NR).
Concluding the data analysis, I confirm the main result (Result 1) using a generalized
linear regression with standardized performance being the dependent variable. Excluding
participants in BL and those with incosistent loss preferences, N = 62 observations
remain. Treatments enter as dummy variables with NR as reference treatment. I elicited
participants risk attitude based on a multiple-price-list (MPL) approach (Holt and Laury,
2013; Gneezy, Imas, and List, 2015). Additionally, I control for loss aversion, gender and
age. Table 5 reports the results.
Table 5: Regression analysis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AR 1.047∗∗ 0.945∗∗ 0.825∗∗
(0.395) (0.403) (0.394)
NS −0.089 −0.185 −0.335
(0.395) (0.403) (0.397)










(intercept) 5.329∗∗∗ 5.687∗∗∗ 6.333∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.659) (0.770)
r.dev/null.dev 0.652 0.632 0.571
∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
I find robust treatment effects reflecting Result 1: compared to NR, treatment AR has
a significant positive and AS has a significant negative effect on standardized performance.
By contrast, NS does not induce different performance levels. This result holds across
all models and especially after controlling for risk attitude. Moreover, I report the ratio
between residual deviance and null deviance as measure of goodness of fit, or rather,
badness of fit.6 After only including treatment dummies, deviance has reduced to 65.20%.
6 Lower deviance values indicate a better fit. The null deviance shows how well the dependent variable
is predicted by a model that includes only only the intercept. The residual deviance shows how
well the dependent variable is predicted by a model including the independent variables. Therefore,
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This substantial improvement in model fit suggests that the combined treatment effects
is not small.
5. Discussion
Several results merit further discussion. First and foremost, I find statistical evidence
that performance in the experiment’s main task differs between treatments. Performance
thus depended on the implemented contract structure. Participants performed worst
under AS and best under AR. They exhibited medium performance levels in NS and NR.
As individual skill was accounted for, the differences in performance across treatments are
likely explained by particpants adjusting their effort investment in response to the contract
structure. Interestingly, the specific performance pattern (AR > [NS = NR] > AS)
resembles the performance pattern obtained by Hoeppner (2016). The pattern aligns
with earlier contributions but is reflective of theoretic predictions based on reciprocity
motives rather than valence framing, to which observed differences between AR and NR
commonly have been attributed (Armantier and Boly, 2012; Brooks, Stremitzer, and
Tontrup, 2012; Fryer, Levitt, List, and Sadoff, 2012; Hossain and List, 2012).
Consistent with the conjecture that loss aversion is not the main driver behind previously
observed differences between AR and NR, I find no evidence of loss aversion driving
performance in the pure loss treatment NS compared to the pure loss treatment NR.
When pooling observation in all loss and in all gain treatments, however, I find that
highly loss averse participants perform better than slightly loss averse participants in loss
treatments, while no similar result occurs for gain treatments. The null result from the
comparison of pure frames has more weight, however, as the comparison from the pooled
observations in gain and loss treatments may include confound by reciprocity motives in
AR for losses and AS for gains. Recall that (Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup, 2012)’s
results indicate some association between loss aversion, cognition, and the influence of
communicated expectation defaults. Not finding evidence for the influence of cognition on
performance or for treatment effects on beliefs about performance expectations appears
to be straight forward when loss aversion is not at work.
As the performance pattern indicates reciprocity motives driving the observed results,
tendencies for negative reciprocity should have reduced participants’ effort investment in
AS compared to NR. Similarly, individual tendencies for positive reciprocity should have
increased effort investment in AR compared to NS. Surprisingly, I do not find statistical
evidence corroborating the reciprocity and moral property rights conjecture. In summary,
what is driving the overserved results in this study remains elusive.
Nevertheless, contract structure clearly influenced how much effort participants invested
in the experiment’s main task. For the exercise of institutional design, the important result
may be that the manipulation worked. Not knowing how it worked may be disappointing
for an experimenters passion for causal interference, but not for regulatory practice (cf.
Engel, 2013). However, ignorance about how legal rules are to be decomposed into a
the ratio of residual and null deviance indicates how much deviance remains after the independent
variables are included.
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combination of definable isolated effects may cause unintended consequences. Ultimately,
a well-intended institutional change may backfire. Insofar as this study calls previous
results into question, much more research is required to understand the implications of
contract and institutional design.
To facilitate further research, some caveats require mentioning. Most apparent is
the precariously small sample size. Given that the data is generated in a controlled
experiments, “less” data points are generally tolerable. However, 20 participants per
treatment that are further split for the purpose of different tests (compare, e.g., Table 3) is
clearly too few and, hence, substantially reduces the reliability of the results both in terms
of statistical significance and in terms of statistical power. Note that this caveat calls for
more experimental testing, not for less (cf.: Hoeppner, 2015). Moreover, performance
levels in BL have been significantly lower than in AR, yet significantly larger than in AS.
Not every performance-contingent incentive structure led to improvements in performance
or effort investment. In fact, only participants in AR exhibited a significant increase in
performance compared to those in BL. This result is indicative of a crowding-out effect
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). Similar crowding-out effects are
often observed when monetary incentives are too small. In future research, therefore,
monetary incentives in the study should be substantially increased. This will likely lead
to higher contrast between the treatments, clearer responses, and thus facilitate more
accurate measurement.
6. Conclusion
How otherwise equivalent incentives are structured can critically influence how much
effort an agent puts into a task. I have previously suggested (Hoeppner, 2016) that prior
research on valence framing in contract design is inconclusive due to a crucial blind spot:
by looking only at a subset of relevant contract structures, research has only focused on
loss aversion and related channels to explain observed differences in effort provision. After
completed the set of equivalent contract structures, I have also supported the theoretical
conjecture with initial data from a field experiment that are in line with a performance
pattern predicted by reciprocity motives rather than loss aversion.
In a controlled experiment, I have replicated this performance pattern. Participants
under annullable rewards (loss) exhibit higher effort levels than participants under normal
rewards (gain) and participants under normal sanctions (loss) exhibit higher effort levels
than participants under (annullable sanctions). However, participants under contract
structures across frames but without reciprocity element, i.e., under normal sanctions
(loss) and normal rewards (gain), do not respond differently to the valence frame. In line
with the reciprocity conjecture, I find no evidence that loss preferences trigger differences
in performance. Similarly, cognitive capabilities of participants in the experiment have
no influence on their susceptibility to valence framing.
However, I find no evidence in support of the reciprocity conjecture. Individual
tendencies for positive reciprocity do not appear to trigger higher effort investment under
annullable rewards compared to normal sanctions. Likewise, the data does not contain
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evidence that individual tendencies for negative reciprocity reduce effort investment
under annullable sanctions compared to normal rewards. The channels through which
the treatments affect observed effort levels remain elusive. The main result that contract
structure matters notwithstanding, the conflicting results lead to one conclusion: much
more research is to be done in this area.
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Appendix A. Robustness check: field of study
Recall that the sample of participants was loaden with business and economics students.
In addition to the controls reported in the main text, I therefore used participants’ area of
study as additional control. As in the maintext, NR is the benchmark treatment category.
Participants study background enters the regression as dummy variables with “computer
science” as benchmark category. In brief, while treatment effects remain significant,
participants’ area of study has no significant effect on standardized performance. Table 6
reports the detailed results.
Appendix B. Quantitative measures for reciprocity
As quantitative measure for participants’ reciprocity tendencies, I employed the same
scenarios as (Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde, 2013). As quantitative measure
for positive reciprocity, I elicited the strategic response profile of each participant as
second mover in a hypothetical trust game and averaged the resulting values. The
scenario is:
Please consider the following situation: You and another person, whom you do not
know, both participate in a study where you can decide on how to assign a certain
amount of money and thereby determine the outcome. The rules are as follows. Both
participants get an account with ¤ 20. At the beginning, both participants thus
own ¤ 20. The other person decides first: She can transfer money to your account.
She can transfer any amount: ¤ 0, ¤ 1, ¤ 2, etc., up to ¤ 20. Each Euro that
she transfers to you is tripled by the conductors of the study and booked to your
account.
After this first stage the other person therefore has ¤ 20 less the amount she
transferred to you. You have ¤ 20 plus the tripled amount of the transfer of the
other person.
Now you get to decide: you have the opportunity to transfer money back to the
other person. You can transfer any amount up to ¤ 80, depending on how much you
have in your account. This will be the end of the study and the account balances
will be final.
The other person has in her account ¤ 20 less the amount she transferred to you plus
the amount you transferred back. You have ¤ 20 plus the tripled amount of what
the other person transferred to you less the amount you transferred back to her.
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∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
We would like to know how much you would choose to transfer back to the other
person, for a given transfer of her to you. Suppose the other person transfers
¤ 5/10/15/20 to your account. After the first stage you then own ¤ 20 + 3 ×
5/10/15/20 = 35/50/65/80. The other person owns ¤ 20 − 5/10/15/20 = 15/10/5/0.
What amount do you choose to transfer back? Please provide an answer for each
possible transfer to you by the other person.
As quantitative measure for negative reciprocity, I elicit each participant’s minimum
acceptable offer in an ultimatum game. The scenario is:
Consider the following: Together with a person you do not know you have won ¤
100 in a contest. The rules are as follows. One of the two of you has to make a
proposal on how to divide the money between the two of you. The other one is
informed about the proposal and has two options. Either he can accept the proposal
or he can reject it. If he accepts the proposal, the proposed division of the money is
implemented. If he rejects the proposal both get nothing.
Suppose the other person makes the proposal about the division of the money. You
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then have to decide whether to accept or to reject the proposal. For you to accept
the proposal, which minimum amount does the other person have to offer you?
Appendix C. Extended Cognitive Reflection Test
Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, and Hamilton (2015) recently extended Frederick
(2005)’s original 3-item cognitive reflection test (CRT) by three additional items. The
extended test and the original test have similar psychometric properties. The extended
scale consists of the following questions, where the first three are Frederick (2005)’s
original questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? [correct answer: 5 cents; heuristic answer: 10 cents]
2. If it takes 5 minutes for five machines to make five widgets, how long would it
take for 100 machines to make 100 widgets? [correct answer: 5 minutes; heuristic
answer: 100 minutes]
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? [correct answer: 47 days; heuristic answer: 24 days]
4. If three elves can wrap three toys in hour, how many elves are needed to wrap six
toys in 2 hours? [correct answer: 3 elves; heuristic answer: 6 elves]
5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How
many students are there in the class? [correct answer: 29 students; heuristic answer:
30 students]
6. In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a medal than
short members. This year the team has won 60 medals so far. How many of these
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“Uncertainty [...] is the only certainty there is, and knowing
how to live with insecurity is the only security.”
— John Allen Paulos (2003),
A Mathematician Plays the Stock Market,
p. v
1. Introduction
Jeremy Bentham fiercly bemoaned the unpredictability and uncertainty of the common
law: “[U]ncertainty is of the very essence of every particle of law so denominated”
(Bentham, 1823, ch. XVII, sec. 83). Bentham envisaged that codifying the law might
provide a solution to legal uncertainty.1 Yet, legal uncertainty is also dreaded in the civil
law tradition, in continental Europe, where codified law reigns (cf.: Raitio, 2008). “The
law, codified, has proven to be quite unstable, unpredictable, and uncertain – quite as
mushly unruly – as the common law, uncodified, has ever been” (Gilmore, 1969, p. 450).
Some degree of legal uncertainty appears as a fundamental, yet disastrous component
of any legal system. As a consequence, legal certainty is a central tenet of the rule of
law. In legal scholarship and legal practice alike, the glorious idea of legal certainty more
and more often is elevated to a general principle, a normative benchmark, and even a
necessary condition for elementary justice (Popelier, 2000; Maxeiner, 2007, 2008).2
Maybe therefore, legal scholars and practitioners usually contend that legal uncertainty
is per se undesirable. Based on this premise, legal uncertainty should be reduced where
possible. In fact, legal certainty is a principle doctrinal lawyers more often than not seek
to maximize (cf.: Maxeiner, 2007; Smits, 2012). Two common arguments are frequently
put forward. First, legal uncertainty leaves persons unsure about their entitlements, while
at the same time granting discretion to official decision-makers. This discretion leads
to risks and costs of official abuse (cf.: Sunstein, 1995). Second, it is argued that legal
uncertainty may stifle activities that the regulator seeks to encourage (e.g.: D’Amato,
1983) and, therefore, that legal certainty is a requirement for economic progress (cf.:
Trubek, 1972; Weber, 1978).
Legal certainty comes in different conceptions: formal, factual, and substantive (Raitio,
2008). This study examines legal uncertainty as the difficulty of perfectly predicting ex
ante how the law will be applied, by judge, government and administration (e.g.: Popelier,
2000). This prediction problem captures the formal concept of legal certainty, i.e., the
requirement of eliminating randomness from legal decision-making. The sources of this
prediction problem are many. Legal uncertainty can arise, e.g., from the retroactive
1 This paper will use the terms “legal indeterminacy” and “legal uncertainty” interchangeably. Although
not congruent, the two are strongly interrelated. Arguably, the legal indeterminacy thesis has achieved
acceptance in American legal academia because the law is fundamentally uncertain. Compare Maxeiner
(2007, 2008).
2 Consider, e.g., the statement of Lord Diplock in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251
House of Lords that “[e]lementary justice or [...] the need for legal certainty demands that the rules
by which a citizen is to be bound should be ascertainable by him”. The European Court of Justice
recognizes legal certainty as a general principle of EU law in 13/61 Bosch (1962) ECR 45, 52.
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application of the law, from subjective or intuitive judicial decision-making, or from
imprecise norm-formulation. In the latter sense, vague legal standards are the vehicle of
the investigation. Suppose the content of a legal provision and, therefore, its application
involves some marginal unpredictability. Ex ante people do not know for sure how a
judge, jury, or public administration official will set a legal standard. As a consequence,
a rule-subjected person faces some probability of being held liable even if she shows a
behavior conforming to the legal standard absent vagueness (false negative). Conversely,
there is some probability of not being held liable when her behavior would otherwise not
conform to the legal standard (false positive). Thus standard vagueness reflects formal
legal uncertainty (cf.: Kahan, 1989). This approach also facilitates accurate predictions
and thereby allows clean experimental testing.
Traditional legal scholarship attaches great value to legal certainty and, consequently,
seeks to minimize legal uncertainty and standard vagueness. By contrast, the economic
theory of law draws a different picture. Well-known for their analysis of the effects of
uncertain standards are the contributions of Calfee and Craswell (1984) and Craswell
and Calfee (1986). Their theoretical results suggest that standard vagueness creates
two opposing effects. First, legal uncertainty creates the positive probability of a false
positive, thereby reducing incentives to comply. Second, while legal uncertainty allows for
false negatives, it also reduces the probability of being held liable when exceeding legal
requirements. This effect creates an incentive to overcomply. The net effect depends on
various features of the legal environment, i.a., the degree of standard vagueness. Craswell
and Calfee (1986) conclude that overcompliance is likely to be common where legal
uncertainty is relatively small. A larger degree of legal uncertainty, however, is likely
to lead to undercompliance. The relation between uncertainty and compliance is, thus,
more complex than the intuitions in traditional legal scholarship suggest. Increasing legal
uncertainty may, in fact, have positive effects. The recent theoretical results of Lang
(2014) point in a similar direction.
Note that the term “legal uncertainty” is not commensurate with how economists
think about uncertainty. In economics uncertainty is risk that is immeasurable. An
event is uncertain if it may or may not happen in the future and the probabilities of
the event occurring or not are unknown (Knight, 1921).3 By contrast, when I analyze
decisions under legal uncertainty in this paper, I refer to risky decision-making because I
assume that probability distributions are known.4 Being exposed to known propability
distributions already qualifies as the prediction problem legal uncertainty refers to (cf.:
D’Amato, 1983).
An innovative laboratory experiment tests the conflicting perspectives of traditional
3 Although Knight (1921)’s conception is arguably the most familiar one, the distinction between
whether probabilities are known (risk) or unknown (uncertainty) also goes by other names, e.g.,
unambiguous vs. ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961) or precise vs. vague (Savage, 1954).
4 This assumption is in line with the previous theoretical contributions in law and economics (e.g.
Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014) and, moreover, reflects how legal scholars think about legal
uncertainty (e.g. D’Amato, 1983; Raitio, 2008; Maxeiner, 2007). This seemingly artificial assumption
is also but a first humble step to bring legal uncertainty to the laboratory without creating much
confound.
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legal scholarship and the economic theory of law. In the experiment, 137 participants
were asked to choose an activity level. After this choice, a critical activity threshhold
was randomly drawn from a normal distribution that was known to the participants.
To experimentally reflect different degrees of standard vagueness as measure of legal
uncertainty, the experiment varied between subjects the standard deviation of the distri-
bution from which the activity threshhold was drawn. Thus the experiment comprised
six treatment groups with varying degrees of standard vagueness. In each treatment, if
the chosen activity level was lower than the randomly determined activity threshhold,
participants were paid according to a payoff function reflecting their private benefits from
the activity level. If the chosen activity level was higher than the randomly determined
activity threshhold, however, particiants had to pay back a specified share of their private
benefits and, thus, received a lower payoff than otherwise.5
The experimental evidence shows that, after controlling for risk-attitude, participants
have been susceptible to the vagueness manipulations. Surprisingly and counter-intuitive
to conventional legal wisdom, I find no monotonic negative relationship between standard
vagueness and activity level choice. Rather, the results resonate with the more complex
dynamics in Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s analysis. Lower levels of standard vagueness
lead to socially undesirable overcompliance. After a tipping point, however, an increase
in standard vaguess leads to increasing average activity levels that, eventually, turn from
overcompliance to undercompliance. Moreover, this study reveals a hidden cost of legal
uncertainty that has so far gone unnoticed: increasing levels of legal uncertainty lead to
more erratic decision-making in the sense that there are significantly more non-compliant
and inefficient choices as standard vagueness increases. The law looses its coordination
function.
In addition to providing empirical evidence for the law and economics literature on
vague standards and legal uncertainty (e.g.: Calfee and Craswell, 1984; Craswell and
Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014), this study relates to two other streams in previous research.
First, the study provides novel experimental evidence for the rules versus standards
debate. A common argument in this literature is that ex ante uncertainty endemic
in standards can lead to undesirable behavior. Vagueness can cause persons subject
to the standard to commit socially undesirable acts (undercompliance) or to forego
socially desirable actions (overcompliance). If persons are risk-averse, the second effect
is argued to be more pronounced and vice versa (e.g.: Kaplow, 1992; Korobkin, 2000).
Previous contributions, however, did not distinguish between different degrees of ex ante
uncertainty of standards. The results show a clear dynamic response between different
degrees of standard vagueness and socially undesirable choices. Second, the study relates
to previous contributions in the deterrence literature. Starting with (Becker, 1968),
the deterrence hypothesis involves that criminal actions decrease in the probability of
punishment. Specifically, Baker, Harel, and Kugler (2003) and Schildberg-Hörisch and
Strassmair (2012) experimentally investigate how risky and ambiguous fines and detection
5 Although the notion is contested that data from field experiments is more realisitic (e.g.: Falk and
Heckman, 2009), I acknowledge that the advantages of controlled laboratory experiments may come
at the price of reduced external validity.
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probabilities deter individuals from opting for a sanctioned action altogether. The idea of
the deterrence effect of legal uncertainty spreads to other legal areas such as, e.g., tax law
(Lawsky, 2009). While previous contributions aim for maximum deterrence, this study
emphasizes that – from an economic perspective – maximum deterrence may be socially
undesirable. Maximum deterrence may result in socially undesirable overcompliance.
Moreover, the data suggest that, after maximum deterrence is achieved, the deterrent
effect of legal uncertainty is undermined if uncertainty is further increased.
This paper is organized as follows. In the following Section 2, I derive predictions
based on a formal model. Section 3 discusses the experimental design. Section 4 analyses
the the data and reports the ensuing results. Section 5 discusses the findings. Section 6
proposes some applications related to the findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Theory & predictions
I derive predictions from a formal model that builds upon previous work of Craswell and
Calfee (1986). I start by setting up the model and reviewing Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s
results. Afterwards, I add behavioral modifications to the original model.
Suppose a rational, fundamentally self-interested person can choose an activity level
x with x ∈ [0, x̄], where x̄ is some upper natural or technological boundary. Exercising
activity x is profitable for a person. Let the function b(x) represent these benefits. I
assume the benefit function b(x) to be twice differentiable and concave, i.e., b′(x) > 0,
b′′(x) 6 0. In addition to the private benefits, however, the activity x imposes costs on
others. Let e(x) denote this negative externality. I assume the externality function e(x)
to be twice differentiable and convex, i.e., e′(x) > 0, e′′(x) > 0.
Further suppose a lawmaker or judge wants to regulate activity x by setting a legal
standard xL with xL < x̄. The legal standard xL is a maximum standard: when a person
chooses 0 6 x 6 xL she is compliant; otherwise, i.e., xL < x 6 x̄, she is violating the
legal standard. Think of xL as, for instance, a speed limit, maximum working hours
per week, or a cap on noise pollution. Moreover, assume that courts will hold a person
violating xL fully liable for the costs that their choice of x imposes on others. When
non-compliant, she has to pay damages d(x) that perfectly compensate for the negative
externality, i.e., d(x) = e(x).6





and thus satisfies the condition b′(x) = e′(x). Following
Craswell and Calfee (1986), I define over- and undercompliance relative to the socially
optimal activity level. When a person chooses x < xS , she reduces her activity level below
the social optimum and is overcompliant. Conversely, when a person chooses x > xS ,
she increases her activity level beyond the social optimum and is undercompliant. Both
overcompliance and undercompliance are socially undesirable because any choice x 6= xS
leads to welfare loss.
6 Because d(x) = e(x), for the remainder of the paper I will not further differentiate between damages
and external costs.
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At least since Brown (1973), early negligence models assume legal certainty in that
they rely on a precise, deterministic legal standard. Moreover, this deterministic legal
standard is often set at the socially desirable level, i.e., xL = xS (e.g.: Shavell, 1980;
Landes and Posner, 1981; Grady, 1983; Kahan, 1989). By contrast, this paper models
a vague legal standard to represent legal uncertainty. Therefore, let the legal standard
xL be stochastic. A person who chooses x only knows that with increasing x there is a
probability P (xL < x) = F (x) with F ′(x) > 0 that a court will find her in violation of the
standard xL. Conversely, P (xL > x) = 1−F (x) represents the (counter-)probability that
a court will find a person compliant. Intuitively, the stochastic nature of xL may result,
for instance, from the varying and possibly erroneous interpretation of the standard
through various judges and administrative officials. Formally, assume that F (x) is a





where f(x) ≡ F ′(x) is the associated probability density function. As functional form,
I assume that xL is normally distributed around the socially optimal level xS , i.e.,
xL ∼ N (xS , σ).7 This modeling step corresponds with how legal scholars conceptualize
legal uncertainty. Legally relevant decisions concern a prediction of how the courts will
apply the law if presented with some dispute (cf.: Holmes, 1897; Popelier, 2000; Raitio,
2008). Legal uncertainty creates a prediction problem. In this sense, a legal rule shapes
a person’s behavior to the extent that the person perceives the chances of being found in
violation or in compliance with the rule. Thus legal uncertainty is a
“situation that obtains when the rule that is relevant to a given act or transaction is
said [...] to have an expected [...] outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability”
(D’Amato, 1983, p. 2).8
In the present model, a higher σ implies a larger interval of activity levels that will
lead to a prediction close to the 0.5 level of being found violating xL. In other words,
the location of the legal standard becomes less predictable with increasing σ. Measures
of dispersion of the underlying probability distribution of the legal standard hence reflect
the degree of standard vagueness and legal uncertainty.
Because I assume that probability distributions are known, this approach to model
“legal uncertainty” is not commensurate with how economists think about uncertainty.
Economists commonly understand uncertainty as risk that is immeasurable. An event is
uncertain if it may or may not happen in the future and the probabilities of the event
7 As a robustness check, Appendix A illustrates predictions when xL is uniformly distributed. Changing
the underlying distribution does not change the basic analytical results and hypotheses.
8 This needs to be clearly differentiated from another, operationally different definition of legal
uncertainty. Legal uncertainty can be understood as a situation that emerges when the legal system
contains at least one legal problem whose correct solution is undeterminable, e.g., a case that cannot
be decided in an identifiably and uniquely correct way. In this sense, Dworkin (1977, p. 286) speaks
of “ties”.
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occurring or not are unknown (Knight, 1921). Technically, this model of legal uncertainty
concerns risky decision-making because probabilities are known for each choice x. This
approach, however, is in line with the conceptualization of legal uncertainty in legal
scholarship. Moreover, recent research in law and economics not only studies legal
uncertainty as Knightian uncertainty (e.g.: Schildberg-Hörisch and Strassmair, 2012) but
also employs the humbler approach of conceptualizing legal uncertaint as risk (e.g.: Lang,
2014).
2.1. Standard preferences & risk-neutral persons
To specify a person’s preference structure, I initially consider a risk-neutral person who







b(x) for x 6 xL (compliance)
b(x)− e(x) for x > xL (violation)
. (1)






= b(x)− F (x) e(x). (2)





expected value of net benefits. This formulation is equal to the original optimization
problem of Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s risk-neutral agent. This congruence deserves
emphasis because Craswell and Calfee (1986) did not make explicit their agent’s utility
function, which has important consequences for the extension to risk-averse agents (see
Appendix B).











= b′(x)− F ′(x) e(x)− F (x) e′(x) (3)












b′(xS)− F ′(xS) e(xS). (4)
The first term of expression (4) describes the gains for the potential defendant from
marginally increasing x. The marginal benefits are discounted by the probability 1−F (xS)
that a person is found compliant. The second term of expression (4) represents the
offsetting effect identified by Craswell and Calfee (1986). Marginal increases in x
also increase the probability of being held liable. A utility maximizing person has
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an incentive to choose an individually optimal level x∗ < xS (overcompliance) when
expression (4) is positive and an incentive to choose an individually optimal level x∗ > xS
(undercompliance) when expression (4) is negative.
As a formal extension to Craswell and Calfee (1986), I derive from (3) the effect of







and get x∗RN = x∗RN (σ).9 That is, the individually optimal choice x∗RN is a function
of the vagueness measure σ. This function describes a risk-neutral person’s optimal
activity level choice given a certain degree of standard vagueness. Figure 1 on page
10 illustrates the relation between x∗RN and σ. The ordinate of the graph in Figure 1
represents the individually optimal choice x∗ relative to the socially optimal level xS and
the legal standard xL. The abscissa of the graph represents σ as a measure of vagueness
of the legal standard. The dashed line in Figure 1 depicts the response function x∗RN (σ)
which resembles the characteristic pattern identified by Craswell and Calfee (1986): a
sufficiently low level of σ induces overcompliance; a further increase of standard vagueness
beyond a tipping point, however, reduces overcompliance; eventually, overcompliance will
turn into undercompliance. Two noteworthy results emerge. Firstly, reducing standard
vaguenes does not necessarily improve the compliance decision. The difference between x∗
and xS describes how much individually optimal behavior deviates from socially optimal
behavior. Despite a reduction in standard vagueness, this difference increases when
standard vagueness is sufficiently high.10 Secondly, a specific degree of standard vagueness
σ∗ > 0 leads to socially optimal compliance decisions, i.e., x∗RN (σ∗) = x∗RN (0) = xS .
When a precise standard is impossible to implement, the existence of σ∗ implies that
increasing (reducing) the degree of standard vagueness can be socially beneficial given
overcompliant (undercompliant) behavior.
2.2. Standard preferences & risk-averse persons
As I am interested in the behavioral consequences of legal uncertainty, I extend the
analysis by gradually incorporating or modifying assumptions about how a person decides.
The first behavioral modification concerns risk attitude. Instead of assuming that a
person is risk-neutral, I assume that a person exhibits risk aversion. I continue to model
society as risk-neutral regarding the social benefits and costs of activity x. Therefore,
the socially optimal activity level xS remains unchanged.11
9 For specification and parametrization of all underlying functions, see Appendix C. As a mathematical
solution to derive x∗RN (σ) is not possible because F (x) has no closed form representation, I simulate
the response functions x∗i (σ), i ∈ {RN, RA, KR}, in Figure 1 with the software environment R.
10 Given a reduction in σ, the difference between x∗ and xS may especially increase when the legal
standard is not distributed around the socially optimal level. See Craswell and Calfee (1986) for an
extensive analysis within the risk-neutral framework.
11 This is a deviation from Craswell and Calfee (1986) who assume that society is only risk-neutral
regarding the social costs of a person’s activity and that, therefore, xS is determined by solving
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Consider a rational, fundamentally self-interested person that is averse to risk. She
has a twice differentiable utility function u(·) with u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0 (concavity). As
















for x > xL (violation)
. (5)
Differentiating her expected utility with respect to x and evaluating this result at the



























Expression (6) is similar to the risk-neutral case in expression (4). The first term describes
the gains for a risk-averse person of marginally increasing x if found compliant (x 6 xL).
The second term represents the offsetting effect that marginal increases in x also increase
the probability of being held liable (x > xL). This marginal increase is weighed by the
opportunity cost of being found violating the legal standard. Similar to expression (4), a
person has an incentive to choose x∗ < xS when expression (6) is positive. Conversely,
she has an incentive to choose x∗ > xS expression (6) is negative.
Analogous to the risk-neutral case, I obtain a risk-averse person’s optimal choice x∗RA
by simulating the response function x∗RA(σ). The solid line in Figure 1 depicts this
response function. x∗RA(σ) shows a pattern very similar to x∗RN (σ): standard vagueness
will first induce overcompliance but, as vagueness increases just enough, overcompliance
will turn into undercompliance. Moreover, Figure 1 reveals that x∗RA(σ) < x∗RN (σ) over
the entire range of σ. This result suggests that the domain of overcompliance is larger
and that overcompliance is more severe. By contrast, the domain of undercompliance
is smaller and undercompliance is less pronounced. Craswell and Calfee (1986, p. 301)
also find that risk aversion increases the likelihood of overcompliance. Compared to their
result, however, the effect of risk aversion in the present model is much less pronounced.
This difference is driven by an implicit assumption of Craswell and Calfee (1986, p.
301). In addition to risk aversion, they implicitly assume asset isolation. Under this
assumption a person separates different payoff streams and computes utility for each









. This assumption strikes me as inconsistent. If one evaluates b(x) through
the utility function of the person choosing x, one should consistently evaluate e(x) through the
utility function of the person suffering the external cost. Moreover, risk preferences in society are
heterogenous. A regulator will hardly be able to specify an aggregate risk preference that sufficiently
takes into account all idiosyncrasies of members of said society. Instead, I adopt the idea of a
rationality default (Schwartz, 2015): when the facts are unobtainable or ambiguous, regulators should
refrain from behavioral assumptions. This approach is “autonomy preserving, administerable, and
coherent” (Schwartz, 2015, p. 1). The coherent application of the risk-neutral standard xS is also
experimentally motivated: in the experiment I only define one activity benchmark for all participants
instead of a specific activity benchmark for each participant given her ex ante elicited utility function.
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person first computes final wealth and then evaluates final wealth through her utility
function. Appendix B elaborates on this difference.







Note: The response functions x∗i (σ), i ∈ {RN, RA, KR}, are plotted with a spe-
cific parametrization for utility family, risk attitude and loss aversion. Appendix
C reports the specifications.
2.3. Reference-dependent preferences
The second modification alters the assumption on how individuals evaluate outcomes. I
incorporate into the model another empirically established finding about human behavior:
hedonic consequences of outcomes depend not only on absolute outcomes, but also on
how these outcomes change relative to a reference point (cf.: Barberis, 2013). Reference-
dependent preferences successfully explain observed behavior that is seemingly at odds
with standard economic predictions. For instance, taxi drivers were found to stop working
when their earnings are unexpectedly high (Camerer, Babcock, Loewenstein, and Thaler,
1997; Crawford and Meng, 2011). Reference-dependent preferences also explain why sellers
overprice their property when facing nominal losses in a real-estate crisis (Genesove and
Mayer, 2001) and why contestants increase effort in contests with a higher proportion of
winners than losers than in contests designed to yield less winners than losers (Lim, 2010).
In the legal context, reference-dependent preferences help understanding why defendants
are more reluctant than plaintiffs to accept settlement offers (Rachlinsky, 1996). Finally,
reference-dependency illuminates why plaintiff’s prefer contingent contracts, whereas
defendants prefer to pay their attorneys fixed hourly fees (Zamir and Ritov, 2010).
Specifically, I build upon Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)’s modeling framework. Let










While the former term describes the intrinsic utility a person obtains from y, the latter
term describes how a person feels about changes in utility obtained from y relative to r.





∣∣ r) ≡ m(y)+ η µ(y − r).
Parameter η > 0 weighs the importance of gain-loss utility relative to outcome-based
utility. Without loss of generality, I assume η = 1 for the remainder of the paper. I
further assume that a person’s absolute utility m(·) is unbounded, strictly increasing,
and (weakly) concave, i.e., m′(·) > 0 and m′′(·) 6 0.
The gain-loss utility component µ(·) satisfies the implicit or explicit assumptions
about the value function in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Bowman, Minehart, and Rabin, 1999; Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). The
gain-loss utility function µ(y − r) is
µ(y − r) ≡
{





for y < r
. (7)
Parameter λ > 1 describes how much the agent weighs losses relative to gains. When
λ > 1, µ(·) is steeper for losses than for gains, i.e., the person is loss averse. Moreover,
m(·) ≡ (·)α, where parameter α measures diminishing sensitivity of the gain-loss utility
function. I assume 0 < α < 1 such that µ(·) is concave in the gain domain and convex in
the loss domain. This assumption establishes consistency with the assumptions about
the absolute utility component m(·).
To further specify the model, let a person derive utility from monetary income, i.e.,
y = w(x). Similar to expression (2), a person’s monetary income w(x) results from a
gamble (b(x), 1− F (x); b(x)− e(x), F (x)), i.e., final wealth is stochastic.
The definition of the reference point r is crucial to predict behavior. Starting with
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most models of reference-dependent preferences equate
the reference point with the status quo. In this sense, reference points are mostly
deterministic and fixed exogenously. Consistently following Kőszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007), I assume a non-deterministic reference point that is formed by a person’s lagged
expectations about relevant outcomes of her choice. Intuitively, when a person codes
recent beliefs about outcomes as a reference point, she evaluates any realized outcome
by comparing it to all possible outcomes. Each comparison is weighted by the ex ante
probability that the alternative outcome occurs. In this sense, expectation-based reference
points are stochastic. Moreover, let individuals form fully rational expectations: a person
correctly predicts her choice set, how her choice influences the distribution of possible
outcomes, and her hedonic response.





























for x > xL (violation)
. (8)





from the private benefits of her choice x. Moreover, she experiences an
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from the comparison of the actual outcome compared
to the counterfactual violation of xL (gain). Conversely, if a court holds a person liable













relative to the expectation of being found compliant with xL (loss).
Differentiating her expected utility with respect to x and evaluating the result at the
















































The first and second term describe absolute effects from marginally increasing x similar
to expression (6). For x 6 xL the decision-maker obtains a marginal benefit that is
discounted by the probability 1 − F (xS) but he also bears the opportunity costs for
x > xL as F (xS) marginally increases. Because of reference dependence, I find two
additional effects. As the third term describes, marginally increasing the likelihood of
x > xL (violation) also increases the potential gain experience if this outcome is not
realized. The fourth term captures that marginally increasing x, however, also threatens
an increased loss when violating xL. This countervailing effect is discounted by 1− F (x).
Again, a person has an incentive to choose x∗ < xS when expression (9) is positive.
Conversely, she has an incentive to choose x∗ > xS when expression (9) is negative.
I obtain the optimal choice x∗KR by simulating the response function x∗KR(σ) analogous
to the risk-neutral and the risk-averse case. The dot-dashed line in Figure 1 depicts the
ensuing relationship. An increase in standard vagueness σ leads to a rapid drop of the
individually optimal choice (overcompliance) also for a person with expectation-based
reference-dependent preferences. However, x∗KR(σ) exhibits a much less pronounced
tipping point. After the initial drop, the extent of overcompliant behavior does not
decrease substantially with increasing standard vagueness. I infer from expressions (9) and
(6) that the difference between x∗KR(σ) and x∗RA(σ) depends on the loss aversion parameter
λ. Apart from notation, expressions (9) and (6) are equal when λ = 1. Depending on the
specific definition, the elicitation method, and the estimation approach, estimates of the
loss aversion coefficient take on values from 1.43 to 4.8 (cf.: Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and
Paraschiv, 2007; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon, 2008). Despite this volatility, the
canonical value as reported by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) is λ = 2.25 and researchers
commonly embrace λ ≈ 2 as a rule of thumb (e.g.: Hossain and List, 2012). For all these
specifications of λ, the simulations indicate that x∗KR(σ) < xS over the entire range of σ.
That is, any amount of standard vagueness induces overcompliance. This analytical result
resonates with the argument from legal scholarship that legal uncertainty undermines
socially optimal activity levels and inhibits economic development.
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2.4. Summary & hypotheses
The theoretical conflict between doctrinal legal scholarship (e.g.: D’Amato, 1983; Maxeiner,
2007; Smits, 2012) and traditional economic theory of law (e.g.: Calfee and Craswell,
1984; Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014) about the effects of legal uncertainty
is by no means trivial academic finger wrestling. I implemented legal uncertainty as
vague standard in a simple negligence model. Depending on the set of assumptions
about how persons decide, the formal analysis supports both views. Given a person’s
preference structure, the model generates contradictory predictions about the behavioral
consequences of vague standards. The equivocal predictions call for experimental testing.
As reference-dependence is the dominant positive approach to economic decision-making
and as the corresponding model captured the widespread intuition in doctrinal legal
scholarship, I derive the research hypotheses with the legal view in mind:
Hypotheses 1 (overcompliance): At all levels of standard vagueness, as measured
by the standard deviation of the underlying probability distribution, participants
will choose an activity level below the socially optimal activity level.
Hypotheses 2 (dynamics): Chosen activity levels are significantly different from one
level of standard deviation to another.
Hypotheses 3 (erosion): Overcompliance monotonously increases with increasing
standard vagueness, i.e., activity levels decrease as standard vagueness increases.
3. Experimental design
3.1. Task & treatments
To emulate the theoretical problem in the laboratory, the main task of the experiment
consisted of two stages. Figure 2 on page 14 illustrates the main task. In the first stage,
participants chose an “activity level” between 0 and 1000 units on a continuous slider.
To prevent a potential systematic distortion from the initial positioning of the slider
(anchoring), the initial slider position was random.
The graphical interface of the choice task provided information for the activity level
choice. Over the entire range of the slider participants received a graphical representation
of the probability that their choice would exceed the randomly determined activity
threshold. This representation was equal to the cumulative density function underlying
the random draw of the activity threshold in the second stage. Moreover, the interface
showed a graphical representation of the activity level dependent payoff, both for the
event that the chosen activity level was smaller than the activity threshhold (compliance)
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Figure 2: Game representation of the main task
0 1000
Stage 1:
Choice of activity level x
x 6 xs x > xs
Stage 2:
Standard xs is determined
b(x) b(x)− e(x) Outcomes
and for the event that the chosen activity level turned out to be larger than the activity
threshold (violation). Over the entire range of possible slider choices, the graphical
representation for the compliance payoff was higher than the payoff representation in
case of violation.12 The payoff representations resemble the specifications in Craswell
and Calfee (1986)’s Table 1.13 Specifically, payoffs given the slider choice were
Π(x) =
{
b(x) = 50 ln(x) for x 6 xl (compliance)
b(x)− e(x) = 50 ln(x)− 0.1x for x > xl (violation)
.
As participants’ slider choice resembles a choice between 1001 lotteries with different
payoffs and different probabilities, the choice interface was predominantly graphical. The
experiment aimed at creating the least abstract choice environment while preserving as
much control as possible. Putting this complex choice into one graphical interface was
one of the methodologically challenging and innovative aspects of the experiment. To
further increase salience of the payoffs, the probabilities of each event occurring, and
their dependence on the current slider setting, the interface also provided information
about the potential consequences of the pending choice by conveniently spelling out the
payoffs and probabilities for each event right next to the corresponding graphical payoff
representation. For any slider setting, participants could see the specific payoffs and the
associated probabilities. Because people frequently struggle with numerical probability
12 See Figure 7 in Appendix D for a sample decision screen from the experiment.
13 The same mathematical specifications determine the response functions in Figure 1.
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descriptions, the interface also depicted the specific probabilities in a pie chart that varied
with the slider position.
In the second stage, a random draw determined the activity benchmark xS . The normal
distribution that determined the random draw of xS varied by treatment. While the mean
of the distribution was always set equal to an activity level of 500, different standard devi-
ations σi represented different degrees of standard vagueness. Altogether, the experiment
comprised i = 1, ..., 6 treatments that only differed in σi ∈ {1, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500}.
Accordingly, the names of the treatments are SD001, SD100, SD200, SD300, SD400, and
SD500. The experiment employed a between-subjects design: participants were randomly
assigned to only one treatment.
After the draw of the activity threshhold, the program compared the chosen activity
level with the randomly determined activity benchmark to determine participants’ payoff.
If the chosen activity level was below or equal to the benchmark, a participant would
gain the payoff b(x) from his activity choice in ECU. If the chosen activity level was
larger than the randomly determined activity threshhold, however, a participant received
only the reduced payoff b(x) − e(x) in ECU. Participants’ activity level choices were
incentivized and translated from ECU to EUR with a conversion rate of 0.03. Altogether,
the main task consisted of six repetitions of these two stages to capture potential learning
effects.
After the main task, the experiment consisted of two post tests relevant to the
theoretical predictions. The first post test elicited risk preferences with a choice list (Holt
and Laury, 2002). The second post test elicited participants’ preferences over gains and
losses employing Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008)’s procedure.
3.2. Procedure & sample
The experiment was conducted during January 2015 in the experimental laboratory
of Friedrich Schiller University Jena. Altogether, 137 student subjects participated in
the experiment.14 Table 1 (page 16) contains further information about the sample.
Upon arrival at the lab, participants were randomly allocated to their cubicle and their
treatment group by drawing a number from an urne. The experiment comprised eight
sessions with three treatment groups each, i.e., SD001, SD100, SD200 in sessions 1-4 and
SD300, SD400, SD500 sessions 5-8.
Because the choice in the main task was complex and participants had to implicitly
deal with probability distributions, they received video instructions that lasted for
approximately 11 minutes. The video instructions provided detailed information about
the functionality of and the displayed information on the graphical interface, about the
payoff structure, about the activity threshold, and about the probability distributions
underlying its determination. The instructions and the choice interface contained neutral
language to avoid contextual associations and label effects. To ensure that participants
understood the instructions, they had to correctly answer a set of control questions.
14 The software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was used to program the experiment and participants were
recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
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Table 1: Sample statistics per treatment and overall
SD001 SD100 SD200 SD300 SD400 SD500 overall
# participants 24 24 21 24 24 20 137
% participants 17.52 17.52 15.33 17.52 17.52 14.60 100.00
% female 58.33 50.00 66.67 58.33 45.83 50.00 54.74
# Age (avg.) 25.44 26.24 25.24 25.78 25.18 26.67 25.74
Strategy (Safety Strategy) 24 22 20 13 12 10 125
field of study: law 0 3 5 0 1 3 12
field of study: economics 4 4 4 5 3 4 24
field of study: natural science 3 6 3 6 5 5 28
field of study: other 17 11 9 13 15 8 73
Without a correct answer, they could not advance to the main task. After the main task,
participants completed the two post tests. All sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes.
At the end of each session, one of the eight rounds – six rounds in the main task and
two post tests – was randomly selected for payment. Altogether, participants received a
payment between 6.30 EUR and 15.10 EUR including a show-up fee. Participants earned
8.70 EUR on average.
4. Results
Hypothesis 1 (overcompliance) holds that at all tested levels of standard deviation
participants will choose an activity level below the socially optimal activity level. In
other words, I predict that participants are overcompliant in each treatment. In the
experiment, this prediction translates into activity level choices of less than 500. Figure
3 on page 17 depicts all observed activity level choices per treatment and the smoothed
conditional mean across treatments.
Across all treatments, on average participants’ activity level choice was 476.37. Based
on a one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test, I reject the null hypotesis that the true
location of the mean of all observed choices is equal to or larger than 500 (one-sided:
V = 3167, p = 0.001).15 Looking at the smoothed conditional mean (Figure 3), however,
suggests overcompliance at most in the first four treatments, i.e., in SD001, SD100,
SD200, and SD300, but not across all six treatments. To test Hypotesis 1 in depth, I use
a series of one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (one-sided) conditional on treatment.
Table 2 on page 18 reports the results. Based on these results, I reject the null hypothesis
that the true location of the average slider choices is larger than or equal to 500 only in
treatments SD001, SD100, and SD200. Average slider choices smaller than 500 are only
statistically significant for the lowest three levels of standard deviation. Average slider
choices in SD300, SD400, and SD500 – the highest three levels of standard deviation –
15 Because the data set contains multiple observations for each participant, the non-parametric analysis
is based on average slider choices for each participant. The data set thus consists of 137 independent
observations.
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are not significantly below 500. Figure 3 illustrates that this result is not a mere artifact
of a lack of observations in the overcompliance domain. Because in SD300, SD400, and
SD500 participants on average chose a slider position that was not significantly below
the 500-mark, the observations are not completely in line with Hypothesis 1.
Result 1 (partial overcompliance): While participants in SD001, SD100, and SD200
exhibit overcompliant behavior, participants’ average slider choices in SD300, SD400,
and SD500 are not significantly below the socially optimal choice.
All economic models that were considered show a dynamic relation between the degree
of vaguess of the legal standard and a person’s activity level choice. In other words, the
degree of vagueness matters for individual choices. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 (dynamics)
predicted that chosen activity levels are significantly different between different levels of
standard deviation. As a first indication, the shape of the smoothed conditional means
in Figure 3 suggests that the observations confirm this expectation. As initial, wide-eyed
test of Hypothesis 2, a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test (χ2 = 23.3797, p < 0.001) leads
to the rejection of the statistical null hypothesis that the treatment samples originate
from the same distribution. This result supports Hypothesis 2. However, this result only
means that at least one of the six samples is statistically different from at least one other
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Table 2: Overcompliance per treatment
Treatment Average Test statistic P-value Significance
choice (V ) level
SD001 492.56 59 0.004 p < 0.01
SD100 393.86 5 0.000 p < 0.01
SD200 461.89 34 0.003 p < 0.01
SD300 487.76 124.5 0.239 p > 0.10
SD400 504.17 150 0.506 p > 0.10
SD500 540.32 139 0.899 p > 0.10
sample. The test does not help to identify where the difference occurs, its direction, or
for how many comparisons the difference obtains.
To analyze in more detail the pattern of average slider choices conditional on treatment,
I conduct Dunn’s test. To reduce the inflated Type I error rate that obtains from simul-
taneous statistical inference, I adjust p-values using the Benjamini-Hochberg correction.
Table 3 reports the difference of average slider choices and the significance level of each
pairwise comparison. Based on these results, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
samples originate from identically distributed populations for all comparisons. Individual
average slider choices in SD100 lie significantly below individual average slider choices
in SD001, SD300, SD400, and SD500. Moreover, the comparison between SD200 and
SD500 leads to a statistical significant difference at the 5-percent level: individual average
slider choices in SD500 lie significantly above the choices in SD200. This more detailed
analysis suggests that the observations are not completely in line with Hypothesis 2.
Nevertheless, individual average slider choices have been susceptible to the manipulations
of standard deviation. Note that the direction of statistically significant differences is not
monotonous. The non-significant comparisons between SD001 and all other treatments
except SD100 point to a U-shape of slider choices between SD001 on the one hand and
SD200, SD300, SD400, and SD500 on the other hand.
Table 3: Difference in average activity level choice between treatments
SD001 SD100 SD200 SD300 SD400 SD500
(492.56) (393.86) (461.89) (487.76) (504.17) (540.32)
SD001 (492.56) –
SD100 (393.86) −98.70∗∗∗ –
SD200 (461.89) −30.67 68.04 –
SD300 (487.76) −4.80 93.90∗∗ 25.86 –
SD400 (504.17) 11.61 110.31∗∗∗ 42.27 16.41 –
SD500 (540.32) 47.76 146.46∗∗∗ 78.42∗∗ 52.56 36.15 –
∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
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Result 2 (no strict differences): Not all average activity level choices are significantly
different between treatments. Average slider choices are significantly lower in SD100
than in SD001, SD300, SD400, and SD500. Compared to SD200, average slider
choices in SD500 are significantly higher.
The results in Table 3 (page 18) also inform the analysis of the third research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 (erosion) holds that overcompliance increases with standard vagueness.
According to Hypothesis 3 one would expect that chosen activity levels decrease as
standard vagueness increases. Table 3 shows that slider choices in SD100 are significantly
smaller than slider choices in SD001. Simultaneously, slider choices in SD200, SD300,
SD400, and SD500 are significantly larger than slider choices in SD100. In other words,
slider choices in the former four treatments are significantly larger than those in the latter
treatment. This result suggests that overcompliance first increases and then decreases
with increases in standard deviation.
I estimate treatment effects on slider choice with a general linear model to additionally
control for other variables. SD100 to SD500 enter the estimation as treatment dummies
while SD001 is reference treatment. Moreover, standard errors are clustered on the
participant level because each participant repeatedly chose a slider position in the same
treatment and therefore standard errors of each participant’s choices may be correlated.
The estimation controls for risk preference, gain-loss preference, age, and gender.16
Table 4 on page 21 reports the results of the estimations. The simple model with
treatment dummies and clustered standard errors at the participant level (model 1) is
comparable with the results from Dunn’s Test in the first column of Table 3 in the sense
that it suggests a U-shape between treatment level and slider choice. In comparison
to the reference treatment SD001, the estimation results in a significant negative effect
(p < 0.05) of SD100 and SD200 on slider choice, while SD500 has a significant positive
effect (p < 0.05) on slider choice. The results of the estimation with additional controls
(model 2) show a significant negative effect of risk attitude (p < 0.05). Moreover, loss
aversion, age, and being female have no significant effect on slider choice. Once accounting
for these controls, the significant effect of the SD200 and the SD500 dummies vanishes.
This result is consistent with the results from Table 3. These findings further undermines
Hypothesis 3: although standard vagueness steadily increases from SD001 to SD500,
SD200 to SD500 do not significantly and negatively affect participants’ slider choices as
compared to SD001. Because I do not find a significant negative treatment effect with
ever higher levels of standard vagueness, I reject Hypothesis 3.
16 Note that I could only introduce the controls (model 2 in Table 4) for a subset of the data as in
sessions 1 and 4 of the experiment, right after the main task, there were technical problems with the
computer infrastructure of the laboratory. Due to these technical problems, I do not have complete
subject data and also could not elicit risk preferences and gain-loss preferences of the participants
in these sessions. I ran both estimations on the same subset of the data to increase comparability
between the models.
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Result 3 (U-shaped activity levels): Activity levels do not significantly decrease
from SD001 to SD500. After controlling for risk attitude, loss aversion, and gender,
only SD100 has a significant and negative effect on average slider choices relative to
SD001.
As part of the explorative analysis, I categorize observed slider choices in two ways.
First, I define slider choices below or equal to the socially optimal threshold of 500 as
“compliant” and the rest as “non-compliant”. I do not define these categories in relation to
the critical activity threshold applied in each round and for each single choice because its
distribution varied across treatments and, therefore, the meaning of “compliant” would
strongly differ between treatments. The left panel of Figure 4 on page 20 reveals that in
SD1 the vast majority of choices were compliant (95.24 %) and only a small fraction of
activity level choices were non-compliant (4.76 %). With the exception of SD300 and
SD400, in which slider choices were not significantly different compared to SD001, Figure
4 shows a steady decrease of the number compliant choices. Simultaneously, the number
of non-compliant choices clearly increases from SD1 to SD300. In SD500, only 51.67 %
of participants’ choices were compliant but 48.33 % were non-compliant choices. Based
on Fisher’s exact test, I can reject the null that the proportions of compliant choices are
equal between SD1 and SD300 (odds ratio = 0.0667, p < 0.001).
Figure 4: Compliance and effiency across treatment groups

























Second, I used the standard deviation from the slider choices in SD001 (σSD001 = 49.62)
and across all treatments defined those slider choices as “efficient” that lie within this
distance on either side of 500. Slider choices with a larger absolute difference to 500 are
categorized as “inefficient”. I used this measure because SD001 resembles the control
group of quasi-legal-certainty. Moreover, standard deviation of the choices in SD001
resembles the most narrow, yet least arbitrary criterion for the definition as “efficient”.
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The right panel in Figure 4 reveals that the majority of choices in SD001 were efficient
(90.48 %), whereas only a small part was inefficient (9.52 %). By contrast, choices in
SD100 exhibit a drastic reversal: the share of efficient choices is much lower (32.74 %)
than the share of inefficient choices (67.26 %). Based on Fisher’s exact test, I can reject
the null that the proportion of efficient/inefficient choices is equal between SD1 and
SD100 (odds ratio = 0.0518, p < 0.001). Finally, in SD500 only 37.50 % of slider choices
remain efficient, but 62.50 % were inefficient. A Fisher’s exact test leads to a rejection of
the null that the proportions of efficient versus inefficient choices are equal between SD1
and SD500 (odds ratio = 0.0639, p < 0.001). However, a rejection is not possible when
comparing the proportion of choices between SD100 and SD500 (odds ratio = 0.8118,
p = 0.452).
Table 4: Summary of regression analysis
Slider choice “compliant” choice “efficient” choice
Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (OLS) (Probit) (Probit)
SD100 −90.569∗∗ −77.513∗∗∗ −1.028∗∗ −1.723∗∗∗
(39.090) (25.471) (0.437) (0.433)
SD200 −32.092∗∗ −23.502 −1.259∗∗∗ −1.636∗∗∗
(15.105) (17.451) (0.420) (0.439)
SD300 2.215 −2.220 −2.064∗∗∗ −1.810∗∗∗
(20.072) (18.705) (0.407) (0.397)
SD400 18.625 13.175 −1.983∗∗∗ −1.506∗∗∗
(19.126) (22.730) (0.418) (0.381)
SD500 54.775∗∗ 40.497 −2.127∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗
(26.427) (29.187) (0.449) (0.395)
Risk Attitude −19.414∗∗ 0.172∗∗ −0.166∗∗∗
(7.567) (0.068) (0.062)
Loss Aversion −0.030 0.003 0.001
(0.268) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.056 −0.011 −0.015
(2.300) (0.026) (0.021)
Female 15.906 −0.292 0.097
(18.844) (0.204) (0.175)
(Intercept) 485.542∗∗∗ 609.659∗∗∗ 1.378 2.734∗∗∗
(5.711) (84.876) (0.902) (0.730)
Note: Treatment dummies and clustered standard errors (N = 612; 102 clusters).
∗: p < 0.10; ∗∗: p < 0.05; ∗∗∗: p < 0.01.
To analyze these findings in more detail, I estimated treatment effects on compliant and
on efficient choices with two probit models. The two right columns of Table 4 reports the
results. Again, SD100 to SD500 are coded as dummy variables relative to SD001 and risk
attitude, loss aversion, and gender serve as additional control variables. Of the control
variables, only risk attitude has a significant effect: the estimation yields a positive effect
on the probability that a participant was compliant (p < 0.05) and a negative effect on
the probability that a participant made an efficient choice (p < 0.01). Moreover, all
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treatment variables have a strongly significant negative effect on the probability that a
participant made a compliant or an efficient choice. While an overall Wald test cannot
reject the null hypotheses that the negative treatment effect is equal across treatments for
efficient choices (χ2 = 2.1653, p = 0.705), the estimated coefficients are not equal across
treatments for compliant choices (χ2 = 23.2773, p < 0.001). Specifically, the negative
effect is significantly stronger in SD300 compared to SD200 (Wald test: χ2 = 9.6656,
p = 0.002). In fact, all pairwise comparisons that include the step from SD200 to SD300
are also significant on the 1-percent level. SD300, SD400, and SD500 have significantly
stronger negative effects on the probability that a participant makes a compliant choice
than SD100 and SD200.
Result 4 (compliance crowding-out): Relative to SD001 participants in all treat-
ments are less likely to be compliant. This effect is significantly stronger in SD300,
SD400, and SD500 than in SD100 and SD200.
Result 5 (loss of coordination function): All treatments except SD001 (quasi legal
certainty) have a strong negative effect on the probability that a participant chooses
an efficient activity level.
5. Discussion
This paper provides laboratory evidence on the effect of standard vagueness on activity
level choices. I use standard vagueness as but one variation of legal uncertainty. In general,
the observations refute the explicit and implicit notion in doctrinal legal scholarship that
legal uncertainty should be minimized where possible because it stifles socially beneficial
activities (cf.: Trubek, 1972; D’Amato, 1983; Popelier, 2000; Maxeiner, 2007, 2008; Smits,
2012). Although the results clearly show that the participants were sensitive to the
general presence and manipulation of standard vaguess, they do not match the legal
intuition as captured in a framework of reference-dependent preferences. The results
rather support earlier modeling efforts from the economic theory of law (Craswell and
Calfee, 1986).
In the experiment, participants did not consistently choose inefficiently low activity
levels (Result 1). Only initial levels of standard vagueness (SD001, SD100, and SD200)
induced significant overcompliant behavior. Whereas one may expect low standard
vagueness to only cause insignificant overcompliance, overcompliance was much more
pronounced at early vagueness levels. Activity levels dropped quickly when the activity
benchmark became less predictable. Interestingly, statistically meaningful overcompliant
behavior already vanishes in SD300. In fact, at the highest vagueness levels tested in the
lab, participants on average chose activity levels that are inefficiently high (undercompli-
ance), although this observation is weakly non-significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test,
one-sided: V = 134, p = 0.145).
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Moreover, the evidence shows that there are meaningful differences in activitly level
choices between different levels of standard vagueness. In other words, there is some
meaningful dynamic between activity level choices and the degree of standard vagueness
(Result 2). Therefore, being concerned about different degrees of legal uncertainty –
in contrast to treating a fixed level of legal uncertainty as a working hypotheses – is
relevant for finding appropriate legal solutions. To the detriment of individuals and
society, different degrees of legal uncertainty can lead to adverse choices of rule-subjected
persons.
In this regard, the results show that overcompliance does not necessarily increase in
response to increasing standard vagueness. The experiment does not reveal a monotonous
negative relationship between standard vagueness and average activity level choices.
Rather, participants in this study responded non-monotonously to increases in standard
vagueness. As a result, average activity level choices exhibit a U-shape (Result 3). As
participants were not only sensitve to the general presence of standard vagueness, but
differentiated between different vagueness levels and adopt nonmonotonous responses, this
finding suggests that intentionally reducing standard vagueness can result in unintended
adverse consequences and undermine activity levels even further.
Altogether, these results correspond to the idea that increasing legal uncertainty
can have beneficial effects for activity levels (Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Lang, 2014).
Thus the experimental evidence from this study suggests that the doctrinal view is
warranted only when a rule designer confronts a choice between legal certainty and lower
levels of legal uncertainty. Then activity levels on average erode with increasing legal
uncertainty. Counter-intuitive to this view, however, adopting a lower degree of legal
uncertainty may increase overcompliance when legal uncertainty is already substantial.
Conversely, increasing standard vagueness may lead to a socially desirable change in
terms of average activity level choices. Given that reducing legal uncertainty is costly,
these counter-inutitive implications attain even more weight.
In addition, the experimental evidence reveals a further effect that has received little
attention in previous contributions in both doctrinal legal scholarship and the economic
theory of law. The analysis shows that increasing legal uncertainty dramatically decreases
the proportions of compliant and efficient choices (Results 4 and 5). This effect is mainly
driven by the increasing spread of activity choice at higher vagueness levels. These results
suggest that hidden cost of legal uncertainty manifest in increasingly erratic behavior.
Under legal uncertainty, legal rules lose their coordination function. Although intuitive,
to the best of my knowledge the discussion on legal uncertainty has not focused on
this aspect, let alone backed such discussion up by empirical research. The erosion of
the coordination function of the law is relevant because it affects the cost to society
in anticipation of a certain activity level. Such costs include, e.g., the excessive or
insufficient purchase of insurance and other investments to forego harm. Although the
direct results of the experiment refute much of the legal intuition on legal uncertainty, the
crowding-out of compliant and efficient choices reinvigorates the motivation to minimize
legal uncertainty where possible. While the data suggest that an incremental reduction of
standard vagueness from higher to lower levels facilitates compliant choices, stimulating
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efficient choices would require to reduce standard vagueness to quasi legal certainty. This,
however, is a tall order.
6. Applications
Before concluding, some examples and possible applications illustrate where the results
from this study may be relevant. This is no exclusive endeavour, of course. Nevertheless,
each application captures an important area of the law and includes potential changes in
legal uncertainty.
6.1. Liability standards
A wide range of liablilty standards – from simple tort or contractual liability to medical
malpractice to liability of pension fund investors – lend themselves as applications of the
experiment’s results and its underlying theory.17 Negligence liability standards generally
assign liability to actors who did not exert reasonable care. What constitutes “reasonably
prudent” behavior, however, depends on the circumstances. For instance, for medical
doctors the benchmark is a professional negligence standard, i.e., what is reasonable is
defined ex post in court through expert testimony of practitioners in the relevant medical
community. The courts, however, may misperceive what these customary practices
actually are. The additional degree of vagueness of the medical malpractice standard
is inherent in the standard formulation and induced by the timing of clarification. Due
to the high social cost associated with the medical malpractice regime, e.g., defensive
medicine and higher levels of health care spending, the issue of a custom-focused liability
system has been frequently adressed in the context of medical malpractise literature (e.g.:
Frakes, 2015). Physicians who seek to avoid liability under legal uncertainty may choose
to overtreat patients, retreat from novel but promising treatment options, or completely
avoid patients and areas of specialization with a high risk of liability.
A less frequently discussed example outside of ordinary negligence liability concerns
the liability regime for pension fund investors. Following the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act (U.P.I.A.), U.S. states have gradually chosen to reformulate the governing liability
standard from a prudent-man rule to a prudent-investor rule. The former standard favored
relatively safe investments, e.g., in government bonds, and, simultaneously, disfavored
speculative investments, e.g., in company stocks. Extensively investing into such safe
options can be considered as overcompliant, if the overall portfolio performance suffers.
By contrast, the prudent-investor rule allows fiduciaries to utilize modern portfolio theory
to guide investment decisions. Moreover, under the prudent-man rule courts assessed
the prudence of each investment in isolation. The prudent-investor rule, by contrast,
assesses prudence in the context of the entire portfolio. The new rule further applies to
17 Note that changes in different liability regimes involve potential change on two dimensions: the
location of the legal standard and its vagueness level. While the examples here reflect changes in both
dimensions, the focus is on the latter dimension. Given a degree of standard vagueness, the influence
of changes in the location of the standard is a possible venue for future research.
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the decision-making process, very similar to the business judgment rule that determines
the liability of managers. In brief, the specific outcome of an investment decision shall
not matter for determining the liability of pension fund investors. Therefore, under the
old rule uncertainty about a judge’s evaluation was to a degree multiplicative such that
vagueness of the overall assessment was higher. The adoption of the prudent-investor
rule can thus be seen as a move towards legal certainty. Interestingly, in their analysis
of pension fund portfolio composition over time Schanzenbach and Sitkoff (2007) find
that after adoption of the prudent-investor rule, portfolio composition changed in favor
of stock and at the expense of low-risk alternatives. In light of the results from the
experiment, the findings of Schanzenbach and Sitkoff (2007) can be interpreted as a
reduction of overcompliance.
6.2. Copyright exceptions: catch all vs. numerus clausus
A fundamental purpose of copyright law is to balance the property interest of right
holders on the one hand and, on the other hand, the private interest to further use
copyrighted works or the public’s interest in open access. One can distingiush two
regulatory approaches that attempt to strike this balance. One approach, typically found
in Common Law jurisdictions, contrasts a truly comprehensive and exclusive copyright
with one open general clause that permits limited use of copyrighted works without
acquiring permission from the rights holders, if certain conditions are met. An example of
this “catch all” approach is the fair use doctrine in U.S. copyright law (17 U.S.C., § 107).
The other approach, traditionally used in continental Europe’s Civil law jurisdictions,
uses an exclusive catalogue of exceptions to limit the comprehensive copyright. An
example of this “numerus clausus” approach can be found in German copyright law (§§
44a - 63a UrhG).
The choice between these approaches has consequences for copyright reality. Techno-
logical innovation rapidly changes the social and economic environment that copyright
law – and in broader strokes also other forms of intellectual property law – seeks to
govern (Depoorter, 2009). In this context, the numerus clausus system casts specific
exceptions into black letter law and thus reduces legal uncertainty both for users and
owners of copyrighted works. However, the system is less adaptive because adaptation
requires the regulator to act. Legal certainty is quite costly if socially beneficial uses that
were facilitated through technological innovation cannot be pursued without infringing
the law.
By contrast, the catch all system allows – at least on the surface – for more rapid
adaptation to technological innovation. This, however, comes at the price of vague
principles and unclear guidelines in precedents. Consider, for instance, the decision in
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed a
decision by a federal judge, who earlier found that a specific sampling of copyrighted
music was not in violation of copyright law. The decision by the Court of Appeals
effectively merged the previous de minimis doctrine with substantiality requirement of
the fair use doctrine. Now the use of music samples can be considered fair use as long
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as it does not rise “to a level of legally cognizable appropriation”18. Otherwise, music
samples have to be licensed.
The degree of vagueness between the two systems clearly differs. I do not contend that
legal uncertainty is absent in the numerus clausus system. While the continental European
system is characterized by rather low degrees, however, the Common Law approach
involves higher degrees of legal uncertainty due to the use of a general clause to govern
all observable behavior. Therefore, one may expect substantial overcompliance under the
continental European approach and lower overcompliance if not undercompliance under
the U.S. system.
6.3. Competition law: resale price maintenance & product bundling
Other possible applications pertain to competition law. Calfee and Craswell (1984, p.
968) note that “it is diffcult to predict [...] how an antitrust court will distinguish between
‘predatory’ and ‘competitive’ price cuts”. Lang (2014) motivates his economic analysis of
the effects of legal uncertainty with two intriguing examples. First, Art. 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) generally prohibits vertical restrains
like, e.g., resale price maintenance or exclusive dealing agreements. However, there is also
a presumption of legality for vertical agreements that is applied depending on the market
share of the parties of the vertical agreement: the block exemption applies if the supplier’s
and the buyer’s market share is 30% or less.19 Although the EC provided guidelines
on how the market shares of the parties are to be determined,20 Lang (2014) proposes
that discrepancies in the defnition of the relevant market, information asymmetries,
measurement inaccuracies, and other factors may make it extremely difficult to correctly
predict the market share as determined by the competition authorities. For instance, if
two parties to a vertical restraint agreement have an objective market share of 27% and
would qualify to the block exemption, there is a remaining chance of a false negative so
that the agreement would be found to be in violation with competition law.
As a second example, consider product bundling and specifically the recent and widely
discussed Microsoft cases.21 Microsoft had progressively produced and added to the
Windows operating system a number of applications, most notably the Internet Explorer
and Windows Media Player. Microsoft’s policy of integrating new functionalities to the
Windows operating system has been challenged by both the U.S. and the European
antitrust authorities. It certainly is not easy to decide when product bundling or tying is
socially beneficial or harmful for competition. When product bundles have mixed effects,
it is even more complicated to determine which effect outweighs the other. And by
18 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) at p. 841.
19 See Artt. 2 and 3 of Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application
of Article 101 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical
agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 102/1.
20 See Section V of the EC Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C), OJ C 130/1.
21 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft; Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft (Tying), OJ 2013 C 120/15;
Judgment T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
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extension, it is hardly possible to predict an authority’s or court’s decision. Interestingly,
the EU case(s) and the U.S. case had opposite final resolutions. While in Europe the
European Commission required Microsoft to pay substantial fines, the U.S. Department
of Justice did not pursue the bundling aspect of the case after a peaceful settlement.
6.4. International tax law
A final related application concerns the enforcement of anti-abuse rules in international
tax law. In recent years the growing number of “tax inversions” have raised concern
over the future of U.S. tax policy. Tax inversion entails that a company acquires another
firm abroad. Afterwards, the company effectively moves its residency abroad in order to
replace the American tax treatment with lower effective tax rates in the other country.
This practice is tied to multiple restrictions with respect to the use of extraterritorial
earnings. Extraterritorial earnings remain subject to the foreign tax regime, as long
as they stay in the accounts of the foreign subsidiary. While this inevitably leads to
a vast amount of stranded capital – the earnings held in foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
multi-nationals are estimated at approximately two trillion dollars (cf. Talley, 2015),
which could be invested at profit – it also exposes large proportions of a firm’s earnings
to undesirable risks from exchange rate volatility, changes in the interest rate, political
risk, etc.
Intercompany loans between subsidiary and parent company, however, facilitate cir-
cumventing the law and using the subsidiary’s assets. This practise is heavily regulated.
Loans cannot remain outstanding after the end of a financial quarter, unless the debt is
satisfied within 30 days of the time at which is incurred. The loopholes in regulation
are used frequently and can only be interrupted at the IRS’s discretion through the use
of anti-abuse rules (Talley, 2015). According to these vague standards, IRS officals can
declare as abusive intercompany loan schemes although they (seem to) comply with tax
law. As a consequence IRS officals can induce taxation of the asset in question. Note
that this example, in light of the data, is very intriguing as it offers a scenario of high
vagueness coupled with large reported incidents of undercompliance.
7. Conclusion
This study has experimentally tested different notions of how legal uncertainty ifluences
decision making of person’s under a vague standard. Doctrinal legal scholarship embraces
the notion that legal uncertainty inhibits socially beneficial activities in the sense that
there is a monotonous relation between legal uncertainty and the extent to which these
activities are stifled. By contrast, previous theoretical research in law and economics
posits that under specific circumstances increasing legal uncertainty may – after a tipping
point – promote activity levels and, thus, reduce inefficient overcompliance. This theoretic
result suggests that legal uncertainty may be socially beneficial.
To resolve the conflict between these positions, this study employed vague legal
standards to bring legal uncertainty to the laboratory. The treatments varied the degree
27
of vagueness of an activity threshhold that determined participants’ payoffs. Interestingly,
the evidence shows that lower degrees of vagueness lead to inefficiently low activity levels.
However, average observed activity levels under higher degrees of vagueness are not
significantly different from the social optimum. Participants in the experiment clearly
responded in a differentiated and non-monotonic manner to increasing vagueness levels.
This finding supports previous theoretical results but runs contrary to the legal intuition
about legal uncertainty.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the data also uncover a hidden cost of increasing standard
vagueness. Although the aggregate activity levels converge back on the social optimum for
higher vagueness levels tested in the lab, individual activity choices become more erratic
with increasing vagueness. The participants were predominantly compliant at the socially
optimal activity level under quasi legal certainty. Under high vagueness levels, however,
I observe a near 50-50 split between overcompliance and undercompliance. Moreover,
even low vagueness levels lead to predominantly inefficient choices. Thus, while aggregate
activity levels are comparable, increasing vagueness erodes the coordination function of
the activity threshold that was employed in the lab to reflect a legal standard. This is
concerning because the data does not suggest learning effects in the sample.
This study only scratched the tip of the iceberg. The present results are mere
foundations for the future work that needs to be done. An interesting extension is if
and how other possible gain/loss framing effects interact with different degrees of legal
uncertainty. Another interesting avenue for further research is to explore the interaction
of legal uncertainty with social preferences. This study conscioulsy avoided these two
aspects to establish a clean baseline. Finally, interesting effects may loom when the legal
standard is certain, but consequences are vague. Yet, many more questions remain.
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Appendix A.
As robustness check, I have simulated the optimal responses x∗i (σ), i ∈ {RN, RA, KR},
when xL is not normally but uniformly distributed around the socially optimal level xS .
To incorporate the notion of standard vagueness, I define xL ∼ U(xS−1.25σ, xS +1.25σ).
Figure 5 depicts the results. The emerging pattern shows defining features comparable
with the pattern under a normal distribution. Therefore, the predictions would not
change qualitatively if the legal threshold was uniformly distributed.
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, where u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0 (Craswell and Calfee, 1986,
p. 300). Reverse-engineering an expected utility expression with a complete probability














































































for x > xL (violation)
.
The crucial difference between the utility functions uRA(·) in expression (5) and uCC(·)
lies in how a person evaluates outcomes of choices that are potentially violating the
legal standard (x > xL). Under uRA(·) a person first computes final wealth and then




for x > xL. Conversely, under uCC(·) a person separates these different payoff streams









for x > xL. This difference concerns a crucial assumption about how
a person edits or codes lottery outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1985;
Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin, 1999). The hedonic consequences of the decision then
depend on which editing procedure is used (cf.: Wakker, 2010, p. 235-236).
The assumption of asset isolation implicitly found its way into Craswell and Calfee
(1986)’s analysis and has substantial consequences for predictions about a person’s choices
under vague standards. Differentiating expression (10) with respect to x and evaluating



















) ] u′(b(xS)) b′(xS)− F ′(xS) u(e(xS)). (11)
Note that the marginal benefits of increasing x are not only discounted by the prob-




















































, i.e., the local rate at which a person is willing to compensate for the negative
externality of activity x in exchange for receiving the private benefits of said activity
while maintaining the same level of total utility. If θ > 1, then 1− F (xS) θ < 1− F (xS).
With risk aversion and asset isolation as in (11), marginal benefits of increasing x are
discounted more than with risk aversion and asset integration in (6). Therefore, iff θ > 1
the first term of expression (11) is smaller than the first term in expression (6). This case
creates a stronger tendency to choose x∗ > xS (undercompliance). By contrast, iff θ < 1
then 1− F (xS) θ > 1− F (xS), i.e., marginal utility of increasing x would be discounted
less under asset isolation. Therefore, iff θ < 1 the first term of expression (11) is larger
than the first term in expression (6). This case creates a stronger tendency to choose
x∗ < xs (overcompliance). Altogether, a person that edits outcomes according to asset
isolation is more likely to deviate from xS when the legal standard somewhat random.
To illustrate the stark contrast caused by assuming asset isolation in lieu of asset
integration, I simulate the distinctive response function x∗CC(σ) (asset isolation) and
compare it to x∗RA(σ) (asset integration) in Figure 6. Instead of a transition from
overcompliance at lower degrees of vagueness to undercompliance at higher degrees of
vagueness, x∗CC(σ) exhibits a rapid drop over the entire range of σ so that x∗CC(σ) <
x∗RA(σ). This pattern signifies extensive overcompliance. That is, assuming asset isolation
in addition to risk aversion also supports the legal scholarship view on legal uncertainty.
Appendix C.
For the generation of the hypotheses, for the simulation of the different response functions,
and for the payoff structure in the experiment, the following specifications for b(x) and
e(x) hold:
b(x) = 50 ln(x)
e(x) = 0.1x
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These specifications come from Craswell and Calfee (1986)’s first example (Craswell and
Calfee, 1986, p. 284).
As functional form capturing absolute utility components, I use an utility function with
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA); specifically, an utility function from the power
family u(w) = wr. Utility functions of this form have been widely used for modeling risk
aversion, both in economics and psychology, and often better fit empirical results than
alternative functional forms (Wakker, 2008). I parametrized the curvature parameter
with r = 0.48 in accordance with the recent estimate of Gneezy, Imas, and List (2015).
I prefer the estimate from this elicitation mechanism because risk attitude is domain
specific and Gneezy, Imas, and List (2015)’s elicitation is based on lottery choices similar
to the experiment. Moreover, in the experiment I use a similar elicitation procedure to
estimate and control for risk preferences.
Moreover, I parametrize loss aversion with λ = 2.61 in acoordance with the estimation
of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon (2008, p. 258). Their elicitation method strikes
a balance between non-parametric measurements and susceptibility to response error and
provides an advantage in measurement efficiency. Moreover, the elicitiation mechanism
uses only those parametric assumptions that are widely supported in the literature, i.e.,
the power specification for utility that I also used to model the curvature of the utility
functions. The method is also perceived to be easier than other methods and minimizes
cognitive burden for participants which leads to high reliablity. Finally, the method is
robust because elicited measurements do not depend on specific probability values. In
this regard, the measurements are unconfounded. Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and L’Haridon
(2008) also found no gender effect in the estimation of loss aversion with their procedure.
Note finally that I did not find a fundamental change in the prediction pattern that




The following figure contains an example of a participants decision screen in treatment
SD100. The screen shows the pure payoff function b(x) from the chosen activity level,
the reduced payoff function b(x) − e(x), and a cumulative distribution function that
determines the probability of exceeding the randomly determined activity benchmark.
On this screen, the slider position is set to 762. The screen conveniently depicts potential
payoffs in ECU with their corresponding probabilities for this slider position. Because
people are commonly found to struggle with the meaning of specific probabilities, the pie
chart next to the payoffs makes more salient the meaning of the probabilities.
Figure 7: Sample Screen of the Decision Screen in the Experiment
Referee Appendix (not intended for publication).
This referee appendix is not supposed to be published. It is intended to facilitate tracing
the formal analysis in the paper. Thus the referee appendix supports refereeing the paper
by providing a clear step-by-step computation of the mathematical expressions used in
the paper.
I. Details for Section 2.1






















b(x) + F (x) b(x)− F (x) e(x)













F ′(x) e(x) + F (x) e′(x)
]
= b′(x)− F ′(x) e(x)− F (x) e′(x).
Using the condition b′(x) = e′(x) when evaluating the agents incentives at the socially













b′(xS)− F ′(xS) e(xS).
This expression corresponds to (4) in the main text.
II. Details for Section 2.2












































































When plugging in condition b′(x) = e′(x) to evaluate a person’s incentives at the socially





















































as the third term becomes zero. This is expression (6) in the main text.
III. Details for Section 2.3
If a court finds x 6 xL, the agent receives b(x) as final wealth. The alternative outcome
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This expression corresponds to the case x 6 xL in expression (8). Inuitively, a person
derives absolute utility from obtaining income b(x) and from a gain of e(x) compared to
the alternative outcome rx>xL = b(x)− e(x) that is discounted by its likelihood.
If a court finds x > xL, the agent receives b(x)− e(x) as final wealth. The alternative


























































This expression corresponds to the case x > xL in expression (8). Inuitively, a person
derives absolute utility from obtaining income b(x) − e(x) and from a loss of e(x)
compared to the alternative outcome rx6xL = b(x) that is discounted by its likelihood






































































































































































































































































































































































Evaluating a person’s incentives at the socially optimal level xS and plugging in b′(x) =



















































Regulatory practitioners realize the social function of the law by associating legal
consequences with predefined individual behavior. Traditional legal reasoning involves a
specific directionality of cause and effect of behavior A and legal consequence L, namely:
A :−→ L
If an individual chooses action A, then this behavior is responsible for the legal consequence
L. This form of causal legal reasoning can be found in any rule that establishes either a
legal claim or a legal obligation.
Landsburg (2012, p. 3) aptly and provocatively noted: “Most of economics can be
summarized in four words: ‘People respond to incentives.’ The rest is commentary.” While
economists take this principle viciously serious, in the context of the law the principle
helps understanding that we may have the directionality of cause and effect mixed up.
Causality between legal consequence L and behavior A appears to run as follows:
L :−→ ¬A
From an economic perspective, the legal consequence that we implement with functional
legal rules will be responsible for an individual not choosing action A. As the law sets a
price for a certain action, this action is less preferable. Thus the law influences individual
choice. This reversed directionality of reasoning is what economic theory of the law,
ultimately, is all about.
But how do we get the legal consequence right? In the recent past legal economists
have been contend with the law creating incentives for efficient behavior (such that A does
not occur). For the past 30 or so years, however, psychology has had and continues to
have an astonishing impact on economic reasoning. Modern behavioral and experimental
economists understand that individual choices are extremely sensitive to formulation,
context, and procedure. This sensitivity results from what behavioral economists call
reference-dependent choice. Then, clearly, “the effects of incentives depend on how they
are designed [...]” (Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-Biel, 2011, p. 206). This added complexity
about how persons behave emphasizes important aspects of the law that have not been
satisfactorily treated in legal scholarship. Legal rules can be formulated in various ways,
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they create context, and they establish procedures. And most often, you and me respond
to these subtle differences. In short: legal framing matters.
These three words summarize the overarching proposition of the preceding text and
its underlying research. Of course, I could not comprehensively analyse the notion of
legal framing, its varieties, and its consequences. In this contribution, the application of
the idea of legal framing to specific areas, the theory of how contextuality plays out, the
experimental testing of that theory, and the observed results can merely exemplify the
overarching proposition.
Nevertheless, the results from the laboratory and the field show that four payoff-
equivalent legal mechanisms – “bonus”, “fine”, “upfront payment”, and “deposit” –
have a substantial impact on the degree of compliance/performance of rule-subjected
individuals. I found consistent and strong evidence that participants under the “upfront
payment” mechanism on average perform best, whereas participants under the “deposit”
mechanism on average perform worst. Minor performance differences between participants
under the “bonus” and “fine” mechanisms have not been statistically meaningful. These
results overall emphasize that rule designers – for contract or statute – need to account
for legal framing if they want to strengthen commitment to contract performance or
rule compliance. In this way, behavioral insights should be integrated in standard legal
arguments when we reason about which incentive mechanism to employ for a specific
(legal) problem. I could not identify the psychological processes behind the observed
performance pattern, however. One may argue that for the exercise of institutional
design, the identification of the driving factors may not be important. The important
result seems to be that the manipulation worked. Not knowing how it worked may be
disappointing for an experimenter’s passion for causal interference, but not for regulatory
practice. Ignorance about how legal rules are to be decomposed into a combination
of definable isolated effects may, however, cause adverse unintended consequences and,
ultimately, a well-intended institutional change may backfire. To this end, I advise
caution of blindly relying solely on the main result of any experimental study.
I have further extended the application of legal framing beyond questions of (implicit)
contract design. Broadening the scope illustrated that reference-dependent decision
making may matter for other aspects crucial to legal scholarship such as legal uncertainty.
Legal uncertainty, here, may be a variable that influences an individual’s perception of
context. Interestingly, I could theoretically show in an economic model that reference-
dependent decision-making under a vague legal standard provides very sound reasons
for our urge to minimize legal uncertainty. Standard models, by contrast, often argue
that legal uncertainty may be unexpectedly beneficial. In an experiment that brings
legal uncertainty to the laboratory, I uncover that participants, who make decisions
under vague standards, decide according to predictions of standard theory. This result is
important not only for legal reasoning about legal uncertainty but also for the notion of
legal framing central to this research project. Whereas legal contextualisation mattered
very much for performance under different contract structures, legal contextualisation
did not matter for decisions under vague legal standards. Apparently, when a decision is
sensitive to context depends on other variables. If we seek to employ the power or curb
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adverse consequences of legal framing in regulatory practice, future research needs to
focus on when context determines a person’s behavior.
Related to questions relevant for future research, the experimental evidence indicates
a couple of secondary findings that are important to understand how the contextuality of
legal rules determines their effectiveness. For one, I find evidence for motivation crowding-
out (Chapter V). In the laboratory experiment on contract structures, participants
under the “deposit” mechanism performed worse than participants without any incentive
component. Employing the “deposit” rule clearly backfired compared to the other three
mechanisms. We need a better understanding of why this result occurred. The result may
be a mere artifact from the experiment. However, the result may also have a systematic
nature. If the latter was true, we would need to understand the psychological processes
behind the systematic result. Eventually, we may need to rethink our use of deposit
mechanisms in any given legal area.
For another, I observed that performance incentives distort choices concerning other
task dimensions (Chapter IV). Whereas in the field experiment all contract structures
increased performance on the monitored task dimension, effort on other task dimensions
decreased. If systematic, this result is alarming. Think about medical malpractice
liability. The medical malpractice standard is usually based on customary practices for
certain procedures in the relevant medical community. As compliance incentives increase
effort on the monitored task dimension, we may expect increased medical care for certain
procedures. However, doctors may evade the performance incentive by conducting less
procedures. This kind of second-order crowding out needs to be better understood if we
do not want socially beneficial institutions to backfire.
To sum up, we learn that legal framing matters. On these grounds, legal practitioners
and scholars alike may want to start considering the implications of the formulation
of an institution, its context, and the procedure by which it came about or that it
creates. We also want to better understand the drivers and possibly other intervening
effects such as motivation crowding-out and second-order crowding-out on other task
dimensions. Methodologically, the project helps updating the understanding of modern
economic theory of law by introducing a more realistic economic paradigm. Moreover, the
three studies exemplify that experimental methodology can fruitfully be used to answer
questions pertaining to legal scholarship. The results of the present project are only the
tip of the iceberg, however. Therefore, we also learn that more research needs to be done
in this area to reliably inform legal scholarship and legal as well as regulatory practice.
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